


Eksistenz



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Hermeneutik und Technik

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Vorwort der Herausgeber

Der Schwerpunkt dieser Ausgabe von *Eksistenz* ist das Verhältnis von Hermeneutik und Technik. Aufgerufen haben wir dazu, Beiträge einzureichen, die aus der Tradition der Hermeneutik stammen oder sich in hermeneutischer Manier mit Themen der Technik auseinandersetzen. Wir sind sehr dankbar für die Beiträge, die wir bekommen haben. Harald Seubert, der Präsident der Heidegger-Gesellschaft eröffnet dankenswerterweise diese Ausgabe mit einem Beitrag über „Heideggers Frage nach der Technik, das digitale Zeitalter und die Möglichkeit des Denkens.“ Wir möchten Herrn Seubert für seine philosophische Arbeit, das Werk und die Anleitung danken, die für uns und für unzählige andere in der Welt zum Vorbild wurde. Herr Seubert ist für den philosophischen Nachwuchs (so benannt nach den „Heidegger-Nachwuchstagungen“) als Lehrer von unschätzbarem Wert. Er ist auch einer der wenigen Philosophen, die sich die Technik für die Lehre nutzbar zu machen wissen. Es darf erwähnt werden, dass Herr Seubert im Internet zahlreiche kurze Videos zu verschiedenen Philosophen veröffentlicht hat, die allen geeigneten Lesern hiermit anempfohlen sind.

Dank gebührt auch den anderen Autoren, die in der Reihenfolge dieser Ausgabe genannt werden dürfen. Obwohl Zhang Zhiwei in seinem Aufsatz nicht direkt die Technik behandelt, ist das von ihm behandelte Problem des Nihilismus eng mit der modernen Technik verbunden. Heidegger sieht im Aufstieg und der Entwicklung der modernen Technik eine Form des Nihilismus, die die zweitausendjährige Entwicklung der westlichen Metaphysik begleitet hat und sich in ihrem Ende offenbart. Der Aufsatz von Herrn Zhang Zhiwei basiert auf seinem Vortrag im Jahr 2023 an der Yuelu-Akademie und ist das Ergebnis seiner langjährigen tiefgehenden und umfassenden Auseinandersetzung mit Heideggers Philosophie. Freya Häberlein präsentiert in ihrem Beitrag zur interkulturellen Technikphilosophie eine Überlegung zur Ambivalenz des Tragischen, die für die Hermeneutik der Technik von großer Bedeutung ist. Wang Hongjian hat einen Artikel von Franco Volpi, Kenner der antiken griechischen sowie Heideggers Philosophie, ins Chinesische übersetzt. Volpis Interpretationen sind für die praktische Philosophie und den Begriff der *phronesis* von großem

Wert und sollen deshalb der chinesischen Leserschaft zugänglich(er) gemacht werden. Zuletzt sei Jure Zovko bedankt, der einen Artikel zum Verhältnis von Techné und Hermeneutik geschrieben hat im Kontext der Platonischen Philosophie. Herr Zovko, ein kroatisch-europäischer Philosoph, ist auch in China bekannt als Kenner (wir versuchen das Wort „Experte“ zu vermeiden) der Kantischen und Hegelschen Philosophie; er selbst hat jahrelang in Freiburg studiert, wo er in Berührung kam mit dem Denken Heideggers und Gadamers.

Neben den Artikeln zum Schwerpunkt veröffentlichen wir in dieser Ausgabe eine Rezension des neuen Buches des berühmten chinesischen Philosophen Sun Zhouxing, ein Interview mit dem irischen Philosophen Conor Cunningham, eine Übersetzung des leider kürzlich verstorbenen berühmten deutschen Heidegger-Forschers Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, der diese Zeitschrift seit ihrer Gründung tatkräftig unterstützt hat sowie einen Artikel zu Diltheys Hermeneutik von Shao Hua, der nicht ganz zum Schwerpunkt passt, aber doch zur Idee und Vorhaben dieser Zeitschrift, die sich der Hermeneutik und insbesondere der Philosophie Diltheys verpflichtet sieht. Um Diltheys wertvolle Ideen zu verbreiten, veröffentlichen wir auch gerne in der Zukunft Artikel, die sich mit Diltheys Werk beschäftigen. Wir freuen uns, wenn Sie uns auch weiterhin Ihre Artikel zur Begutachtung schicken.

Wir freuen uns über das stetige Gedeihen und Wachsen unserer Zeitschrift Eksistenz! Die nächsten Ausgaben sind bereits in Planung und die nächsten Call for Papers werden zeitnah bekanntgegeben. Weiterhin werden wir versuchen, dem interkulturellen und philosophischen Austausch zwischen „dem Westen“ und China zu fördern. Herrn Wang Zhaonong und Herrn Zheng Junze wird für ihre Mitarbeit bei der Redaktion und Korrektur der chinesischen Beiträge in dieser Ausgabe herzlich gedankt. Wir bedanken uns bei der uns geneigten Leserschaft, bei den Autoren, bei den Mitgliedern unseres wissenschaftlichen Beirats und ganz besonders bei unserem Verleger und Herausgeber Wolfgang Sohst, dem Leiter des Berliner Xenomoi Verlags in Deutschland.

Karl KRAATZ, Hongjian WANG, Jinliang ZHU
September 2024

Harald Seubert

Heideggers Frage nach der Technik, das digitale Zeitalter und die Möglichkeit des Denkens

Zusammenfassung: Der Text behandelt die Philosophie Martin Heideggers, insbesondere seine Ansichten zur Technik. Heidegger argumentiert, dass Philosophie die Essenz ihrer Zeit widerspiegeln sollte, indem sie zeitgenössische Phänomene diagnostiziert, um tiefere Bedeutungen aufzudecken. Heideggers Kritik an der Technik ist nicht bloß technikkritisch, sondern befasst sich mit den metaphysischen Grundlagen und Voraussetzungen des „Wesens der Technik“. Im Gegensatz zu anderen Philosophen, die Aspekte wie Entfremdung (Adorno, Frankfurter Schule) oder die Veraltung des Menschen (Günther Anders) betonen, geht Heidegger tiefer und behauptet, dass das Wesen der Technik nicht technisch, sondern ein metaphysisches-seinsgeschichtliches Geschehen ist. Heidegger sieht die Technik als den Höhepunkt der Metaphysik, wo der „Wille zur Macht“ zu einem selbstverstärkenden „Willen zum Willen“ wird, was zur Verdeckung der Offenheit des Seins führt. Der Text untersucht Heideggers Konzept des „Gestells“, das beschreibt, wie die Technik das moderne Leben formt und dominiert, sowie seine Kritik an der Reduktion des Denkens auf bloße Berechnung in der Kybernetik. Heideggers Philosophie wird mit Husserls Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und der Notwendigkeit verglichen, dass Philosophie die fundamentalen Fragen der Existenz ansprechen muss. Der Text schließt mit der Betonung der Relevanz von Heideggers Denken im Kontext der heutigen technologischen Entwicklungen und der Notwendigkeit, dass Philosophie diese Fragen kritisch angeht.

Abstract: This paper discusses the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, particularly his views on technology. Heidegger argues that philosophy should reflect the essence of its time, diagnosing contemporary phenomena to uncover deeper meanings. Heidegger's critique of technology is not merely about technological criticism but about the metaphysical foundations and presuppositions of the „essence of technology.“ Unlike other philosophers who focus on aspects such as alienation (Adorno, Frankfurt School) or the obsolescence of humanity (Günther Anders), Heidegger delves deeper, asserting that the essence of technology is not technological but a metaphysical-historical event. Heidegger sees technology as the culmination of metaphysics, where the „will to power“ becomes a self-perpetuating „will to will,“ leading to the closure of the openness of Being. The text also explores Heidegger's concept of the „Gestell“ (enframing), which describes how technology shapes and dominates modern life, and his critique of the reduction of

thinking to mere calculation in cybernetics. Heidegger's philosophy is compared to Husserl's crisis of modern civilization and the need for philosophy to address the fundamental questions of existence. The text concludes by emphasizing the relevance of Heidegger's thought in the context of contemporary technological developments and the need for philosophy to engage with these issues critically.

摘要：本文讨论的是海德格爾的技术观。海德格爾认为，哲学应反映其时代的本质，通过诊断当代现象来揭示更深层次的意义。海德格爾对技术的批评不仅仅是技术批评式的，而是关注“技术之本质”的形而上学基础和前提。与其他哲学家不同——他们强调异化（阿多諾，法兰克福学派）或人类的过时（君特·安德斯），海德格爾的探讨更为深入，他主张技术的本质不是技术事件，而是一种形而上学 - 存在历史的事件。海德格爾认为技术是形而上学的顶峰，“权力意志”变成了自我强化着的“求意志的意志”，从而导致存在的开放性被封闭。本文探讨了海德格爾的“集置”（*Gestell*）概念，描述了技术如何塑造和主导现代生活，以及他对控制论中思想被简化为纯粹计算的批评。作者将海德格爾的哲学与胡塞尔关于欧洲科学的危机的论述相对照，强调哲学必须呼应实存的基本问题。本文最后强调了海德格爾思想在当代技术发展背景下的重要性，以及哲学必须批判性地应对这些问题。

Keywords: Martin Heidegger, Technik, Hermeneutik

I

Große Philosophie sagt, was in ihrer Zeit vorgeht. Sie sagt, was ist: mit einem diagnostischen Blick, der in den Oberflächenphänomenen die Tiefensemantik und in der Tiefe wiederum den Vordergrund erfasst. Dies tat schon Platon im Gegenüber zur Sophistik und den Deformationen der attischen Demokratie seiner Zeit, und es blieb wesentlicher Bestandteil einer philosophisch betätigten Urteilskraft in der Neuzeit, zwischen Rousseau und Nietzsche, die Konturen der eigenen Zeit im Denken zu fassen, bzw. das eigene Denken im Licht dieser Konturen zu schärfen. Wenn – zu Recht – beklagt wird, dass Philosophie sich in einer Zeit der massiven Umbrüche, wie sie am Anfang des 21. Jahrhunderts sich abzeichnen, in innerakademischen Diskussionen und einer Sonderwelt verkriechen und kaum Essentielles zu den existenziellen Fragen beizutragen habe, so ist

dies nicht ein Anwendungsproblem. Es ist vielmehr ein grundlegendes Problem. Auch dieser Engpass kann im Blick auf Heidegger korrigiert werden.

Heideggers Denken der Technik sollte zunächst in dieser Unbestimmtheit und zugleich konzisen Form festgehalten werden: Dabei geht es vor jeder Spezifizierung in eine Technikphilosophie primär um eine Fragebewegung, die ohne das ekzentrische Zentrum seines Fragens, die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein und dem menschlichen Dasein nicht verstanden werden kann. Der unvergessene Walter Biemel, Zeitzeuge erster Stunden und Zeuge von Heideggers Freiburger Vorlesungen in den vierziger Jahren, explizierte einmal, dass es bei Heidegger gerade nicht um Technikkritik gehe, sondern um die metaphysischen Grundlegungen und Voraussetzungen des „Wesens der Technik“. Dies ist eine der fundamentalen Unterscheidungen zwischen Heideggers und anderen prominent gewordenen Technikphilosophien seit der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Gewiss, diese können manche Aspekte beleuchten, die Heideggers umfassender auf eine Art Metaphysik der Metaphysik der Technik gerichteter Blick als indifferent und vorläufig übergehen würde: Das Phänomen der Entfremdung (Adorno, Frankfurter Schule), die anthropologische Problematik der „Antiquiertheit des Menschen“ (Günther Anders) oder Walter Benjamins prominenten Fokus auf das „Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit“.

Heidegger fragt anders und tiefer. Er zeigt, dass das Wesen der Technik nichts Technisches, sondern ein metaphysisch-seinsgeschichtliches Geschehen ist. Er bleibt auch bei der Klärung der Frage nach der Technik der einen bestimmenden Frage nach dem Sein auf der Spur. Aus diesem Horizont würden die genannten technikphilosophischen Fragerichtungen im Bereich des Ontischen, Vorontologischen bleiben. Heidegger vertraut demgegenüber mit provozierender Konzentration und Ausschließlichkeit der ohnmächtigen Mächtigkeit denkerischen Fragens. Er nimmt, ganz entgegen den disziplinären Zuordnungen nicht explizite Anleihen bei einzelnen Wissenschaften, die die Technik kanalisieren und deuten (so sehr er auch seinerzeit Kybernetik und Atomphysik sich aneignete: C.F. v. Weizsäcker zeigte sich davon stets beeindruckt). Vielmehr fasst er die Technik als letzte und tiefreichendste Grundform der Seinsgeschichte, genauer: als

Endpunkt der Seinsvergessenheit, mit der die entbergenden und verbergenden Möglichkeiten der Metaphysik an ihr Ende gekommen sind.

Die Artikulation jenes Endes ist in den *Beiträgen zur Philosophie* (GA 65) unter der Rubrik der „Anklang“ verhandelt. Machenschaft und Riesenhaftigkeit, vor allem aber „das Gestell“ sind die Prägungen, in denen die moderne Technik begegnet, eine Technik, die keine Grenzen mehr kennt und tatsächlich ins Planetarisch-Interstellare ausgreift. Seit den frühen fünfziger Jahren konnte diese Bestimmung in eine Zeit treffen, die von der Technologie neuer Waffensysteme geprägt war, Hiroshima und Nagasaki, dem Brüsseler Atommodell und dem Wasserkraftwerk, das nicht mehr wie die alteuropäische Holzbrücke in eine Landschaft eingebaut ist; vielmehr ist, wie Heidegger erkannte, die Landschaft in das Kraftwerk eingelassen. Sie wird zum Lieferanten von Wärme und Energie. Sie ist „gestellt“, „zugestellt“, „umstellt“ in einer Weise, die den Zeug- und Dienlichkeitscharakter nicht mehr erkennen lässt.

Den freien Figurationen von Denken und Dichten ist in der kybernetischen Ordnung eine Matrix vorgegeben, die auch die menschlichen Selbstverständigungen der Matrix des technischen ‚Gestells‘ folgen lässt.

Ihre Evidenz prima facie hat Heideggers Rede vom „Gestell“ als dem Grundcharakter der neuzeitlichen Technik in dem Phänomen, dass sich keine Natur und keine Lebenswelt mehr diesseits der Kreisläufe der Technik fixieren lässt.

Mit Nietzsche und gegen ihn verstand Heidegger die neuzeitliche Technik als die letzte Konstellation der Metaphysik als Äußerung des „Willens zur Macht – nichts außerdem“, der im letzten ein hermetisch in und um sich kreisender „Wille zum Willen“ werde: Eine In-Sich-Verkrümmtheit und Selbstwiederholung, die letztlich nur noch sich selbst herstellt, in sich wiederholenden Endlosschleifen. Mit diesem Gedanken gewinnt Heidegger offensichtlich eine meist übersehene frappante Nähe zu Walter Benjamins Analyse der technischen Kreisläufe, der Technik als unabschließbarem Reproduktionsmechanismus bis in die technische Reproduzierbarkeit der Kunst, aus der als Gegenbild das Motiv der Lanthanonen sich abhebt, der im Verborgenen Lebenden, das Benjamin ebenso bei allen Divergenzen und Differenzen mit Heidegger erstaunlicherweise teilt.

Im Willen zum Willen „verendet“ gleichsam der „Wille zur Macht“, und damit verschließt sich die Aufbehaltenheit des „Offenen“ und zugleich „Verborgenen“ des Seins, in das Gestell. Die Möglichkeitsbedingung philosophischen Denkens, die von Platon bis Nietzsche reicht, besteht darin, dass Sein in eine Leitgestalt des Seienden gebracht wird, von der Platonischen Idee bis zum „Willen zur Macht“ und der „Ewigen Wiederkehr“. Diese Ressource ist aufgebraucht, wo die Macht nurmehr um sich selbst kreist. Die Technik ist mithin Erbin und Pervertierung der Metaphysik. Deren Wegbahnen von Parmenides und Platon bis zu Nietzsche schienen in das technische ‚Gestell‘ einzumünden, womit sich die Frage stellt, ob dieses Enden von einem „Verenden“ zu unterscheiden ist.

II

Zunächst spricht vieles für die Unterscheidungslosigkeit. Wo die Technik zu ihrem Zielpunkt kommt, besteht eine „Not der Notlosigkeit“. Heidegger sah in der Kybernetik, der Reduktion von Welt auf die binäre Kombination von 0 und 1 die Schlüsselsignatur des „rechenhaften Denkens“, das letztlich das Ende des Denkens ist. Eine Perzeption von Technik im Rahmen einer selbst technologischen Epistemologie bzw. einer technologisch verwalteten „Universität“ verstrickt und affirmiert im Sinn Heideggers jenes technischen, rechenhaften Denken nur noch weiter. Je erfolgreicher solche epistemologischen Wege und Ansätze sind, umso stärker sind sie selbst in das Gestell eingezeichnet. Im Sinn der „Not der Notlosigkeit“ kann man davon ausgehen, dass diese Verstrickung nicht auffällt. Zweck-Rationalität wird zum autopoietischen Geschehen der technologischen Systeme transformiert, denen selbst Intelligenz zugeschrieben wird, und deren „Gadget“ (Spielzeug), wie neuere Technikphilosophien zeigen, der Mensch ist – nicht umgekehrt. So behutsam man mit der Behauptung von unmittelbaren Aktualitäten sein sollte, nimmt Heidegger eine Veränderung der klassischen Zweck- Mittel-Verhältnisse an, die sich erst in der Gegenwart vollständig verifiziert. Zieht er nicht doch eine Linie zur der auto-technologischen Hypermoderne mit ihren Visionen einer trans- und posthumanistischen Welt?

In jedem Fall nimmt Heidegger gerade mit seiner Frage nach der Technik den Faden von Husserls Frage nach der Krisis der neuzeitlichen Zivilisation auf. Er treibt den Befund über die Krisenschrift hinaus und versagt sich jeden Appell an eine verantwortliche, geeinte Menschheit. Einen Appell, der durch die Selbstbesinnung, das Cartesianische Meditieren des transzendentalen Egos, sein Fundament findet. Es scheint so, als würde mit der Riesenhaftigkeit des Gestells all dies weggerissen. Stattdessen konstatiert Heidegger eine unumgängliche Agonie, die bereits in der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft grundgelegt ist. Dies artikuliert Heideggers berühmt gewordener Satz: „Die Wissenschaft denkt nicht“.

III

Bereits in den *Beiträgen zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis* entwickelt Heidegger sein Denken der Technik in seiner grundlegenden Gestalt. Wie schon anzu-deuten war, versieht er die neuzeitliche Technik mit den Epitheta der MACHenschaft, des Riesenhaften und Unbegrenzten. Die totalitären Selbstermächtigungen des 20. Jahrhunderts, jene von links und jene von rechts, erweisen sich in seinem Blick als Phänomene jener umfassenderen Vernichtung des Offenen, in dem Dasein (Mensch) und das sich lichtende Sein, in der frühgriechischen Rede von der ‚Physis‘ geahnt, einander begegnen können. Dies wird in den Bremer (und Freiburger) Vorträgen bis zu provozierenden Aussagen weitergetrieben wie: „Im Weltalter der Technik ist die Natur keine Grenze der Technik. Die Natur ist da vielmehr das Grundbestandstück des technischen Bestandes – und nichts außerdem“. Man mag Heideggers synkritischen Blick auf die Verwüstungen neuzeitlicher Technik und auf die „Produktion von Leichen“ weiterhin auf eine ethische Indifferenz hin interpretieren. Dies verfehlt meines Erachtens ihre Pointe. Sie besteht eben darin, dass das technische Gestell in Heideggers Sicht gerade der alles bestimmende Grundzug der Wirklichkeit geworden ist.

In der Verwahrlosung entbirgt sich das Wesen der Technik, da sie das wechselseitige ‚Verwahren‘ von Lethe und Aletheia, von Verborgenen und seiner Erscheinung, und die Differenz zwischen beiden verbirgt. Sie verbirgt aber auch

ihr eigenes Wesen. „Allein die Technik ist nicht am Ende erst kein bloßes Instrument mehr, sondern von ihrem Wesensanfang her niemals ein Mittel in der Hand des Menschen gewesen. Sie hat sich im Vorhinein der Behandlung als Mittel entzogen, obzwar der alltägliche Anschein des technischen Leistens und Wirkens ein Anderes vorgibt“.

In der Verbindung von Verbergung dessen, was ist, (einem ganz und gar anti-phänomenologischen Zug jener Technik) und der Selbstverbergung ihres Wesens indiziert sich eine höchste Gefahr: „Das Gefährlichste der Gefahr besteht nach dieser Hinsicht darin, dass die Gefahr sich als die Gefahr, die sie ist, verbirgt. Nachstellend dem Wesen des Seins, verstellt das Ge-Stell sein Gefahrwesen“. Wenn Technik ihren Gegenpart, die Natur, die sich für das Denken zunächst als physis lichtete, so sehr außer Kraft setzt, dass diese kein Eigenrecht und keine eigene Macht mehr hat, so ist sie thesis ohne physis. Man könnte, auf die antike Philosophie abgebildet, auch sagen: der brutale Sieg einer mit Instrumenten bewehrten Sophistik über das physis, das den Ordnungen des Kosmos ebenso wie des von Natur her Gerechten zugrunde liegt.

Heidegger verfolgt die Seinsverlassenheit nicht weiter auf solche ethischen und naturrechtlichen Überlegungen hin. Sie sind aber in seinem seinsgeschichtlichen Blick angelegt.

Seine Beschreibung des Nullpunkts der Technik beschwört aber eine Indifferenz, aus der keiner der verschiedenen Akteure einen Ausweg zeigen kann: Nicht der Weg einer politischen Linken oder Rechten und nicht derjenige eines Liberalismus, der diese Technik meint, in das Gefüge des Welfare of Nations einbeziehen zu können. Er weist sie auf, und deutet auf die Absurdität ethischer Appelle angesichts einer umfassend Wirklichkeit präformierenden Technik. Man mag in Heideggers metaphysischer Diagnose den Blick auf die Normativität freier Gesellschaft vermissen, die ihrerseits durch das Wesen der Technik in Frage gestellt bleibe. Zu thematisieren bleibt in Zukunft auch, ob ein solcher – ontischer –, die Linien der späten Husserlschen Schriften über die Krisis Europas wiederaufnehmender Blick Heidegger einfach nur fremd, mit ihm unvereinbar ist, oder ob an dieser Stelle das Gespräch zwischen Heideg-

ger, Husserl und Cassirer noch einmal neu aufzunehmen ist. Manches spricht dafür, dass dies in der gegenwärtigen Lage von Philosophie und Technik ein dringendes Desiderat sein kann.

Der Husserlsche Ansatz, dass Wissenschaft ihrem erkenntnistheoretischen Weltbegriff nach wieder lernen müsse, Zweck und Mittel voneinander zu unterscheiden und Reservate der Lebenswelt zu sichern, bleibt ethisch von Belang. Heidegger erfasst aber die Problematik in einer Dramatik, die der Krisis-Schrift noch nicht zu Gebot stand. Eine sachliche Rekonstruktion wird auch in den Blick bringen können, dass Heidegger nicht als „Antipode“, sondern in radikaler Fortsetzung über den egologischen Rayon in jenen der Seinsfrage selbst die Frage nach dem Wesen der Technik formulierte, die sich aus dem Abstand der schrittweisen Annäherung an die Seisfrage versteht.

IV

Wenn man indes in ungeschützter Naivität den Fokus auf das Phänomen der ‚Technik‘ selbst richtet und Heideggers Analysen in die Gegenwart hinein extrapoliert, wird man konstatieren, dass das planetarische Gestell heute die Form eines durchlässigen und zugleich dichten Gewebes hat, eines weltumspannenden Netzes, in dem die Informationen formiert und einen Mausklick weit entfernt sind. Ent-fernung: bedeutet im Wortsinn dann, dass Fernen keine Rolle mehr spielen und damit auch von Nähe keine ausdrückliche Rede mehr sein kann. Die Durchlässigkeit des Netzes hat nicht mehr die Form des Gestells, sondern einer reaktiven zweiten Haut, die durch Algorithmen die Welt lesbar macht. Entfernt werden kann aber auf diese Weise die Offenheit des Denkens selbst. Die Ubiquität des Netzes eröffnet faszinierende Optionen des Informationsaustauschs, die mit einer schlichten Kulturkritik nicht getroffen wären. Doch was Wissen im Unterschied zur Information im digitalen, der künstlichen Intelligenz verschriebenen globalisierten Welt bedeutet und wo seine Residuen sind, was dies weiterhin für Bildung und Polis bedeutet, ist längst nicht geklärt. Damit hängen die weiteren Fragen zusammen, welche Rolle Urteilskraft und Gefühl spielen, Reflexion, Selbstverständnis und ein Humanismus, dem Visionen von Cyborgs und Post-

und Transhumanismus begegnen, die menschliche Fähigkeiten in exponentielle Höhen führen, das konkrete Humanum aber vernichten. In diesem Sinne ist Heideggers Denken der Technik kontrafaktisch zu den Signaturen unserer Gegenwart und zugleich hoch aktuell. So provozierend die fundamentalontologische Fragetiefe und die Radikalität seins-geschichtlichen Fragens dem akademischen Comment ist und so gute Begründungen ein solches an die Radix gehen im heutigen Comment braucht: in den vielen Antworten, die zu Fragen der Gegenwart gegeben werden, in den Effizienz-Herstellung-Prozessen, die mit Schumpeter produktiv und zugleich zerstörerisch sind, gälte es Heideggers Fragedimension wiederzugewinnen, als Horizont, als letzte Fragetiefe, die die technik-philosophischen Rationalitäten als vorläufige immer schon eingeholt hat: und dies eben, weil Heideggers Einblick in das, was ist – so eben wollte er seine denkerische Bestimmung des Wesens der Technik verstanden wissen, aus der „Kehre“ gewonnen ist, einer Umkehr der Blickweise, so dass erst aus dem Wesen der Technik die Frage nach dem verborgenen Grund der Metaphysik mit höchster Sinnklarheit gefragt werden kann. Nicht durch Fatalismus, sondern durch den Blick in die Kehre, zeigt Heideggers Fragen nach der Technik sein ungehobenes Potenzial.

Der Einblick in die Technik führt mit einer sachlichen Notwendigkeit über deren Wesen hinaus in den anderen Anfang. Noch einmal Heideggers Wortlaut: „Alles nur Technische gelangt nie in das Wesen der Technik. Es vermag nicht einmal seinen Vorhof zu kennen. Darum beschreiben wir, indem wir versuchen, den Einblick in das, was ist, zu sagen, nicht die Situation der Zeit. Die Konstellation des Seyns spreche uns an“.

Am Rande bemerkt: Mir ist im genauen Studium seiner Selbstkommentierungen und Randbemerkungen, die in GA 82: „Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen“ auf den Brennpunkt von *Sein und Zeit* hin eindrucksvoll dokumentiert sind, noch einmal neu deutlich geworden, ein wie kritischer- und selbstkritischer Heidegger ist. Jederzeit bleibt er auf der Hut, ob das zu Denkende und zu Sagende auch angemessen gesagt worden ist. Darin steht er in nichts dem anderen großen Solitär, Wittgenstein, nach. Nicht nur in einer „Zeit der Zauberer“ begegnen sie sich (so der Buchtitel von Wolfram Ellenberger), sondern auch in diesem

Gestus denkerische Genauigkeit und Differenziertheit. Ist dies nicht eine kluge aufklärerische Maxime gegenüber einer weiter um sich greifenden technischen Unifizierung, einer Zu- und Abrichtung des Menschen, die sich, diesseits der banalen Kulturkritik, auch und gerade im Gebrauch von Sozialen Netzwerken und Smartphones zeigt.

V

Doch Heideggers Technikphilosophie ist nicht nur ein einsamer Solitär. Sie steht in Netzen, und es tun sich erstaunliche Affinitäten auf: Folgt nicht Hans Blumenberg, *contre coeur*, viel eher Heideggerschen Spuren, wenn er die jeweiligen technischen Optionen als Schlüssel zu den langen, Begrifflichkeit und Unbegrifflichkeit verbindenden ideengeschichtlichen Linien versteht, ohne dies in die gängigen und allzu simplen Matrices von „Unterbau“ und „Überbau“ einzubetten. Der eigentliche Antipode Heideggers wäre vielleicht Gotthard Günther, der während seines USA Aufenthalts seit den vierziger Jahren die Bedeutung des Computers anders als Heidegger, ja: gegenläufig zu ihm, doch mit ähnlicher Grundsätzlichkeit erfasste: Ende eines alteuropäischen Überlieferungszusammenhangs in seiner Materialität, aber zugleich die Chance, hochkomplexe Operationen mehrwertiger Logik mit der gesteigerten Rechenleistung zu verbinden. Ein „digitaler Humanismus“, wie er jüngst eingefordert wird, erfordert ontologische und logische Reflexionen, sonst bleibt es bei der von Hegel bereits genial aufgewiesenen ethischen Krankheit, dass hier die hohen Prinzipien sind, dort der Weltlauf zynisch weitergeht. Solche Überlegungen und Konstellationen sind erfreulicherweise am gestrigen Nachmittag und am heutigen Vormittag auch von den sehr realen Nachwuchswissenschaftlerinnen und -wissenschaftlern, die sich weltweit mit Heideggers Denken befassen und sich an ihm abarbeiten, formuliert worden. Dies ist eine Zukunftsspur, die die Martin Heidegger-Gesellschaft gerne und mit Interesse, nach der italienischen Vortragsbezeichnung in der Musik „*con amore*“, weiterverfolgen wird.

Heideggers Diagnose und Beschreibung des Wesens der Technik hat stellenweise das Potenzial eine Welt in den Blick zu nehmen, in und mit der das „An-

thropozän“ endet. Doch die „Lieder zu singen, jenseits des Menschen“ (Celan) sind wie die Gedanken, die in ein „jenseits des Menschen“ reichen selbst genuine und glaubwürdige Zeugen von Humanität. Die tiefe Kluft in der Affinität zwischen Heidegger und Celan, die tief in die Prägung des 20. Jahrhunderts einging, kann und soll durch die gemeinsame Nennung beider Namen in keiner Weise relativiert oder gar neutralisiert werden. Doch es bleiben Berührungen, Spuren, die mit Heidegger und gegen ihn weiter auszubuchstabieren sind. Gerade die Verflechtung des Wesens der Technik in die politische Raserei bietet dafür Anhaltspunkte.

Ich gehe einen Schritt weiter: jene unleugbaren Züge eines Mangels an Urteilskraft in Phasen von Heideggers Denken zeigen seine Partizipation an dem technischen Gestell selbst. Heute partizipiert daran aber eine Meinungsindustrie, die dieses ab- und widerständige, genuin neue Horizonte eröffnende Denken erledigen möchte. Die Sache und die Realität der Heidegger-Forschung legen nahe, dass dies nicht das letzte Wort bleiben wird.

VI

Wenn man den Blick erweitert auf die Sache von Heideggers Denken, die in der Frage nach der Technik wie in einem Brennpunkt kulminiert, wird deutlich, dass Heidegger die vielleicht entschiedenste Antithetik zu der Aussage Marshall Mac Luhans „The Medium is the Message!“ formuliert. Die Gefangenschaft in medialen Kanälen nicht unbefragt als Schicksal hinzunehmen, erfordert umgekehrt, der Sprache und der Sache des Denkens jenen tieferen Resonanzraum zu geben, der aus einer Archäologie des Nie-Gedachten schöpft und aus der Zwiesprache von Denken und Dichtung herrührt, in Verbindung mit den elementarsten, grundlegenden, sich niemals, auch methodisch nicht beruhigenden Fragen. Einem Fragen, „als stehe Heraklit daneben“, wie Walter Schulz treffend sagte.

Mit ihrem Endpunkt hat neuzeitliche Technik einerseits den Wesenszug einer List der Vernunft verloren, einer Hilfestellung der zweiten Natur. Vielmehr unterlaufen ihre Operationen die Unterscheidungen zwischen Natürlichkeit und Künstlichkeit, zwischen Schein und Sein. Darin aber zeigt sich, wie Heidegger

wie kein Zweiter gesehen hat, dass Technik mehr ist als List, sondern die genuine Kunst, in der sich die anfängliche Seinserfahrung zuletzt verbergen kann, aber in der sie nicht ausgelöscht werden wird, wenn die innere Kehre von erstem und anderem Anfang gedacht wird. In den Zusätzen zu seinem Kunstwerk-Aufsatz deutet Heidegger diese Linie an.

Diese Kehre, die sich am Wesen der Technik vollzieht, artikuliert sich Heidegger zufolge nirgends trefflicher als in der Hölderlin-Sequenz aus der Patmos-Hymne: „Wo aber Gefahr ist/Wächst das Rettende auch“.

Die Tektonik von Heideggers spätem seinsgeschichtlichen Denken bildet jene Zusammenhänge ab, nicht in einer neuen Philosophischen Systematik, aber auch nicht im Gestus der Bearbeitung von einzelnen zu untersuchenden philosophischen Fragen; sondern in der Explikation dessen, was ist, bzw. wie sich Sein zuschickt. Vor dem Letztpunkt der „Machenschaft“ scheidet sich die Seinsfrage neu. Von hier her werden die Differenz zwischen erstem und anderem Anfang und das Wesen der Wahrheit sinnfällig: bis in das Begreifen des Unbegreiflichen, das Heidegger mit dem esoterischen Gedanken des letzten Gottes zum Thema macht.

Dass Heideggers Denken gerade an der Unterscheidung festhält, ist in der in Bestand nehmenden Dynamik des technischen Gestells von besonderer Wichtigkeit.

Die Beiträge enden mit dem Dreiklang des „Menschen in seiner Geschichte“, des Kunstwerks und der Sprache, und sie münden in die akroamatische Dimension der Hermeneutik (Manfred Riedel): in die Sighetik, als Grundzug des Schweigens. Heideggers Denken seit Sein und Zeit findet in der Frage nach der Technik seine Fokussierung und seine Kondensation. Umgekehrt verweist die Frage nach dem Wesen der Technik auf diesen gesamten Hintergrund. Sie schreibt an die Radix gehend, Max Webers Entzauberungsdiagnosen fort und weiß mit Weber, dass auf die Entzauberung die irisierende und blendende Wiederverzauberung des Irrationalen folgt. Übrigens bieten gerade die *Überlegungen. Schwarze Hefte* eine Auseinandersetzung mit der totalitär nihilistischen Selbstverleugnung des Denkens. Deshalb ist es tunlich und nötig, Heidegger nicht nur im Horizont des

20., sondern auch des 21. Jahrhunderts zu begreifen. Diese 20. Jahrestagung der Martin Heidegger-Gesellschaft will dazu einen Beitrag leisten: Sie unternimmt eine gleichermaßen gegenwartssensitive und strikt sachliche Zugangsweise. „Zur Sache selbst!“, „Zu den Sachen selbst!“ – als phänomenologisches Votum, das die seinsgeschichtliche Tiefe nicht scheut.

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张志伟

存在即虚无

——海德格尔的“虚无主义逻辑”

摘要：人之有限性注定了遭遇虚无的命运，自觉的虚无主义出现在19世纪并非偶然，它是轴心时代文明理念没落的结果。海德格尔通过与尼采的争辩提出了一种“虚无主义逻辑”：形而上学混淆了存在与存在者的存在论差异，它以存在为思想的对象实则思的是存在者，尼采揭示了虚无主义是形而上学的本质，但是当他试图通过以感性世界作为唯一的世界，强调存在者存在而存在不存在的时候，并不能克服虚无主义。海德格尔将尼采向前“推进”了一步：存在之所以不存在是因为存在自行隐匿，因而存在即虚无。或许唯有以虚无主义才能克服虚无主义。

Zusammenfassung: Die Endlichkeit des Menschen zwingt ihn zum Schicksal des Nichts, und es ist kein Zufall, dass der bewusste Nihilismus im 19. Jahrhundert als Folge des Niedergangs der Zivilisation im Achsenzeitalter entstand. Heidegger legte in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Nietzsche eine „Logik des Nihilismus“ vor: Die Metaphysik verwechselt den ontologischen Unterschied zwischen Sein und Seiendem; sie nimmt das Sein zum Gegenstand des Denkens, denkt aber eigentlich nur über das Seiende nach. Nietzsche entlarvte den Nihilismus als das Wesen der Metaphysik, aber er konnte ihn nicht überwinden, als er zu betonen versuchte, dass das Seiende ist und das Sein nicht ist, indem er die sinnliche Welt zur einzigen Welt erklärte. Heidegger geht mit Nietzsche noch einen Schritt „weiter“: Das Sein ist nicht, weil es sich selbst verbirgt, und somit ist das Sein das Nichts. Vielleicht ist die einzige Möglichkeit, den Nihilismus zu überwinden, der Nihilismus selbst.

Abstract: The finiteness of human beings forces them to the fate of nothingness, and it is no coincidence that conscious nihilism emerged in the 19th century as a consequence of the decline of civilization in the Axis Age. In his debate with Nietzsche, Heidegger presented a “logic of nihilism”: Metaphysics confuses the ontological difference between Being and beings; it takes Being as the object of thought, but actually only thinks about beings. Nietzsche exposed nihilism as the essence of metaphysics, but he could not overcome it when he tried to emphasize that beings are and Being is not by declaring the sensual world to be the only world. Heidegger goes one step “further” with Nietzsche: Being is not, because it hides itself, and thus Being is nothingness. Perhaps the only way to overcome nihilism is nihilism itself.

Keywords: 海德格尔, 尼采, 存在, 虚无主义, 存在即虚无

在某种意义上说，关于存在即虚无的思考贯穿了海德格尔的整个学术生涯，在其前后期的思考中尝试了不同的思路和言说方式，由此而体现了问题之艰难：在什么意义上说存在即虚无？如果存在即虚无，我们如何能够思考和言说存在？就此而论，以存在为虚无，不仅需要“对存在”进行全新的理解，也需要对“虚无”做全新的领会。我们借用坎宁安《虚无主义谱系》中的“虚无主义逻辑”这一概念来呈现海德格尔尝试克服虚无主义的思路。

存在即虚无的问题与形而上学有关。对海德格尔来说，形而上学的基本问题是 *Warum ist überhaupt Seiendes und nicht vielmehr Nichts*——孙周兴教授译作“为什么存在者存在而无反倒不在”，并且提示：也可以译作“为什么是存在者而不是无”。¹我们可以将其拆解为两个问题：“为什么存在者存在”与“为什么不是无”，形而上学始终追问的是前者即“存在者的存在”，海德格尔关注的则是后者即“无是什么”，这个问题所指向的是使存在者存在的存在本身。鉴于形而上学试图超越存在者去思存在是不可能的，所以海德格尔的工作是在存在与存在者的存在论差异的基础上将这两个方面“融为一体”，套用佛教的术语“止观”：“见”存在者如“观”存在。见存在者之“见”，与观存在之“观”不同，见存在者是不可能见到存在的，需要观的本事。形而上学试图超越存在者而思存在，实际上“见”到的始终是存在者。尼采揭示了形而上学的虚无主义本质：我们之所以见不到存在，是因为存在根本不存在。按照海德格尔，见存在者而观存在，当且仅当存在即虚无。

从1936年到1940年，海德格尔做了六个关于尼采哲学的讲座，加上1940-1946年的几篇论文，一同构成了1961年出版的《尼采》这部著作的内容，可视为海德格尔与尼采“争辩”的产物。以尼采作为形而上学批判的“代言人”，海德格尔试图通过反思尼采而反思形而上学问题。我们试图通过海德格尔对于尼采的解读，围绕存在即虚无的思想，展示其“虚无主义逻辑”，探讨海德格尔克服虚无主义的尝试。

1 参见海德格尔：《形而上学是什么》，载《路标》，孙周兴译，商务印书馆，2016年，第143页译者注。

一、虚无主义

虚无主义 (nihilism) 源出拉丁语 nihil, 德语通常用 Nichts 表示“不”、“无”、“虚无”或“空无”, 虽然与“虚无主义”中的 nihil 并不是同一个词, 但是它们的含义大致是相同的。尽管“虚无”不等于“虚无主义”, 例如当哲学家们把超越于存在之上的东西称为“无”的时候, 当老子说万物生于有而有生于无的时候, 当《圣经》称上帝从无中创造了世界的时候, 当普罗提诺的“否定神学”主张神或上帝超越于一切存在的时候……这里所说的“无”并不是“没有”或“不存在”的意思, 而是某种高于存在或者超越于一切存在的“存在”。然而, 我们也不能说它们与虚无主义完全没有关系, 坎宁安在《虚无主义谱系》中区别了虚无主义和虚无主义逻辑, 我们上面所说的就属于他所说的“虚无主义逻辑”, 其含义是: 割裂有物, 将其变为无物, 再让这个无物最终是为有物。² 坎宁安把海德格尔划归虚无主义逻辑, 不过我以为海德格尔恰恰是反其道而行之, 他要通过把最终的有物变成无物, 进一步把存在思为虚无。虽然海德格尔的意图是克服虚无主义, 但是断定任何存在都难逃虚无主义的质疑, 或许只有通过虚无主义才能克服虚无主义, 所以我们仍然可以称海德格尔为虚无主义逻辑。

如果我们把超越于一切存在之上的东西称为“无”, 那的确意味着“无”是“某物”, 当然是不同于一切事物的“某物”, 这并不就是虚无主义, 至少不是自觉的虚无主义, 因为这里的“无”只是对于某种超越性的存在的另一种称呼。如果我们认为这个超越一切存在的“某物”因为其超越于一切存在因而是不可知的, 这相当于变相承认它的“存在”, 这也不是虚无主义。不过, 从超感性的存在是不可知的, 到超感性的存在根本不存在, 仅一步之遥。如果我们对这个“某物”采取否定的立场, 认为所谓超越于一切存在之上的东西不可能存在, 一切存在并没有超越的基础和根据, 从而否定一切存在的超越于自身的意义和价值 (在某种意义上当代科学技术支持这种立场), 这样的“虚无”就是完全彻底没有或者不存在的意思, 这就是虚无主义——自觉的虚无主义。从作为“某物”的“虚无”到空无所有的“虚无”, 体现了虚无主义产生的历史过程, 按照海

2 参见康纳·坎宁安: 《虚无主义谱系》, 李昀译, 华东师范大学出版社, 2022年, 第3页。

德格尔，这也是形而上学走向终结的历史过程。这的确符合“虚无主义逻辑”，不过在某种意义上说，海德格尔给这个“逻辑”增添了一个新的环节，他要进一步追问这个“无”。

按照雅斯贝尔斯，轴心时代各个文明理念起源于面对虚无（空无）的恐惧：“人类体验到世界的恐怖和自身的软弱。他探寻根本性的问题。面对空无，他力求解放和拯救。通过在意识上认识自己的限度，他为自己树立了更高的目标。他在自我的深奥和超然存在的光辉中感受绝对。”³就此而论，仅就它们多以某种永恒无限的东西为纷繁杂乱变动不居的现实世界奠定基础而论，我们可以把轴心时代形成的各个文明理念视为抵御虚无的“意义世界”，为各个文明共同体的成员提供了安身立命的基础和根据。然而，17世纪科学革命以及由此而引发的一系列连锁反应，经过几百年的演进，使得全世界差不多都从传统社会转型为现代社会，形成了我们这个时代的全球性科技文明，轴心时代的各个文明理念作为传统文化逐渐失去了对现代世界的影响力，其结果是那些曾经抵御虚无的价值理念蜕变成了虚无，以至于在我们这个时代的语境中，虚无主义无所不在，甚至成了矛盾双方互相攻讦的武器：宗教徒可以指责不信神的无神论者是虚无主义，无神论者也会批评宗教徒是虚无主义，因为宗教徒所信仰的神在他们看来并不存在；形而上学可能会批评它的批判者是虚无主义，而形而上学的批判者也会以存在或实体并不存在而批评形而上学是虚无主义……如此等等。就此而论，我们这个时代乃是虚无主义的时代，当它认定轴心时代各个文明理念（天、道、神、上帝、存在、实体甚至真理……）统统失效了的时候，无论对于虚无主义采取什么样的态度——消极的虚无主义或积极的虚无主义，否定的虚无主义或肯定的虚无主义，我们都身在其中。

就哲学而论，虚无主义与形而上学密切相关。在某种意义上说，形而上学（metaphysics）是希腊哲学与基督教神学相互融合的产物，它诞生于古希腊哲学，孕育于中世纪经院哲学，成熟于德国古典哲学。形而上学的核心问题是超越问题，经过基督教神学的“强化”，哲学家们面临着“绝对的超越”的难题，例如在一般形而上学与特殊形而上学

3 雅斯贝尔斯：《历史的起源与目标》，魏楚雄、俞新天译，华夏出版社，1989年，第8页。

的区分中，存在论相当于一般形而上学，上帝则是不同于一切存在物及其存在的绝对的超越者。基督教神学貌似在希腊哲学中看到了通过理性通达信仰的对象的一线希望，然而随着唯名论的兴盛，调和理性与信仰的工作最终失败。近代哲学从笛卡尔开始直到德国古典哲学试图构建形而上学体系以便为人类知识重新奠基，不过既不能满足“绝对的超越”的诉求，也不能为实证科学所接受，从而在形而上学衰落的同时暴露了虚无主义的问题，因而虚无主义或者“现代虚无主义”出现在19世纪并非偶然。通常我们以尼采关于“上帝死了”“绝对价值的自行贬黜”的论断作为虚无主义的标志，而实际上虚无主义不仅限于西方文明。诚如海德格尔所说，“这个‘基督教上帝’还是一个主导观念，代表着一般‘超感性领域’以及对它的各种不同解说，代表着种种‘理想’和‘规范’、‘原理’和‘法则’、‘目标’和‘价值’，它们被建立在存在者‘之上’，旨在‘赋予’存在者整体一个目的、一种秩序，简而言之，‘赋予’存在者整体一种‘意义’。”⁴因而，虚无主义不仅仅是西方文明的困境，也是人类文明的困境。

轴心时代形成的各个文明理念都带有抵御虚无的意义，除了佛教与众不同而外，其他文明理念的核心基本上都是以某种永恒无限的实在作为纷繁杂乱变动不居的现实世界的基础和根据，哲学——形而上学——的对象就是作为一切存在者的基础和根据的“存在”（Being）。与基督教神学的融合凸显或强化了“绝对的超越”的难题，哲学家们貌似接受了“绝对的超越”是难以企及的后果，尼采则“独具慧眼”：绝对超越的存在不是难以企及而是根本不存在。迄今为止，人们或者默认或者接受了尼采的结论，海德格尔则致力于去思不存在的存在，所以他与尼采必有一场“争辩”。

我们简略梳理一下海德格尔的“虚无主义逻辑”。

首先，存在与人之此在之间有某种“相互需要”的特殊关系：一切存在者因存在而在，此在亦然，但此在与与众不同之处在于，存在可以因此而在而显现。在某种意义上说，此在是被存在“选中”的唯一能够显现存在的在者，因而“思”存在乃人之此在的使命。

其次，存在以本质性地现身（wesen）的方式，亦即以离弃出存在

4 海德格尔：《尼采》（下卷），孙周兴译，商务印书馆，2002年，第671页。

者的方式让人思存在，这的确引起了人的“惊奇”——惊奇于存在者的存在，哲学-形而上学的历史由此而开端。然而，存在以离弃出存在者而自身隐匿的现身方式使得人始终以思存在者的方式思存在，从而混淆了存在与存在者之间的“存在论差异”，海德格尔称之为“存在的遗忘”。

最后，一部形而上学的历史就是存在的遗忘史。尼采的伟大贡献是揭示了存在“不在”，因而形而上学的本质是虚无主义——把不存在的存在当作存在乃至当作存在者的意义。然而在海德格尔看来，归根结底是存在之离弃状态导致了存在之被遗忘状态，并非根本没有存在，而是存在在显现为存在者之际付诸悬缺，因而存在即虚无，我们必须准备好通过思虚无而思存在。

由此，海德格尔试图扭转人们关于虚无主义的理解，他通过与尼采的争辩来反思形而上学的整个历史。尼采给形而上学历史划了一个“圆满的”句号，为海德格尔从第一开端向另一开端的“跳跃”做了准备。限于篇幅，我们不准备系统全面地梳理海德格尔与尼采的“争辩”，仅仅关注于海德格尔关于尼采的柏拉图主义的“倒转”的分析以及“转变出来”所预示的方向。

二、柏拉图主义的“倒转”

海德格尔在《尼采》一开始便说到，“如果说西方思想迄今为止的传统在某个决定性方面聚集并且完成于尼采思想中，那么，与尼采的争辩就将成为一种与迄今为止的全部西方思想的争辩。”⁵在某种意义上说，海德格尔以尼采作为批判形而上学乃至反思全部西方思想的“代言人”，他给尼采的定位是：既是形而上学的终结者，也是最后一位形而上学家，因为对海德格尔来说，尼采揭示了形而上学的本质是虚无主义，但是他克服虚无主义的方式同时也是形而上学的完成。因此，海德格尔将尼采置于形而上学的历史之中，与尼采的争辩同时也是与全部西方思想的争辩，而其核心问题就是虚无主义问题。

一般认为虚无主义 (nihilism) 这个概念产生于18世纪，最早使用于哲学的是雅可比，而19世纪俄罗斯文学家屠格涅夫则塑造了一位彻

5 海德格尔：《尼采》（上卷），孙周兴译，商务印书馆，2002年，第5页。

底批判社会的虚无主义者形象，不过真正具有代表性并且对后世产生了广泛深远影响的当属尼采，我们都知道他的名言：“虚无主义站在门口了：我们这位所有客人中最阴森可怕的客人来自何方呢？”⁶在人们的心目中，尼采是虚无主义的倡导者，至少也是积极的虚无主义者，而在海德格尔看来，尼采的虚无主义问题要复杂得多，它有一个形成与演变的过程。简言之，虚无主义是尼采所揭示的形而上学的本质，而他寻求的是对虚无主义的克服，然而归根结底尼采没有能够跳出形而上学的限制。按照海德格尔关于哲学的主导问题和基础问题的区分，前者作为“第一开端”开始了形而上学的历史，问题始终是存在者的存在即“存在者是什么”，而海德格尔要开辟的“另一开端”要回答的问题则是“什么是存在”，即将存在者的基础作为基础来追问，是为“基础问题”。⁷尼采虽然没有跳出第一开端的限制，但是他的虚无主义理论为我们从第一开端到另一开端的“跳跃”做了准备。

尼采关于形而上学的批判体现为他对柏拉图主义的“倒转”，而在海德格尔看来，尼采早期的“倒转了的柏拉图主义”与他最后在《偶像的黄昏》中达到的立场是十分不同的。⁸

按照柏拉图主义（形而上学的代表），真实之物即真实存在者是超感性之物即理念。与之相反，感性之物就是“非存在者”，当然这并不意味着它们是绝对不存在者，而是说它们虽然并不是绝然一无所有，但也不能被称为存在者。倘若感性之物可以被命名为存在者，那么它们必定是以超感性之物为尺度的，不存在者是从真实存在者那里获得存在的影子和剩余的，感性之物是理念的摹本。于是，所谓把柏拉图主义倒转过来，也就是把尺度关系倒转过来，在这种倒转的实行过程中，感性之物变成了真正存在者，亦即变成了真实之物，变成了真理，这乃是实证主义的学说。不过，在尼采完成真正的颠倒的成熟岁月里（1879—1881），他实际上已经经历了一种极端的实证主义，这种实证主义经过转换，也被采纳到他后期的基本立场中了，而事关宏旨的

6 尼采：《1885—1887年遗稿（〈权力意志〉上卷）》，《尼采著作全集》第十二卷，孙周兴译，商务印书馆，2014年，第147页。

7 参见海德格尔：《尼采》（上卷），第71页。

8 参见海德格尔：《尼采》（上卷），第169页。

恰恰是这种转换，在这种倒转中，尼采完成了他最独特的哲学思想。下面我们按照海德格尔的解读复述这个过程。⁹

直到晚期，在其思想工作中止前不久，尼采才完全清楚地认识，他在这种对柏拉图主义的倒转中被推向了何方。随着尼采越来越理解这种倒转的必然性，亦即把它理解为克服虚无主义的任务所要求的，他也就越来越清楚地认识到了这一点。在说明对柏拉图主义的倒转时，我们必须以柏拉图主义的“结构形态”为出发点：超感性领域是真实世界，它作为赋予尺度的东西高高在上，而感性领域作为虚假的世界位居低层。在倒转之后，感性领域即虚假世界位居高层，超感性领域即真实世界则降为低层。然而，所谓感性领域位居高层的意思是说感性领域是真实的东西，是真实存在者，仅此而已的话，那么高层和低层的区分还是保留着的，只是做了不同的角色分配，这意味着柏拉图主义的“结构形态”依然存在，这样的倒转并没有完成它作为对虚无主义的克服必须完成的东西，并没有彻底克服柏拉图主义。只有当高层本身从根本上被清除，以前对于一个真实的和值得追求的东西的设定已经终止，理想意义上的真实世界已经被取消掉，对柏拉图主义的彻底克服才能获得成功。这意味着如果取消了真实世界，也就必定取消了虚假世界。只有在这个时候，柏拉图主义才得到了克服，即是说，经过柏拉图主义的倒转，哲学思想就从柏拉图主义中“倒转出来”了。在海德格尔看来，这是尼采倒转柏拉图主义的最后步骤，而且是在其创作生涯的最后一年里（1888）才清晰地完成了这种颠倒，见于尼采在《偶像的黄昏》中对于柏拉图主义历史的描述，它包含六个阶段，¹⁰其中第六个阶段首次把尼采带入阴影消失殆尽的完全光明之中了。按照尼采，“我们已经废除了真实世界：还剩下哪个世界呢？莫非是虚假世界么？……决不是！与真实世界一道，我们也废除了虚假世界！”由此，“尼采自己的哲学的最后阶段开始了。”¹¹

如果虚假世界与真实世界一道被废除掉了，那还有什么存在呢？真

9 参见海德格尔：《尼采》（上卷），第221页及以下。

10 参见海德格尔：《尼采》（上卷），第224-229页；也可参见尼采：《尼采著作全集》第六卷，孙周兴译，商务印书馆，2015年，第97-98页。

11 海德格尔：《尼采》（上卷），第229页。

实世界（超感性领域）与虚假世界（感性领域）一起构成了与纯粹虚无对立的東西，即存在者整体。如果两者都被废除了，那么一切就都将落入空洞的虚无之中，这不可能是尼采的意思，因为他希望克服掉任何形式的虚无主义。因此，这里包含着对感性世界的肯定，而不是对它的废除。虽然尼采说“我们也废除了虚假世界”，但是所谓“真实世界”和“虚假世界”的区分是柏拉图主义的“结构形态”，尼采实际上废除了这种解释，由此才开启出一条道路，一条肯定感性领域因而也肯定非感性的精神世界的道路。¹²因此，海德格尔从尼采那里“看出来”的是：

“无论对感性领域的废除还是对非感性领域的废除，都是没有必要的。相反地，倒是需要消除对感性领域的误解和诋毁，同样也要废除对超感性领域的过分抬高。当务之急是为一种以感性与非感性的新等级秩序为基础的对感性领域的重新解释开出一条道路。这个新的等级秩序并不是要在旧的秩序模式之内简单地颠倒一下，并不是要从现在开始高估感性领域而低估非感性领域了，并不是要把处于最底层的東西置于最高层上面了。新的等级秩序和价值设定意味着：改变秩序模式。就此而言，对柏拉图主义的倒转就必定成为一个从柏拉图主义中转变出来的过程。”¹³

对海德格尔来说，尼采在其创作生涯的最后一年（1888）才完成的对柏拉图主义的倒转，不仅仅是“倒转”，因为仅仅是“倒转”仍然是虚无主义，唯有“转变出来”才能克服虚无主义，然而尼采终究还差一步，而这关键一步是海德格尔循着尼采的足迹迈出的。尼采的问题同样也是形而上学（柏拉图主义）的问题：不能思虚无，他在废除感性领域和非感性领域的同时也废除了虚无。人们从中看到的或许是一种极端的实证主义立场（感性世界是唯一的世界），海德格尔从中看到的却是：存在即虚无，虚无即存在。

通常观点认为，作为对一切存在的否定，虚无不是存在者，不能被对象化，不过“是”一个空无所有的东西，所以虚无无从思起。海德格尔则设问道：

12 参见海德格尔：《尼采》（上卷），第231页。

13 海德格尔：《尼采》（上卷），第231页。

“倘若虚无事实上虽然不是一个存在者，但也决不是完全空无所有的东西，那又如何呢？还有，倘若关于虚无之本质的问题借助于那个‘非此即彼’还没有被充分地提出来，那又如何呢？最后，倘若这个展开的关于虚无之本质的问题的悬缺，乃是西方形而上学必然沦为虚无主义的原因，那又如何呢？那样的话，虚无主义、更原始而且更本质性地被经验和被把握的虚无主义，就会是那种形而上学历史，这种历史驶向一种形而上学基本立场，而在这种形而上学基本立场中，虚无的本质不但可能得到理解，而且不再被把握了。这样，虚无主义或许就意味着：根本不思虚无的本质。”¹⁴

由此可见，尼采的伟大贡献是揭示了形而上学的本质是虚无主义，然而当尼采废除真实世界与虚假世界的时候，他把存在气化为最后一缕青烟，同时废除了存在与虚无。现在海德格尔要做的就是——去思虚无，或者说，同时肯定存在与虚无。

三、存在即虚无

海德格尔终其一生追问的是存在问题，也可以说终其一生要解决的是虚无主义问题。

海德格尔在其前期代表作《存在与时间》中依据存在与存在者的存在论差异说明了存在问题的独特性：一切存在者皆因存在而在，但是一说到存在总是某个存在者的存在，所以追问存在问题须通过存在者，而唯一能够提出和追问存在问题，并且其存在方式为“去存在”（zu sein, to be），以至于存在能够通过它的存在而显现的存在者，就是我们向来所是的存在者——此在（Dasein）。当形而上学以存在作为思想的对象时，这意味着哲学家们企图站到存在之外去思存在，这种思维方式思的并非存在而是存在者。海德格尔在《存在与时间》中试图通过关于此在的生存论分析来描述此在是怎么存在的，以期通过此在的生存活动来呈现存在。由于种种原因，《存在与时间》（1927）发表三年之后，海德格尔的思想发生了转向，其中至少有一个原因是，他意识到此在的存在仍然还不是存在本身。从存在与存在者的存在论差异看，虽然形而上学误入歧途，但是此在之路也此路不通，这意味

14 海德格尔：《尼采》（下卷），第692页。

着不仅要意识到存在与存在者的存在论差异，而且要寻求消解这一差异的途径。在某种意义上说，与尼采的争辩坚定了海德格尔将存在解释为虚无的决心。

如前所述，尼采揭示了形而上学的虚无主义本质，他克服虚无主义的方式类似以肯定存在者的感性世界的方式消除存在问题，这意味着存在者存在而存在不在。海德格尔由此而思的问题却是：**为什么存在者存在而存在反倒不在？**也就是说：**为什么存在者存在而无反而不在？**如果存在不在，那么存在者是怎么存在的？如果存在者存在着，那么作为存在者的基础的存在怎么存在？海德格尔要追问的是存在者存在的基础。

人们通常把海德格尔于1930年所做的讲演《论真理的本质》看作是其思想转向的开始，在这篇讲演中他借追问真理的本质探讨了知识与对象符合一致的基础。当我把事物表象为对象时，人们把这种表象活动归结为主体的能动性，海德格尔则强调表象乃以一个敞开领域为前提，在此敞开领域中，我对物开放，物对我显现。然而当我把物表象为对象时，我与物相遇，使我和物相遇的敞开领域本身却处于隐蔽状态，在敞开境域中除了我和物，此外无他。在“尼采讲座”时（也是在写作《哲学论稿——从本有而来》时），海德格尔把这个自身处于遮蔽状态的敞开境域称作存在的“本质性现身”（*wesen*）：存在面对人的显现即本质性的现身，以离弃出存在者的方式让人思存在。然而，在存在本质性现身为存在者之际，存在自身却是自行隐匿的。鉴于存在与存在者的存在论差异，存在只能通过呈现为存在者的方式让同样作为存在者的人去思存在，但是同样由于存在论差异，人作为存在者能够思的是存在者而不是存在。当存在离弃出存在者之际，存在者在而存在“不在”，因而存在以“拒予”的方式造成“急迫”（*Not*），迫使人去思存在，人也就的确去思了，但是这个思之所思的却不是存在而是存在者——人惊讶于存在者的存在而追问“存在者是什么”，哲学由此而开端，乃有形而上学。结果，存在的离弃状态所引发的并不是对存在而是对存在者的思，由此造成了存在的被遗忘状态。形而上学一向自以为思的是存在，从此不再有“急迫”，殊不知却是把“急迫”变成了最高的急迫——“无急迫的急迫”。尼采以虚无主义的方式重新激发了存在的“急迫”，由此可知尼采对于海德格尔来说的重要性：他揭示了形

而上学的虚无主义本质，废除了柏拉图主义关于真实世界与虚假世界的“秩序模式”，为海德格尔指示了从形而上学中“转变出来”的可能性，从而坚定了海德格尔把存在思为虚无的决心。

那么，海德格尔是如何接续尼采从形而上学中“转变出来”的？

形而上学根据存在与存在者的差异划分了两个世界——作为超感性领域的真实世界和作为感性领域的虚假世界，尼采废除了两个世界的区别：没有两个世界，只有一个世界即感性世界。对海德格尔来说，形而上学的确是虚无主义，然而尼采也没有克服虚无主义。的确只有一个世界即我们的感性世界，而这个存在者的世界的基础——存在——在现身为存在者之际自行隐匿。形而上学之所以不能思存在并非只是因为形而上学无能，根本原因在于存在本身付诸悬缺。所以，如果存在者存在，那么存在就不在，存在即虚无，但是这并不意味着存在空无所有。“存在**不存在**，但我们仍然不能把存在与虚无等同起来。而另一方面，我们又必须下决心把存有设定为虚无——如果‘虚无’说的是非存在者。”¹⁵ 思存在之艰难就在于此。

以存在为虚无，海德格尔试图彻底扭转自尼采以来虚无主义的方向。

海德格尔从尼采的柏拉图主义的“倒转”所预示的方向“转变出来”的既是对存在的重新理解，也是对虚无的重新理解。对他来说，非如此不能克服形而上学，非如此不能克服虚无主义。形而上学与虚无主义源于对存在的误解亦源于对虚无的误解，“转变出来”的方向是——存在即虚无。存在本质性现身而离弃出存在者，虽然其自身自行隐匿，但是并非无迹可寻：

“人即使在惟一地根据存在者之为存在者认识存在时也已经与存在相对待，就此而言，人就在与存在打交道。人置身于存在本身与人的关联中，因为人之为人是要与存在者之为存在者打交道的。由于存在把自己托庇于无蔽状态中——而且只有这样它 (Es) 才是存在——，存在本身就与它的到达场所（作为其悬缺的寓所）一道发生出来了。这个所在 (Wo) 作为隐蔽之所的此 (das Da der Bleibe) 属于存在本身，‘是’ (ist) 存在本身，因此被叫作此之在 (Da-sein)。”¹⁶

15 海德格尔：《哲学论稿》，孙周兴译，商务印书馆，2014年，第303页。

16 海德格尔：《尼采》（下卷），第989页。

人投身于“此之在”而存在于存在与存在者“之间”，如果我们把存在与存在者比喻为一条河的两岸，人必须投身于其中而成为“之间”。不过，人投身于其中的这条“河流”并没有“两岸”，只有一岸——存在者，另一岸虽为存在实为“虚无”，因而存在对人来说乃是“深渊”（Abgrund）：存在是存在者的“原始—基础”（Ur-grund），不过这个“原始—基础”相当于“无—基础”（Un-grund），所以是“深渊”、“离基深渊”或“渊基”（Abgrund）。¹⁷

所以，人之此在的确在存在与存在者“之间”（Zwischen），不过不是在两个东西之间。这个“之间”只有一边是“实在的”，另一边是深不可测的深渊。形而上学之所以是形而上学，虚无主义之所以是虚无主义，皆在此“深渊”。克服形而上学，克服虚无主义，也在此“深渊”。在某种意义上说，海德格尔对存在的重新理解——存在即虚无，也是对虚无的重新理解——虚无即存在，相对于存在在形而上学那里作为高大上的思想对象而言，海德格尔揭示了存在“阴森恐怖”的一面。在前期的《存在与时间》中，海德格尔通过最极端的情绪“畏”（Angst）将此在嵌入无之背景下而使之意识到“我在，且不得不在”，这里的“无”被称为“无何有之乡”（nirgends），即空出了所有存在者而剩下的“世界”，而此“世界”乃是此在与存在者打交道的生存活动形成的，因而此在避之不及的恰恰是它自己的存在，面对自己的存在，让此在油然而升起“不在家”（unheimlich）的陌生感，现在的海德格尔则把存在比喻为“深渊”。就此而论，面对存在亦即面对虚无，面对存在无异于冒险：“对于基础的探基必须冒险一跳，跃入离—基深渊之中，必须去测度和经受住离—基深渊本身。”¹⁸在某种意义上说，人一向畏惧虚无，实则畏惧存在，而人一向畏惧存在，实则畏惧虚无。

对存在的重新理解亦即把存在理解为虚无，同样，对虚无的重新理解亦即把虚无理解为存在。我们把海德格尔的相关思想称为“虚无主义逻辑”，或者准确地说，克服虚无主义的逻辑。人之所以恐惧虚无是因为虚无空无所有，所以执着于存在者——

“但真正的虚无主义是在什么地方活动呢？在人们缠住熟悉的

17 参见海德格尔：《哲学论稿》，第406页。“渊基”是王庆节教授的翻译，参见王庆节：《形而上学导论》译者后记，商务印书馆，2015年，第243页。

18 海德格尔：《哲学论稿》，第406页。

存在者不放的地方；在人们以为只要一如既往，按照现在时兴的样子去抓住存在者的地方。这样，人们就把存在问题拒之门外，把存在当作一个绝无 (nihil) 来对待，而这个无，只要它在那儿，它就以某种方式‘是/在’。把这个存在忘得精光，只知道去追逐存在者，这就是虚无主义。”¹⁹

但如果存在即虚无、虚无即存在呢？人之此在在存在与存在者“之间”，或许我们可以不恰当地把这个“之间”比喻为一枚硬币的两面，一面是有而另一面就是无：

“存在者之虚无与存在者之存在形影相随，犹如黑夜之于白昼。倘若没有黑夜，我们又何曾能看到白昼，何曾能把白昼当作白昼来经验！因此，一个哲学家是否立即从根本上在存在者之存在中经验到虚无之切近，这乃是一块最坚硬、也最可靠的试金石，可以用来检验这位哲学家的思想是否纯真，是否有力。谁若经验不到虚无之切近，他就只能永远无望地站在哲学门外，不得其门而入。”²⁰

在某种意义上说，尼采的虚无主义与实证主义不谋而合。当今全球性的科技文明所理解的物理世界是唯一的世界，其他任何超出这个世界的解释除非与之协调一致，否则不会被接受，而我们始终无法获得这样的解释，虚无主义之所以令人束手无策，原因多半在此。

海德格尔的“虚无主义逻辑”（也包括尼采）的启示是，试图通过任何永恒的实在消除虚无主义是不可能的，因为人的有限性，无论什么名义上的永恒实在都是“绝对的超越”，除非信仰，否则难以触及，而信仰终究需要可遇而不可求的“启示”。海德格尔像尼采一样，貌似以虚无主义对抗虚无主义，所不同的是在他那里“存在即虚无”。如果说尼采揭示了形而上学的“秘密”：形而上学是本真的虚无主义，那么我们或许可以说海德格尔揭示了虚无主义的“秘密”：存在即虚无，虚无即存在，人们畏惧虚无实则畏惧存在，人们逃避存在，实则逃避虚无，因而视存在为虚无，以虚无为存在，或许是唯一的出路。因此，虚无主义并非只是现代性文明的“疾病”，其历史要悠久得多。我们的“虚无主义逻辑”往往

19 海德格尔：《形而上学导论》，第232-233页。

20 海德格尔：《尼采》（上卷），第450页。

只是把虚无主义看作现代文明的产物，进一步说是资本主义的产物，亦即物化或异化的结果，就此而论，克服虚无主义可以通过消除物化或异化，通过消除资本主义而实现。这并非没有道理，因而也是一种“虚无主义逻辑”。不过在我看来，这种逻辑仍然是表层的。在某种意义上说，虚无主义是随着轴心时代各个文明理念的形成而出现的，只不过那个时候大多数情况下针对的是“虚无”而非虚无主义，但是也有例外。我们可以从佛教看出虚无主义的端倪。《奥义书》和佛陀的时代，追求自我的永生即“常见”（婆罗门教）而不可得，遂由此而陷入了“断灭见”或“断见”（顺世论唯物主义），此“断见”即虚无主义。原始佛教主张超越“常见”与“断见”而采取“中道”，其核心思想是“断见”乃由“常见”而来，源自“先有而后无”的痛苦，因而消除“断见”的关键是消除“常见”：原本空无所有，去除了常见也就去除了断见。在某种意义上说，佛陀在 2000 多年前就意识到了虚无主义根源于追求永恒之常见，而这恰恰是轴心时代各大文明理念的出发点，17 世纪科学革命之后随着轴心时代文明理念的没落，虚无主义兴起，不过貌似其命运早在轴心时代就已经注定了。海德格尔曾经对佛教感兴趣，自有其原因。

如果我们把存在与虚无，形而上学与虚无主义，看作是两堆“青草”，哲学家陷入了“布里丹的驴子”的困境，海德格尔则尝试以“存在即虚无”在两者之外开辟一条出路。尼采试图通过废除存在来废除虚无，海德格尔“翻转”了尼采：不是同时废除存在与虚无，而是同时肯定存在与虚无——存在即虚无。他的思想极具启发性，其意义或许在于我们不要试图去“克服”虚无主义，或者说不要把“克服”理解为“消除”。虚无植根于人之本性，是消除不了的。我们也许应该考虑的是，如何像“带癌生存”一样，与虚无主义共存，或者准确地讲——与虚无共存。

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Tragedy and the Bipolarity of Value in the Hermeneutics of Technology

Abstract: When considering tragedy for the hermeneutics of technology, one is pointed toward investigating the value systems and cosmologies that underpin concepts such as progress or invention. Tragedy defines an ambiguity of the values, reflected in the definition of technology being pharmacological, that is, both remedy and poison at the same time – according to the original ambiguity of the translation of the term “pharmacology.” Philosophers of technology like Gilbert Simondon, and more recently Bernard Stiegler, give tragedy noteworthy attention in their understanding of the complex and mutual relationship of culture, nature, and technology – ideas that in the course of Western philosophy had been viewed as separate and distinguishable. This article follows a genealogy of tragedy in the hermeneutics of philosophy of technology, starting with its Ancient Greek origin, followed by the account of tragedy in the early works of Friedrich Nietzsche (who is influential to both Simondon and Stiegler), before moving to the implications of tragedy in philosophy of technology that emerged in the twentieth century with the rise of modern technological inventions. Additionally, this article emphasizes the question of tragedy in the hermeneutics of technology outside the European context of its origin by including Yuk Hui’s comparison of tragedy with Chinese value systems.

Zusammenfassung: Bei Überlegungen zur Bedeutung der Tragödie für die Hermeneutik der Technik ist es notwendig, die Wertesysteme und Kosmologien zu untersuchen, die Konzepte wie „progress“ oder „invention“ untermauern. Die Tragödie definiert eine Ambiguität der Werte, die sich in der Definition der Technologie als pharmakologisch widerspiegelt, das heißt, sowohl Heilmittel als auch Gift zur gleichen Zeit – gemäß der ursprünglichen Ambiguität der Übersetzung des Begriffs „Pharmakologie“. Technikphilosophen wie Gilbert Simondon und in jüngerer Zeit Bernard Stiegler schenken der Tragödie bemerkenswerte Aufmerksamkeit in ihrem Verständnis der komplexen und wechselseitigen Beziehung von Kultur, Natur und Technologie – Ideen, die im Verlauf der westlichen Philosophie als getrennt und unterscheidbar betrachtet wurden. Dieser Artikel verfolgt eine Genealogie der Tragödie in der Hermeneutik der Philosophie der Technik, beginnend mit ihrem Ursprung im antiken Griechenland, gefolgt von der Darstellung der Tragödie in den frühen Werken von Friedrich Nietzsche (der sowohl Simondon als auch Stiegler beeinflusst hat), bevor er zu den Implikationen der Tragödie in der Philosophie der Technik übergeht, die im 20. Jahrhun-

dert mit dem Aufkommen moderner technologischer Erfindungen entstanden sind. Darüber hinaus betont dieser Artikel die Frage der Tragödie in der Hermeneutik der Technik außerhalb des europäischen Kontexts ihres Ursprungs, indem er Yuk Hui Vergleich der Tragödie mit chinesischen Wertesystemen einbezieht.

摘要: 在考虑悲剧对技术诠释学的意义时，有必要探究支撑“进步”或“发明”等概念的价值体系和宇宙观。悲剧定义了价值的模糊性，这体现在技术的药理学定义上，即技术同时是解药和毒药——根据“药理学”一词翻译的原始模糊性。技术哲学家如吉尔伯特·西蒙东和近期的伯纳德·斯蒂格勒在他们对文化、自然和技术——这些观念在西方哲学的发展进程中被视为独立和泾渭分明的——的复杂的交互关系的理解中，对悲剧给予了显著的关注。本文追溯了技术哲学之诠释学中悲剧的谱系，从其古希腊起源开始，接着是弗里德里希·尼采早期作品中的悲剧描述（他对西蒙东和斯蒂格勒都有影响），然后转向20世纪随着现代技术发明的兴起而出现的 技术哲学中的悲剧内涵。此外，本文还强调了在其起源的欧洲背景之外技术诠释学中的悲剧问题，并引入了许煜（Yuk HUI）对悲剧与中国价值体系的对照。

Keywords: Tragedy, Pre-Socratics, Nietzsche, Hermeneutics, Technology, Bipolarity, Dualism, Value

1. Introduction

When considering tragedy for the hermeneutics of modern and contemporary philosophy of technology, the underlying question is that of the value systems and cosmologies that define such concepts as progress, invention, or design. Philosophers of technology like Gilbert Simondon, and more recently Bernard Stiegler, give the Ancient Greek concept of tragedy noteworthy attention in their understanding of the complex and mutual relationship of culture, nature, and technology – ideas that in the course of Western philosophy had been viewed as separate and distinguishable. Tragedy defines in this regard first and foremost an ambiguity of values, reflected in the definition of technology being pharmacological, that is, both remedy and poison at the same time. The Ancient Greek term “*pharmakon*” (φάρμακον) has gained popularity in recent ethical discourses around algorithmic technology and AI, and is in its translation ambiguous. This means that it can be translated both as remedy and as poison, as point-

ed out by Derrida,¹ who makes this important remark on Socrates' definition of writing as a *pharmakon* in Plato's *Phaedrus*. Stiegler continues in extending the concept of the *pharmakon*, beyond writing, to other domains of technology, but also problematizes it, since pharmacology can attain an ethical indifference, echoing Nietzsche's warning against the romanticization of uncertainty.

A potential hermeneutics of technology seeks to outline the complex relationship between thought, practice, and the ontology of the technical object. The legacy of French thought on technology following Simondon emphasizes such hermeneutics in a reciprocal sense, as it explores both the importance of technology for the production of knowledge as well as social and cultural epistemologies that have influenced and shaped the invention of technical objects. Georges Canguilhem,² a teacher to Michel Foucault and Simondon, writes in his article "Machine and Organism" that a veritable theory of the organic would be required to define the physiological qualities of the organism that had hitherto been described with mechanist principles. Developing such a theory became the project of Stiegler, who employed the concept of "general organology." By that, he understands that technical objects should be understood *via* their organic extensions, for example through the bodies and concepts that mobilize them as prostheses. While, at the same time, recognizing that technology itself co-constitutes the becoming of collective and individual consciousness. As society builds on technics of memorization, they become the products of "exosomatization" by being stored anterior to the body. As such, they become part of the process of *hypomnesis*, which Stiegler relates to Plato's idea of *anamnesis* as the process of knowledge production of the soul *via* remembrance. General organology for Stiegler encompasses the idea that there are reciprocal effects between psychological, social, and technical becoming so that exosomatized knowledge informs such becoming in shaping perceptions, emotions, or ideas.³

1 Jacques Derrida (1981). "Plato's Pharmacy". In: *Dissemination*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.

2 Georges Canguilhem. (1992). „Machine and Organism". In: *Incorporations* (eds. J. Crary and S. Kwinter. New York: Zone Books.

3 Bernard Stiegler (2017). "General Ecology, Economy and Organology". In:

Philosophy of technology as a discipline makes explicit the special role that technology has in Western epistemology. With his notion of “cosmotechnics,” Yuk Hui aims to diversify the complex relationship between culture, nature, and technology from a global perspective: if technics are hermeneutically situated in their cultures, this implies that the meaning of a technical object would be different in China than it is in the West. However, such an understanding of hermeneutics may also call into question the very notion of technics itself. Given a post-Eurocentric perspective of the complex implications of technics and technology that are both local and unique as well as a globalizing force in their own right, Hui differentiates between the following categories:

“technics refers to the general category of all forms of making and practice, *tékhne* refers to the Greek conception of it, which Heidegger understands as *poiesis* or bringing forth; and technology refers to a radical turn which took place during European modernity, and developed in the direction of ever-increasing automation, leading consequently to what Heidegger calls the *Gestell*.”⁴

As such, “technology” as a concept holds truth even in a global perspective, and the notion of “cosmotechnics” that Hui will introduce in his work, aims to counterbalance this globalizing tendency in the organological relation of thought and technics. As this article wants to demonstrate as its main argument, this is also true when considering tragedy for the hermeneutics of technology as bearing particular value judgments attributed to technical objects and their position in a globalized world. Effectively, and following Hui, I will differentiate between these three terms: “technics,” “technology,” and “cosmotechnics.”

This article suggests a genealogy of the question of tragedy for the hermeneutics of technology, by, in the second to fourth section, reconstructing the interest shared by Nietzsche and Simondon in pre-Socratic philosophy and its accounts on the relation between the individual, the collective, and the indefinite. Such a relation

General Ecology: The New Ecological Paradigm (eds. E. Hörl & J. Burton). London: Bloomsbury.

4 Yuk Hui (2016). *The Question Concerning Technology in China*, London and Falmouth: Urbanomic, p. 4.

is also reflected in the axiological ambiguity of tragedy; as presented in the fourth section, Simondon considers tragedy explicitly for the question of value in technology. From this perspective, developed in the fifth section, Stiegler will renew this framing from Simondon in the context of today's technologies, invoking ethical imperatives in light of the disruptive powers of technology today. Hui draws on general organology in a post-Eurocentric context, broadly opening the question of technology in its distinct relation to a Chinese cosmology, and in particular discussing the question of a Western dualism of value co-emerging from and with tragedy. However, the final section aims to highlight the special place that Nietzsche occupies in reflecting on tragedy, aiming just to overcome such a dualism.

2. Technology and the Indefinite

The origins of the Greek tragedy are to be found in storytelling. The authors of such tragedies, which are written interpretations of Ancient Greek mythology (for example by Sophocles or Aeschylus) were celebrated in the ancient culture as their narratives depicted the complex role-reversal of the hero into a fool or scapegoat, showing that the concept of value is intricate and ambiguous – what is good fortune can quickly turn bad, and that everything has both a positive and a negative side at the same time. Tragedy was, alongside the epic, a dominant form of storytelling in Ancient Greece, and its narrative structure can even be found in the philosophical writings of Plato, such as in the *Apologia* of Socrates.⁵ There, Socrates is both the hero and the scapegoat, and his hemlock drinking both kills him and makes him immortal as the founding figure of Western philosophy. But first and foremost, this article aims to follow Nietzsche's suggestion to situate the origin of tragedy in the intellectual and mythological milieu of the pre-Socratic philosophers, that is, the early Greek philosophers that came before Socrates and the written recreation of his thought through philosophers such as Plato (hence Nietzsche calls the pre-Socratics the pre-Platonics).⁶

5 See, e.g., Jacob Howland (2008). "Plato's 'Apology' as Tragedy", *The Review of Politics* 70(4).

6 Friedrich Nietzsche (1998). *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*.

Following Nietzsche, Simondon also shows a keen interest in pre-Socratic philosophy, especially with regard to Anaximander of Miletus. Like Nietzsche, Simondon spends a considerable amount of time with the reconstruction of Anaximander's concept of the *apeiron* (ἄπειρον) –translated as “the indefinite” or “boundless,” as the term stems from the Greek *peirar* (πεῖραρ), meaning “end” or “limited”;⁷ for Nietzsche, the *apeiron* is also the undefined (“*das Unbestimmte*”). He considers Anaximander a pessimist, as, in the light of everything returning to the undefined, becoming has no meaning in its temporary emancipation from dissipation. For Nietzsche, Anaximander is a truly tragic thinker as he addresses the question of ethics amidst the dying of all things:

“ [...] Anaximander was no longer dealing with the question of the origin of this world in a purely physical way. Rather, when he saw in the multiplicity of things that have come-to-be a sum of injustices that must be expiated, he grasped with bold fingers the tangle of the profoundest problem in ethics. [...] How can anything pass away which has a right to be? Whence that restless, ceaseless coming-in-to-being and giving birth, whence that grimace of painful disfiguration on the countenance of nature, whence the never-ending dirge in all the realms of existence? [...] At last, after long pensive silence, he puts a question to all creatures: ‘What is your existence worth? And if it is worthless, why are you here? Your guilt, I see, causes you to tarry in your existence. With your death, you have to expiate it. Look how your earth is withering, how your seas are diminishing and drying up; the seashell on the mountain top can show you how much has dried up already. Even now, fire is destroying your world; some day it will go up in fumes and smoke. But ever and anew, another such world of ephemerality will construct itself. Who is there that could redeem you from the curse of coming-to-be?’”⁸

According to Nietzsche, at the heart of Anaximander's philosophy lies the fundamental ethical struggle against the meaninglessness of existence. Such is the tragedy of fate coming and going in the flux of what he will define as the eternal

Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing

7 Lidell and Scott (2024) “πεῖραρ”, *A Greek-English Lexicon*. www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0057:entry=pei=rar (accessed 30 August 2024).

8 Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, p. 48.

return. It could be said of modern technology (especially in its affinity with transhumanism) that it attempts to halt this flux by creating linear progress in a world that is indefinite. In this sense, it functions as compensation for the profound abyss that opens up once such boundlessness is revealed.

Simondon too turns to Anaximander and reconfigures the concept of the *apeiron* in light of thermodynamics as what he calls the “preindividual,”⁹ that is, the potentiality that enables the coming-into-existence of the individual and the social. It appears that, especially for Simondon, the pre-Socratics provide an understanding of values that helps recontextualize important questions of today, that is, the psychic and collective relation and with it the status of technology. According to Simondon, philosophy hitherto had little regard for the technical object, treating it as alien and anterior to culture, instead of perceiving culture and technics as mutually influential.¹⁰ That is, culture ought to be an active response to the integral becoming of the individual and the social – very similar to Nietzsche in the reading of Pierre Klossowski¹¹ whose interest in Nietzsche marks the beginning of a renewed reception of the philosopher in France – emerging from a preindividual moment, epochally reflecting and producing value judgments instead of referring to static cultural laws.

Simondon’s philosophy is particularly compelled with individuation, that is, the possibilities and circumstances of the individual (‘individual’ meaning, of course, that which cannot be divided). Nietzsche too reflects on individuation, or what he refers to as the *principium individuationis*, and its relation to tragedy. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, he defines two tendencies that tragedy encompasses as a scope of both axiological and aesthetic qualities, the Apollonian and the Dionysian. The Apollonian, named after the Greek deity Apollo, who is the god of truth, light, prophecy, and healing, is considered to correspond to such principle

9 Elizabeth Grosz (2017). *The Incorporeal: Ontology, Ethics and the Limits of Materialism*. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 204.

10 See, e.g., Gilbert Simondon (2015). “Culture and Technics (1965, tr. O. L. Fraser)”, *Radical Philosophy* 189.

11 See Pierre Klossowski (1997). *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, London: The Athlone Press.

of individuation and is also associated with art forms such as sculpture (an Ancient Greek sculpture is associated with harmony, strict form, and perfection).¹² For Nietzsche, Apollo is also an elusive figure, since the individual is in itself an impossibility – but, as Stiegler will highlight, an impossibility nonetheless worth attempting in a world that is paradoxically inhabited both by chaos and an increasing isolation of individuals (as will be discussed in the fifth section of this article). The individual is impossible in the sense that it is merely a grasping of an object or thought out of a primordial chaotic whole, that in turn, via transindividuation, is always more than just the individual (see also Section 4). Thus, the individual is tragic in the sense that it *is* and *is not*, as it is defined by its limitations; recall Nietzsche's reference to Anaximander: "How can anything pass away which has a right to be?"¹³ To accept tragedy is to accept change;¹⁴ from Nietzsche's perspective, it was therefore important to introduce the Dionysian as a concept into Western, predominantly Apollonian, society to counter-balance the totalizing tendencies manifesting social hierarchies romanticizing all such uncertainties that would have made axiological contradictions unbearable.

Dionysus is the Greek god of excess, inebriants, and fertility, and he is associated, as Nietzsche points out, with music; music bears a certain immediacy, a detachment from words and conceptualizations, which makes it unique as an art form. According to Aristotle, the dithyramb was the predecessor of tragedy, a choral hymn sung in celebration of the Greek god Dionysus.¹⁵ In these choral pieces, a soloist is paired in a call-and-response pattern with a choir, aesthetically corresponding to the fundamental and necessary instability of psychic and collective relations that, according to such thinkers as Nietzsche or Simondon, lies at the heart of pre-Socratic thought. The Dionysian in Nietzsche's philosophy is

12 Friedrich Nietzsche (2007). *The Birth of Tragedy* (tr. R. Speirs). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

13 Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, p. 48.

14 And to accept the cyclicity of life and death, of which certain concepts of transhumanism appear to be in denial when proclaiming eternal life through technological enhancement.

15 Aristotle (1987). *Poetics* (tr. R. Janko). Cambridge: Hackett, p. 6.

invoked as a figure that stands for the affirmation of excess that withdraws from any attempt to systematize individuation. An important difference that should be noted between Nietzsche and Simondon is that the latter does not speak of the individuation as being a principle, which contributes to the argument developed in the fourth section of this article, that tragedy will become a problematic term in philosophy of technology. Despite this absence of coherence, tragedy is still capable of complementarity and hence points towards a systemic notion of cosmology, which becomes relevant precisely at the point when technology disrupts the milieu and the relation between the individual and the collective.

Especially in the Western philosophical context, technology poses an obstacle for any suggested natural order which separates being from becoming or *techne* from *logos*.¹⁶ That is, the technical object is traditionally considered anterior to nature, and, upon reflection by Simondon and his successors, trans-values cosmological paradigms. It is in that sense that it is often constructed to imitate natural systems with increasingly greater efficiency and resemblance. Erich Hörl's observation that the concept of ecology has gone through a semantic shift from being identified with the natural to the unnatural (as today there are "ecologies of sensation, perception, cognition, desire, attention, power, values, information, participation, media, the mind, relations, practices, behavior, belonging, the social, the political" etc.),¹⁷ is in itself a tragic reevaluation of the concept of ecology. Tragedy points toward the cyclicity of life and death (since the *apeiron* is the potential that makes new life possible, emerging out of disorder) and is nested within a cultural milieu that has influenced and shaped an understanding of the values of technology and technics. Hence, tragedy should be considered regarding the development of the hermeneutics of technology.

16 Ars Industrialis (2024). "Anamnesis and Hypomnesis". <https://arsindustrialis.org/anamnesis-and-hypomnesis> (accessed 30 August 2024).

17 Erich Hörl (2017). "The Ecologization of Thinking" (tr. N. F. Scott). In: *General Ecology: The New Ecological Paradigm* (eds. E. Hörl & J. Burton). London: Bloomsbury, p. 1–2.

3. Nihilism, Value, and Modernity

Simondon points out the continuities of the pre-Socratic tradition of axiology and the philosophy of Nietzsche in his claims about the values of technology today. Both are defending claims about the relativity of values that differ, as Simondon (and Nietzsche for that matter) argues, from the Christian understanding of values which served as a ground for modern rationalism, in the sense that all value judgments are subjugated to a “divine finality.”¹⁸ Simondon however also points out that Nietzsche, with his notion of the eternal return of the same, creates a “pantheism” that diverts from the pre-Socratic tradition:

“But we should note that the pre-Socratics conceived complementarity differently as a pair of contraries: birth and death, ascent and descent, paths leading upward and downward. For the pre-Socratics, the death of one being is the condition for the birth of another; what Nietzsche rediscovered as an essential myth in the pre-Socratics and integrated into his pantheism is the complementarity of the sum of becoming expressed by the notion of the eternal return.”¹⁹

Nietzsche himself is barely explicitly concerned with the ontology of the technical object, although he experiences the epochal turn of industrialization and modernization. In this regard, as Stiegler writes, he is however significant for considering the role of technics in a historicity (or genealogy) of techno-scientific rationalism that had been until then ignored in Western philosophy.²⁰ Nietzsche’s work emerged during a time when Western society changed immensely, and scientism informed by Enlightenment began to replace Christian belief. The problems that accommodated modern rationalism at the time are diverse (as it, for example, coincided with the rise of fascism), and certainly

18 Gilbert Simondon (2020). “Values and the Search for Objectivity”. In: *Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information Volume II: Supplemental Texts* (tr. T. Adkins). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, p. 403.

19 Ibid.

20 Bernard Stiegler (1998) *Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 252.

shaped the way in which modern technology came into existence.²¹ And yet, especially in his earlier philosophy, it is also Christianity that is rigorously criticized by Nietzsche with regard to the constraints that it poses for ethics. Hence, in *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche identifies Christianity with the Apollonian; the overexpression of Apollonian tendencies in Western society is what Nietzsche figures to be problematic in the light of a metaphysical crisis that he describes as nihilism. In his early work, Nietzsche invokes Dionysus who was worshipped in Ancient Greece as a counter-figure to the Apollonian tendencies in society, to address the problem of nihilism. One of Nietzsche's major contributions to Western thought is the notion of the "transvaluation of all values"²² which means that values, and the ethical decisions that are based on them, change over time, as their corresponding perceptions and perspectives do too, rather than being dependent on a moral law. This discovery leads Nietzsche to address further concerns: If there is no principle of goodness, on what basis should our actions be based? And even further, how to do so without falling into nihilism, that is, into believing that there is no value to anything at all. It is important to acknowledge that these questions arise at a point when society becomes secularized, and science and discourse demystify religious doctrine. For Nietzsche, the emergence of modern science does not replace Christianity in a sufficient way that would improve the individual's ability to act ethically in any given circumstance – hence his famous outcry that 'God is dead,' which Nietzsche did not mean to express triumphantly, as he was aware that society has found nothing with which to replace religion and therefore suffers from an ethical void. On the contrary, the absence of God leads to an increase in nihilism, that has, according to Stiegler, not seized to spread in the digital age – his notion of "automatic nihilism" will be addressed in the fifth section of this article.

21 See, e.g., Hans Blumenberg (1963) „Lebenswelt und Technisierung unter Aspekten der Phänomenologie“, *Filosofia* 14(4).

22 See Friedrich Nietzsche (2009). *Beyond Good and Evil* (tr. M. Faber). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The young Nietzsche in his debut work and *The Birth of Tragedy* seeks to offer a path to affirm the excess that comes from the acceptance that values are not fixed. But Nietzsche also critically reflects on various aspects of his own early work in a late preface, that is included in *Ecce Homo*; the ornamentality of the text – that means the poetic and flamboyant language of the text, as well as the strong recourse of dialectics when defining the Dionysian and Apollonian are subjects of such criticism. Gilles Deleuze, who is an important influence for Stiegler and himself influenced to a large degree by Simondon, points out that Nietzsche even shifts the tragic antinomy of Dionysus and Apollon to that of Dionysus and Socrates, so that the tragic relation is no longer between disorder and order, but between excess and reason, in an attempt to further concretize the problem of dialectics.²³

4. The Early Reception of Nietzsche in French Philosophy of Technology

The question of tragedy is of noteworthy importance in the hermeneutics of technology emerging with Simondon in the course of the twentieth century. But the validity of the concept is also at stake at the very moment when technology is introduced into the tragic relation of the individual and the collective, since tragedy merely considers the dialogical exchange between the psychic and collective, but not the technological. As such, tragedy supposes the problem of value in philosophy of technology; or rather, technology offers the possibility of an axiology beyond tragedy, as Simondon suggests. The contemporary relevance of this topic becomes apparent as the Simondonian legacy in philosophy on technology has today gained ethical grounds in problematizing the legitimacy of large-scale cybernetic interventions that act on an ecological level.²⁴

For Simondon, psychic and collective individuation is mainly described through three categories: the preindividual, the transindividual, and the individ-

23 Gilles Deleuze (1983). *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (tr. Hugh Tomlinson). New York: Columbia University Press, p. 11.

24 See Yuk Hui (2021). “Über Kosmotechnik”, *Dritte Natur* 4(3).

ual. The transindividual supposes that every relation between two objects is in itself a signification; hence, relation does not mean a simple rapport between two entities, but rather is in itself of value. Therefore, Simondon differentiates between transindividual relations and interindividual connections; whereas the latter marks a static field of identifications, the transindividual marks the individual both in its potential and its incompleteness as complete, taking into consideration that the “reality of the subject [...] is ‘vaster than the individual’”. Therefore, the transindividual is the process of becoming-individual that is dynamic in order to “carry a charge of preindividual reality”. Additionally, the transindividual already considers the individual in relation to the technical object, as the technical object marks an encroachment of both the psychic and the collective sphere.²⁵ The individual in itself is, so to speak, fictitious and not a singularity that depends upon the moment. As will be further explained through Stiegler in the following section, the individual may be impossible (as also already Nietzsche remarks) but nonetheless requires to be attempted. Such an attempt, however, is only possible in the encounter with the collective. Hence, Simondon refers to Nietzsche’s *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* to explain the concept of “transindividuation” when Zarathustra realizes that he should seek fellow creators instead of followers.²⁶

To a certain degree, Simondon’s concept of psychic and collective individuation bears continuity with Nietzsche’s *principium individuationis*, through which the latter expresses that individuation is an illusion inasmuch that what is individual – identity, objects, or concepts – lies in the eye of the beholder who creates the idea of the individual through a particular, Apollonian, perception of a chaotic and primordial whole. Another difference between these two philos-

25 See Jean-Hugues Barthélémy (2012). „Fifty Key Terms in the Works of Gilbert Simondon”. In: *Gilbert Simondon: Being and Technology* (eds. A. De Boever, A. Murray, J. Roffe and A. Woodward). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 230–231.

26 Gilbert Simondon (2020). *Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information* (tr. T. Adkins). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, p. 314.

ophies is that Simondon's work harbours a realism that exceeds the noumenal sphere; hence, he finds processes of individuation in the living world, for example in the coming-into-existence of a crystal.²⁷ The technical object is for Simondon another example of an individual that comes into existence, but one that is unable to individuate itself and thus tied to an organic and creative impulse by the inventor. A suitable metaphor to depict this process may be that of a termite mount, as suggested by Lynn Margulis and Dorian Sagan in their essay on the evolution of technical objects.²⁸ The technical object thus poses an obstacle to individuation and hence its relation to value, as it is static, "holds" truth and stores memory (see also the sixth section). It therefore also poses an obstacle to the fluxes of anamnesis.²⁹ Stiegler refers to the Platonic division of anamnesis and hypomnesis to explain this difference, but also critically adds that such division supposes a problem which lies in the distinct division of body and soul in anamnesis. Tragedy marks the initial moment of departure in which the excess created by the technical object becomes reincorporated into value.³⁰

Again, what Simondon shares with the pre-Socratics and with Nietzsche is the idea of indeterminacy. Such indeterminacy however must differentiate between coherence and complementarity. Unlike the Christian value system (in which there are clear doctrines on what is good and bad), the *apeiron* harbours incoherence, but nonetheless evokes complementarity.³¹ This enables us to read Simondon's understanding of the tragedy of choice (a decision that is both *for* something or someone and *against* another something or someone) in the con-

27 Simondon, *Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information*.

28 Lynn Margulis and Dorian Sagan (1987). "Gaia and the Evolution of Machines", *The Whole Earth Catalog* 55.

29 Plato develops the concept of anamnesis as part of his cosmology in several of his dialogues; anamnesis is the process of the remembering of the soul that is reborn into the world from immortality. The soul that has forgotten reality (also 'truth' in the sense of *aletheia*, which contains the Greek word *lethe* which means 'oblivion') and has to remember it during lifetime through culture, education, etc.

30 Ars Industrialis, "Anamnesis and Hypomnesis".

31 Simondon, "Values and the Search for Objectivity", p. 403.

text of technology: “What is tragic about choice is no longer fundamental if choice is no longer what establishes communication between an independent city and an independent individual as substances.”³² The proposition here is to read this passage with an emphasis on ‘as substances’: As neither the individual nor the collective are sufficiently defined as substances, as being consistent and exhausted in themselves, since they in-form one another (with and through the technical object), normativity must present itself in a different manner. And indeed, Simondon continues to argue that the concept of choice is merely “a recourse to schemas of already performed actions.”³³ Hence, if, on the one hand, substances are dissolved, psychic and collective individuation is at risk of losing its productive relation (as for example in the context of algorithmic automatization). On the other hand, if instead the individual is “grasped as the singular point of an open infinity of relations,” “there is no longer any opposition between the desire for eternity and the necessity of collective life,”³⁴ then this proposes a co-constitutional understanding of anamnesis and hypomnesis as suggested by Stiegler (see next section). The absence of choice does not necessarily encompass a problem; on the contrary, it makes veritable normative action possible, enabling a contingency of ethics, which ought to be a necessary condition for the subject in the context of organological relations. This is also pointed out by Hui, who writes that, in renegotiating the relation between nature, culture and technics, technology presents a potential moment of veritable contingency (that might be defined as ethico-organological becoming) in which nature is not fixed in its ontology but affiliated to the categories and exceptions attributed to it.³⁵

As the next section wants to show, the cosmologies presented in this article are also relying on different interpretations of thermodynamics. Tragedy supposes a cosmological order that does not seem to align with today’s reality in which technology has become a major ecological force that impacts the stability

32 Ibid., p. 407.

33 Ibid., p. 408.

34 Ibid., p. 407.

35 Hui, „Über Kosmotechnik“, p. 36.

of the global ecosystem disrupted by human impact. This is also reflected in the axiological implications of thermodynamics, where connections to tragedy have been made with regard to the values associated with entropy and negentropy, in which energy is dissipated and temporarily accumulated. Again, the question at hand is that of a system, and of the boundaries of a system. Nietzsche, for example, writes that “philosophical systems are wholly true for their founders only.”³⁶ As Joel White points out, for Nietzsche, the articulation of the hypothesis of heat death (the eventual death of the universe) in thermodynamics poses an obstacle to his concept of the eternal return, which derives from a critique of finalism, whereas heat death ultimately points towards an end. White also explains however that Nietzsche is mainly focussing on the first law of thermodynamics in his notes that came to be part of the *Will to Power* and may have been aware of the potential implications of heat death on the eternal return.³⁷ Stiegler too investigates the concept of thermodynamics in his later works extensively and, while incorporating the idea of an end, maintains the possibility of temporal order or metastability.

5. Disruption, Disindividuation, and “Automatic Nihilism”

Tragedy, thermodynamics, and pharmacology play a crucial role in the values attributed to technology today, and even more so in the relation of technology to current crises such as the climate catastrophe or the mental health crisis. Stiegler links these disruptive issues to an overall and structural loss of individuation (also called “disindividuation” by both Simondon and Stiegler), brought by a proletarianization of the exteriorized memory faculties. Hypomnesia, the exteriorization of memory via the technical object, in its current shape has evoked a feeling of detachment from the world, a perception of others as those “with whom I feel nothing.”³⁸ Many of the social reactions to current crises are defined

36 Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, p. 23.

37 J. White (2024) “Philosophy of Thermodynamics”. Seminar held at The New Centre for Research and Practice. www.youtube.com/watch?v=KALQti4P-mUs (accessed 30 August 2024).

38 Bernard Stiegler (2014). *Symbolic Misery, Vol I: The Hyperindustrial Epoch*

by Stiegler as madness or *affolement*.³⁹ Such madness is also a phenomenon of disruption, which encompasses an end and a break, and has also been defined by Stiegler as “automatic nihilism.”⁴⁰ “Disruption” is the term that Stiegler uses to link a variety of contemporary crises to the problems of the organological relation of the psychic, the social, and the technological in the digital age. For Stiegler, this is primarily expressed through the absence of reason that is attributed to what he calls “careful thinking” (*panser*). Processes of automation deprive us of the sense of making value judgments in the moment, based on individual situations. In this regard, Stiegler warns against an overly expressed ambiguity of the pharmakon, that is, of the tragic value of technological objects being both remedy and poison. The “misuse of the pharmakon of the literal attentional technique”⁴¹ is therefore opposed to what he calls the “the constant need to neganthropologically take care of the pharmakon,”⁴² so as to individually reflect on the values of technology instead of merely giving in to mass media that, via marketing strategies that harness attention and desire, corrodes the ability to create transindividual relations.

Stiegler also claims that, in order to transvalue these issues and the nihilism that is part of it, Nietzsche himself would have to be transvaluated, since, given the special status of the technical object, there is no possibility of surrendering to a higher cosmological cause but simple normative action.⁴³ In this sense, he echoes Simondon’s opting for a contingency of value that is marked by the open infinity of relations which individuals find themselves in. Such a contingency however stands in for an affirmation that does not affirm the absence of a final

(tr. B. Norman). Cambridge & Malden, MA: Polity Press, p. 3.

39 Bernard Stiegler (2019). *The Age of Disruption* (tr. D. Ross). Cambridge: Polity.

40 Ibid., p. 7.

41 Bernard Stiegler (2012). “Relational Ecology and the Digital Pharmakon”, *Culture Machine* 13, p. 6.

42 Stiegler, *The Age of Disruption*, p. 303.

43 Ibid., p. 304.

cause but in fact “the cooling of the solar system”⁴⁴ as implicated by thermodynamics. Hence, Stiegler aims to argue for a normativity that does not orientate itself within the traditional Western cosmology. He rather considers the “tragedy of disruption” to be merely the first step of the transvaluation of all values.⁴⁵ Those who take such measures in this direction of normativity despite an eventual end, such as Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg, are for Stiegler “tragic voices” (“*Greta Thunberg est une parole, et cette parole est une force. Portée par son image tout à fait impressionnante, à l’écart de tout stéréotype, de toute pose, cette parole et la voix qui la dit sont celles d’une tragédienne*”),⁴⁶ echoing what Nietzsche pre-empted when he defined the problem of nihilism. Such a problematization, as he will write in his late preface to *The Birth of Tragedy*, encompasses the rule or even romanticization of *Unklarheit* (“uncertainty”) that goes hand in hand with fascism,⁴⁷ and it is those who take action amidst such uncertainty that are working towards what Stiegler calls “the Neganthropocene.” In *Qu’appelle-t-on panser ? 2. La leçon de Greta Thunberg*, where Stiegler draws a connection between Thunberg and Antigone, it is unclear whether he had Nietzsche’s association with Sophocles’ Antigone as being Apollonian in mind. Nietzsche himself associates Cassandra with the Dionysian tendencies in tragedy. It should be noted here, however, that both Antigone and Cassandra are tragic figures for Nietzsche that complement one another; nonetheless, they represent different tendencies.⁴⁸

Aeschylus’ Cassandra foresees the terrors of the world that no one believes. Apollon, who is captivated by Cassandra’s beauty, gives her the power of prophecy. But when she refuses his courtship, Apollon casts her with the fate that no one would believe her true prophecies. In Sophocles’ *Antigone*, the heroine fol-

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid., p. 301.

46 Bernard Stiegler (2020). *Qu’appelle-t-on panser? 2. La leçon de Greta Thunberg*. Paris: Les Liens qui Libèrent, p. 14–16.

47 Friedrich Nietzsche (1999). *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.

48 Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, p. 27–28.

lows her own ethical consciousness as she buries her brother despite the issued ban against such a burial that would be punished by death, as she responds to the moral guidance of the gods and not of the law. Although there could be an obvious connection drawn between Thunberg and Cassandra, which is that Thunberg too warns people about the end of the world, and those who should listen do not, Stiegler refrains from drawing this connection. Instead, Thunberg, and those who call themselves the last generation, choose, like Antigone, to stand up against the disruption of what Sophocles' called the "divine order," an order that encompasses piety, decency, and caring for one's descendants.⁴⁹ The story of Antigone, who commits suicide after being convicted to being buried alive, is that of normative action amidst existing morality. The reason why Stiegler compares Thunberg to her is because she acts to do what she feels is right, and not what is applied by culture. As this all shows, however, despite Nietzsche declaring decidedly that his work does not aim to be dialectic, there are certain aspects that remain bipolar, in the sense that the Apollonian and Dionysian are not oppositional contradictory essences but varying complementary degrees. Therefore, as the following section aims to show, the question of tragedy and its relation to the hermeneutics of technology is related to the application of bipolar value systems that are common in Western thought. Going beyond this bipolarity may provide further insights to address the question of automatic nihilism and disruption in today's times.

6. Tragedy and the Hermeneutics of Technology from a Global Perspective

This last section of the article aims to take a brief look at the hermeneutics of tragedy in the philosophy of technology from a non-Western perspective. Hui has taken on the task of searching for a possibility of a philosophy of technology that both incorporates onto-epistemological elements of Simondon's and Stiegler's philosophy and a post-colonial and post-Eurocentric perspective, in which the philosophy of technology means to understand technics "as an onto-

⁴⁹ Stiegler, *Qu'appelle-t-on panser?*, p. 14.

logical category [which] must be interrogated in relation to a larger configuration, a ‘cosmology’ proper to the culture from which it emerged.”⁵⁰ His concept of “cosmotechnics” addresses the following: If we consider Simondon’s trajectory that technology is co-emergent with and through a psychic and social milieu, and if such a milieu, as Stiegler suggests, creates the organological relation of thought, culture, and technics, then there should be overlapping yet different conceptualizations of cosmologies *qua* technics. Hence, “cosmotechnics” expresses the ethico-organological axis of cosmology and technics situated within a (non-Western) culture. A culture such as the Chinese has a different relationship to technics than, for example, India, to the extent that even the Greek category of *techne* becomes questionable as a philosophical category; although, as Hui argues, the concept of *techne* persists when considering technics to be the extension of human organs, such as hands, as Andre Leroi-Gourhan suggests,⁵¹ usually discussed under the guise of prosthesis in philosophy and media theory. That is, the Greek concept of *techne* persists for Hui as an anthropological category instead of a philosophical one. Hui also discusses the relevance of Heidegger’s notion of “technics” as *Gestell* in the context of cosmotechnics, and gives credit to it to a certain degree, which is that, in a globalized world in which technology is predominantly defined through Western modernity, *Gestell* still holds truth to China’s relationship with technics, which is perhaps one of the reasons why Heidegger is popular among Eastern Asian thinkers. However, Heidegger’s claim that technology is international is profoundly criticized by Hui.⁵²

Hui figures that tragedy is related to the values appointed to technology in the West and that China emerged from a different value system. This observation is one of the basic grounds for his project of “[sketching] out a possible way to construct a properly *Chinese* philosophy of technology.” Unlike the Ancient Greek myth of Promethianism (which is also mentioned by Nietzsche as being tragic), which counts as the Western myth of the origin of humanity as a being

50 Hui, *The Question Concerning Technology in China*, p. 10.

51 Ibid., p. 7.

52 Ibid., p. 3–4.

of default, Hui writes that, in Chinese culture, there does not exist a myth of Prometheus and that “the radical separation between the world of the gods and the world of man that was necessary for the development of Greek rationality didn’t happen in China. Thought of the Greek type arrived too late to exercise any formative influence – the Chinese had already ‘naturalised the divine’.”⁵³ In a later passage, Hui also writes that China, in his history of thought, did not develop a problematization of the value of technology in nature in comparison to the West, and that, with reference to Japanese philosopher Keji Nishitani, Asian thought had already found the means to “transcend nihility” by refraining from the abstraction of science from lived practice in the first place. Buddhism and Zen-Buddhism, which are deeply rooted in Eastern Asian cultures, also do not invoke the concept of the individual in the same way as Western philosophy, as “being” as a concept is undermined by the practice of self-negation.⁵⁴

According to Hui, the opposition between the divine and the rational that was essential for Western thought and the hermeneutics of technology is not predominant in the cosmotechnical history of China. Tragedy emerges in Europe with

“philosophy’s attempt to separate itself from mythology, meaning that mythology reveals the germinal form of such a mode of philosophising. Every demythologisation is accompanied by a remythologisation, since philosophy is conditioned by an origin from which it can never fully detach itself. Accordingly, in order to interrogate what is at stake with the question of technology, we should turn to the predominant myths of the origins of technology that have been handed down to us, and at once rejected and extended by Western philosophy” (Hui 2016: 11–12).

Hui will address this bipolarity emerging from the differentiation between science and mythology when he traces the origins of systems thinking, that is, cybernetics, back to German idealism, a time in which the interest in tragedy was regained through Hölderlin, Hegel, and Schelling.⁵⁵ In *Recursivity and Contin-*

53 Ibid., p. 14–16.

54 Ibid., p. 242–249.

55 Ibid., p. 11, and also Hui, (2019). *Recursivity and Contingency*. London and

gency, he also writes with reference to Jean-Luc Nancy that tragedy as a concept does not hold in times of ecological destruction that emerged with and through technology, in which humans are no longer, like in Ancient Greece – and neither in Confucianism, Taoism or Buddhism for that matter – subjects of larger cosmic forces. Rather, the modern world and the humans who inhabit it, are themselves responsible for the cosmological shift that the contemporary world is faced with: “The end arrives as an event and discloses the monstrosity of metaphysics.”⁵⁶ Compared to Simondon and Stiegler, the references to Nietzsche remain marginal in Hui’s work. Nonetheless, in all cases, tragedy appears to be marked by a certain bipolarity that persists even though Nietzsche’s reading of tragedy came after German Idealism and sought a renewal of the interest in the topic under different conditions, some of which have undoubtedly paved the ground for the axiologies developed in French philosophy of technology in the twentieth century. Nietzsche explicitly attempts to avoid Hegelian dialectics, as he for example writes in his late preface of the *The Birth of Tragedy*, and also criticised German Idealism at large for its creation of purely noetic systems.⁵⁷ Nietzsche’s anti-systematic thinking that is marked by the excess that bears a resemblance with Simondon in the regard that the latter critiques Norbert Wiener, one of the founders of cybernetics proper, for not considering the outside-perspective of the observer of the system to already pose an obstacle to any conceptualisation of a closed system.⁵⁸

7. Conclusion

This article provided an overview of the significance of tragedy in the philosophy of technology by developing a genealogy of thinkers that have elaborated on the

New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

56 Hui, *Recursivity and Contingency*, p. 233.

57 M. J. M. Branco (2015). “The Song of the Sirens: Nietzsche and Hegel on Music and Freedom”. In: *Nietzsche, German Idealism and its Critics* (eds. K. Hay and L. Ribeiro dos Santos). Nietzsche Today, Vol. 4. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, p. 100.

58 Gilbert Simondon (2017). *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects* (tr. C. Malaspina). Minneapolis, MN: Univocal Publishing, p. 51.

special role that tragedy plays in the hermeneutics of technology, as expressed in Stiegler's concept of "general organology." Tragedy brings forth the question of an axiology that goes beyond a simple dualism of values and as such traces the origins of the question of the technical object beyond its division from epistemology in the philosophy that preceded Plato. Nonetheless, tragedy remains bipolar to a certain degree and bound to a larger cosmological framework that differentiates between being and becoming. But the differentiation of degrees of value, rather than of essences, is certainly of noteworthy importance, and pinpoints towards current questions connected to the hermeneutics of technology, by calling into existence the problem of nihilism. Stiegler's project, in particular, as he often writes, is politically charged with his motivation to reconcile the concepts of hypomnesis and anamnesis in order to understand technologies' effects on emotion, attention and imagination, and to create awareness for a normativity that actively engages with the pharmacology of the technical object.

Hui follows this trajectory by reposing the question of technics and technology from a global and non-Eurocentric perspective. He finds that, by looking especially into Chinese culture, Eastern Asian thought does not have the same dualistic principles in its history of knowledge, and that, hence, the question of tragedy for the hermeneutics of technology only holds limited capacity, since Western technology as deriving from modernity and industrialization is already globalized and affecting non-Western cultures. Nonetheless, a thorough investigation of the continuities of Nietzsche's philosophy and Eastern Asian philosophy would be required to adequately measure Nietzsche's account of tragedy against Chinese philosophy, since Nietzsche distances himself decidedly from German Idealism and the dialectics that emerged from it. "Nietzsche's" tragedy maintains a bipolarity of value, but the differentiation between Apollo and Dionysus is one of degree, allowing him to address the possibility of overcoming nihilism. Both Simondon and Stiegler however call into question the systematic framework that Nietzsche attached to his work, which is that of the eternal return.

As Hui's work shows, there is a continuity between cosmologies, values and invention. The bipolarity of values in Western philosophy is thus reflected in

multiple applications of binaries and divisions. To deem technical objects only either remedy or poison has led to several ethical problems – on the one hand, the enthusiasm of technical invention as a solution to current problems lacks care with regard to social and ecological diversity, and on the other hand, the pessimism directed against technology in relation to culture has turned culture into a sterile und inflexible (and irreflexible) social superstructure. What both techno-optimists and techno-pessimist try to resolve can never be resolved in one way or the other, or kept in permanent balance. To constantly take care of the pharmakon is, according to Stiegler, the main task for approaching ethical problems emerging with and through technology. This article aimed to highlight tragedy and tragic thinking as a way of enduring ambiguity of values in Western philosophy, which therefore deserves special attention as a point of departure for Stiegler's pactice of caretaking of the pharmakon.

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为什么是实践哲学？ ——技术时代的意义定向问题¹

摘要：我们的时代可谓是科学与技术不断进展然而哲学却不断失势的时代，其根本特征是价值多元主义和虚无主义。科学与技术一方面解决了无数个个别问题，但另一方面，它们无法解决人类行动和生活整体的意义定向问题，而后者是我们无法放弃的问题，是哲学所面临的基本问题。基于此，哲学不应该满足于成为某种代偿知识，也不能将自己局限于某种精神科学的范围之内，而是必须重拾其与实践问题的联系（哲学的这种实践要求始于柏拉图与亚里士多德），将自己理解为某种“实践”哲学。

Zusammenfassung: Unsere Zeit kann als eine Epoche beschrieben werden, in der Wissenschaft und Technik unaufhörlich voranschreiten, während die Philosophie zunehmend an Bedeutung verliert. Ihr grundlegendes Merkmal ist der Wertpluralismus und Nihilismus. Wissenschaft und Technik lösen einerseits unzählige spezifische Probleme, doch andererseits können sie das Problem der Sinnorientierung menschlichen Handelns und Lebens nicht bewältigen – ein Problem, auf dessen Lösung wir nicht verzichten können und das ein Grundproblem der Philosophie darstellt. Daher sollte die Philosophie sich nicht damit zufriedengeben, bloß eine Art kompensatorisches Wissen zu sein, noch sollte sie sich auf den Bereich der Geisteswissenschaften beschränken. Vielmehr muss sie ihre Verbindung zu praktischen Problemen wiederherstellen (dieser praktische Anspruch der Philosophie begann bei Platon und Aristoteles) und sich selbst als eine Art „praktische“ Philosophie verstehen.

Abstract: Our time can be described as an era in which science and technology are constantly advancing, while philosophy is increasingly losing importance. Its fundamental characteristic is value pluralism and nihilism. On the one hand, science and technology solve countless specific problems, but on the other

1 本文译自Volpi, F., “Warum praktische Philosophie? Zum Problem der Sinnorientierung im Zeitalter der Technik”, in: G. Figal, J. Grondin, D. J. Schmidt (Hg.), Hermeneutische Wege. Hans-Georg Gadamer zum Hundertsten, Tübingen: Mohr, 2000, 325-333.

hand, they cannot solve the problem of the meaning orientation of human action and life - a problem that we cannot avoid solving and which is a fundamental problem of philosophy. Therefore, philosophy should not be satisfied with being merely a kind of compensatory knowledge, nor should it limit itself to the realm of the Human Sciences. Rather, it must re-establish its connection to practical problems (this practical claim of philosophy began with Plato and Aristotle) and understood itself as a kind of “practical” philosophy.

Keywords: 技术; 虚无主义; 实践哲学

一、失势的哲学

贯穿着所有科学学科的是一种高度专业化的快速发展进程，而这对于哲学研究而言也是一种不可避免的趋势。倘若人们想要“保持水准”，那么，现如今——即便是在哲学中——已经没有其它可能道路。时至今日，即便在哲学领域，也无法设想在现代信息网络和记录系统之外的单独空间了，没有相应的专业化、制度化和财务资助，任何研究都无法实现。

对于活生生的哲学思考而言，这一发展较之任何其它知识领域都更为灾难性，因为随着这一发展趋势，它导致了片面朝向具体可证实的结果，亦即实质上放弃了传统哲学的宏观的提问方式，并且它带来了对哲学史的任何可能角落的历史考察。诚然，这一高度专业化的发展也威胁着扼杀对于哲学思考的实行具有构成性意义的批判性提问和追问的能力，这种提问和追问是面向整体的，针对专业化的个别学科和话语种类，其运作方式必然也是一般性和跨越性的。

然而，在我们所生活的现实之中，依然存在着某些领域和向度，以及由对我们生活世界的技术殖民所引发的问题，对于这些而言，在一般性的迷失方向之中，自觉的、批判性的哲学之思想和提问始终是不可放弃的。

这样一种领域无疑是实践，人类的行动和放任 (Tun und Lassen) 及其伦理、政治意蕴，首要的则是对某种意义筹划和意义定向的需求。随着神学的、意识形态的、政治的、文化的传统意义框架的流逝，对这一问题的解决看起来越发困难，而这一问题也越发急迫。

当今，哲学的这一能力并非不言自明的，因为人们无法对以下这个

到处回响着的问题充耳不闻：在当前，哲学——作为对实践理性之何所是和能力的反思——对于生活之定向，对于我们行动的规范和可能的有约束力的意义建构模型，究竟是否还有话语权？当今时代，哲学已经演变为诸多精神科学学科中的一种，甚至可以说，哲学已经因为其它的知识形式亦即科学与技术而失势了，那么它是否还能够要求为当前的人类之失向给出答案？

笔者的论题是：倘若哲学尚且对此有所要求，那么，它就不能被还原为某种单纯描述性的精神科学。哲学必须保持其与实践问题的联系，并且——诚然是以间接的方式——追求实践意义，亦即将自己重新理解为某种“实践”哲学。

二、科学与技术作为不可放弃的知识

为了检验哲学的这一要求，适当的做法乃是更切近地考察以下这一现象，亦即似乎在当今明显地给予实践问题以决定性答案且使得每一种实践哲学变得多余的现象。当今，我们拥有某种操作性知识（operatives Wissen），较之其它知识，它能够让我们的行动更好、更快速、更有效地成功。这是科学和技术知识，通过其快速的进步，它已经从根本上被证明为能够达到每一种理论上和实践上的成功。其成就是明显的：当今的人们掌握了科学和技术知识，以解决一切类型的问题，以在微观和宏观的向度上成功地行动，以安排和规划其手段与目的、其规则与或然性。简而言之，这一知识深深地渗入了人类行动的一切领域，并且征服和殖民化了我们生活的一切空间。在当今，它似乎是一种无法放弃的知识。这种知识的发展呈现出一种类似于生物学进程的必然性和不可逆转性。

“退出”或彻底拒绝的尝试似乎是浪漫主义的迷梦。时至今日，即便科学与技术具有某些反常的结果，但从总体上拒斥它是行不通的。我们无法自由地在进步和退步之间做选择，因为进步持续地给我们带来问题，而这些问题只有通过继续进步才能被解决。在这一发展背后隐藏着的不僅僅是某种现代的反常，要认识到这一点，我们可以援引海德格尔（尽管不必成为海德格尔主义者）：“然而在此，真正阴森的并非，世界逐渐成为一个技术化的世界；远为阴森的乃是，人类对于世

界的这种变化毫无准备。”²

因此,重要的是探究是否还有尚未耗尽的现存的意義资源,依据它我们可以在全球化意义经验的框架内、在某种有约束力的符号和文化视域内抵御科学和技术。针对科学与技术的挑战,哲学——尤其是实践哲学——究竟当采取何种态度?

三、科学与技术作为对哲学的挑战

一开始,当代哲学思想就把科学与技术的特征看作某种进步的人本主义。它的基础是对科学和技术的功能的某种原则性区分。一般而言,科学旨在知识的积累和增长,这无论如何都是积极的;而技术则是对这一知识的实践应用,这涉及良好应用的问题。技术本身不包含任何诡计或反常;其价值仅仅取决于其应用。因此,在哲学的时代意识中,科学与技术首先、主要站在反抗蒙昧主义和人类异化的一方,为了启蒙和解放而抗争。他们有助于将普罗米修斯从他的枷锁中解放出来,为人类创造一种美好的、至少是更好的生活。在这种进步的、乐观主义的人本主义的框架下,着眼于科学和技术的发展,哲学的批判意识并未尤其警觉。为了制度上的承认和建设,哲学很乐意呈现为精神科学,且通过其奠基于精神科学的、人本主义的总体框架为科学和技术提供某种文化上的巩固。这里说的是“两种文化之间的结合”。

然而,特别是在过去的数十年里,科学和技术在我们世界中的地位及其文化上的自身呈现逐渐地发生了深刻的改变。首先是其含义的改变:科学和技术越来越无法呈现为我们世界的简单组成部分之一。它们越来越成为知识和行动的某种无所不包的支配性形式,成为一种无时无刻不在起支配作用的权力综合体,其命令被认为具有优先性和独特性。科学和技术成为了某种全球性的重大要素。

按照“上帝之死”、“迄今价值的罢黜”、“意义消逝”、“中心的丧失”以及虚无主义的进一步现象,在科学与技术中自行推进的意志摆脱了一切超验束缚,并且依据其自身的动力机制而发展起来。它极大地提升了人类针对自然的力量和干预可能性,且同时在其中引发了对无限增长的追求。

2 Martin Heidegger, *Gelassenheit*, Pfullingen 1959, 20.

诚然，这一发展动力机制和结构改变带来了某种递增的能力，亦即代偿人类的不完美的自然禀赋——诚如赫尔德已经注意到，人类乃是缺陷物”。但它也联系着操纵人类本质的递增能力。“人类”这个普全者、这个普遍概念，这一曾几何时被哲学家们所“思辨”的抽象本质，在当今看起来被充作实验室里基因组的具体[研究]对象，人们可以任意“操作”它。在这一处境中，除了技术上可制作之物以外，技术甚至无法识别任何其它界限；其次，因为技术令人难以置信地扩展了我们的个体和集体自由，因而技术的权利（亦即始终重新尝试可能之物）会得到保护。这样一来，通过祛魅化和虚无主义的意义空洞，技术面临着使得由它所揭示的自由空间变得荒芜的威胁。

四、技术进步与传统人本主义之争

在这一点上，科学和技术开始陷入与传统的、精神科学的人本主义的争论（科学和技术的发展是在这种人本主义的保护下进行的），特别是陷入了与从道德上阐释人类之观念的先验性的争论。自此，一切都改变了。此前联结科学和技术与进步的活力联盟，宣告终结。越发技术化、乃至在基础研究中就已经具有操纵性的科学的诡计与人本主义文化的“自然主义”和“本质主义”正相反对。人们曾经采纳的调解性措辞，所谓的“两种文化的结合”抑或人本主义思想和科学技术知识之间的“幸运和谐”，被证明是空洞的套话。知识的纯粹性和科学与技术的中立性不再是不言自明的。人们在“纯粹”研究的层面上、而不必在应用的层面上就可以了解可能的危险，并且可以严肃地提出以下问题：是否应当——即便是违背了通常被认为是现代的宝贵成就而得到高度肯定的研究自由的原则——拒绝某些实验。

在 19 世纪和 20 世纪上半叶，科学和技术知识的进步持续被阐释为对提高和推动人性有所助益，然而，在当今，许多地方都开始怀疑科学技术发展和传统的、精神科学的人本主义价值之间的据说必要的联盟。即便科学和技术无疑能够给我们提供越来越多的掌控生活的手段，然而，它们根本上没有能力着眼于终极目的，为人类行动和生活整体提供定向，将其安置到某种符号化的意义视角之中。与我们对符号资

源的需求相反, 科学与技术一再被证明为从根本上是“非符号的”。的确, 借助于由它们所施行的世界的祛魅化, 它们掏空了此种视角一般的可通达性, 也因此掏空了以下这些基本问题的在场: 我们从哪里来? 我们是谁? 我们到哪里去?

五、多神论: 决断的不可通约性

这一境况由于科学的价值无涉断言而加剧了。某种纯粹的、价值无涉的知识意义上的科学理想的提出, 导致了传统理性失去了其实质性内涵, 被还原到某种单纯工具性的理性之上。由于不可能从中赢获某种理性的、全球化的行动定向, 最后一种如此建构的科学理想失去了它对生活的重要性。它也失去了其生活意蕴。

在此所刻画的西方理性的危机早已成为著名诊断的对象: 韦伯和斯宾格勒, 胡塞尔和海德格尔, 阿多诺和霍克海默可以作为知名人物被提及。那时候他们批判性地、富有远见地以各个不同的视角所认识到的发展动力的后果, 在今日已经昭然若揭。

在经济人 (*homo oeconomicus*) 的压迫性命令之下, 由工匠人 (*homo faber*) 所带来的世界改变脱离了道德 - 实践理性乃至——在全球化的压力之下——政治 - 实践理性的审判。传统的意义框架和符号资源快速瓦解, 真、善、美的宏大理念似乎到处都变得破碎和无力。在纯粹理性的界限中, 人们认为终极目的和价值是未经论证且无法论证的。人们发现, 曾经的价值专制变成了价值的均力 (*Isosthenie*) 和无政府状态, 而这导致了诸种规定的同等衰弱、诸种禁令的同等愚昧。现代性似乎注入了这样一种信念, 亦即价值的彻底不可通约性与无决断的多神论乃是不可回避的, 而这又导致了怀疑主义和相对主义。因为按照价值来阐释世界导致了价值的普遍中性化。甚至对“价值”概念的使用也是成问题的。因为严格来说, 这里相关的不再是某种价值多神论, 毋宁说是某种决断多神论。时至今日, 形式之物耗尽了实质之物, 习俗之物取代了自然之物。一度由古老欧洲的文化语义学所提供的真理——神话、宗教、宏大意义叙述及其相应的典范、意识形态——在虚无主义的警钟之下放弃了它们的精神。技术深刻地改变了我们的现

实，而由于技术的总体运动的几近地质上的力量，德性和道德尚且拥有的不过是稀有化石般的美好和吸引力。因此，虚无主义不再是病理学状况：它已经成了一般状况。

六、我们身处的悖论

然而，着眼于意义定向的真空状态，人们感受到了某种混乱的不安，这种不安也出现于大量危机文献的消极措辞中。由于实质理性的悬缺与对生活世界空间和意义资源的技术殖民，当今人们以不同方式通过远离现代的理性观（这一理性观已渐成习惯）而对此加以回应。所谓的后现代通过远离这一观念，而尝试重新激活整体性的意义机所，如神话、宗教、艺术和政治，并借此重新赋予生活世界以完整性。然而这种重新激活无法抵挡非理性、无政府主义和失序的幽灵涌现。

在这一背景下，我们也可以理解，何以在当下的后现代中人们不再采取涵盖性的批判方式（如韦伯将现代性阐释为祛魅化和理性化进程，具有黑格尔-马克思特色的历史-辩证的历史哲学，胡塞尔对欧洲科学危机的诊断），而是首要采取一种排斥性的批判。这意味着：不再以尝试接受现代性的问题和立场且纠正其病理的方式进行阐释，而是直面现代性，从根本上拒斥现代性及其理性观，亦即不再将现代性看作一项未完成的规划，而是看作一项失败的规划。因此人们开始寻求西方理性的替代物，回归感性、神话和艺术。

因而，在当今世界中，着眼于我们生活和行动的定向，我们处于某种矛盾处境之中。一方面，科学技术的理性化解决了大量个别问题；另一方面，科学与技术似乎始终是某种次要之物，它无法给定符号经验和终极目的，以便容纳人类行动与生活整体。由于古老欧洲的参照系的基础危机和衰退（无论是宗教的、神学的、形而上学的、道德的还是意识形态的参照系，其传统内涵都被科学-技术的理性化所侵蚀），这一矛盾处境愈发加剧。在具有人本主义思想倾向的精神科学的祭坛上，已经很长时间没有真正的礼拜仪式了，仍呈献的仅仅是代替性圣物。

在人类可制作之物和理性决断（即决断做什么有意义）的能力之间，敞开了某种越来越深的裂缝。科学与技术不断增长的力量扩展了我们行动的作用世界，无论是在宏观层面（对原子能的利用）还是在微观层面（此处最令人不安的例子就是对基因技术的操纵可能性）。我们的处境在原则上又要求某种更有约束力的定向——在这样的处境中，我们不再拥有迄今的意义资源，因此我们的道德定向能力越发虚弱和不稳定。科学与技术启动了对全球的动员，这威胁着每一种迄今的均衡和每一种传统秩序。鉴于这种去稳定化而裂开了某种真空，在其中，当今人类在其本就不稳定的决断能力中（决断做什么，或者更合适的表述，决断让什么）陷入了某种无定向之中，凭借着其情绪的令人惊讶的天然性或者其理性的无限性，人类孤独地处身其中。

与之相对的是今日流行的采取代偿的趋势。人们相信，可以在与科学和技术相反对的知识中，亦即在关于艺术、文学和精神科学的人本主义的知识中发现这种代偿。因此，人们有理由提出精神科学的代偿功能这一课题。此外还有形形色色的宗教、秘传式的替代道路可供选择。哲学思考看起来面临着以下选项：或者是一种偏向于科学和技术的反思，亦即推进知识信仰与技术信仰，或者是采取某种田园牧歌的态度；或者是投身于一种寄生的服务岗位，亦即成为科学的婢女，或者是成为一种苍白的、无能的代偿知识，人们对它的满足要超过某种替代性安慰物。

七、关于一种理性的行动定向的思维模式

着眼于这一普遍的失向，并不缺乏关于一种理性的行动定向的解决方案，并且这些解决方案并不仅仅来自于哲学，毋宁说也来自其它学科，例如社会学（卢曼系统论的社会科学）、人类学（盖伦的人类学制度学说和道德理论）、民族学（康拉德·洛伦兹向道德和文化批判地形的渗入）。

而在哲学方面，在当今的众多选项中，有一些方案脱颖而出，应当得到仔细的检验，因为即便它们没有立刻给出具体行动定向的坐标系和关联点，但它们至少唤醒了和对问题和疑难的某种批判意识，由此而指明了前景。在此我想要提及以下这些方案：

第一，约纳斯对技术文明的伦理学的筹划，建基于“希望原则”。

第二，阿佩尔和哈贝马斯的交谈伦理学作为为伦理和政治理性奠基的范式。

第三，对实践知识的新亚里士多德主义重建，由哲学诠释学，亦即首先由伽达默尔，然后由鲁迪格·布伯纳（Rüdiger Bubner）所发动。在此值得提及的是其它类似的方案，它们以独立的方式尝试某种伦理学或政治学奠基，例如克劳斯·黑尔德（Klaus Held）由现象学和亚里士多德同时激发的“对政治意见的重建”，蒂特·亨利希（Dieter Henrich）的“核和平的伦理学”，汉斯·克拉默（Hans Krämer）的“个体伦理学辩护”或麦金泰尔的“交往主义”。

第四，无数的“应用伦理学”方案，亦即尝试以道德哲学的视角探讨一切由科学和技术的发展以及由全新的侵犯可能性、行动类型和处境所产生的问题。应用伦理学与原则性的东西保持着距离，聚焦于具体的个别问题的讨论和解决，在此它首要在医学（医学伦理学与生物伦理学）、经济和生态领域被提出，它希望以最小化的策略继续前行。

八、开放式问题：做什么，抑或让什么？

在多种选项之中，看起来人们的痛苦仅仅在于选择。然而，我们可以怀疑的是，是否真的有一条引领我们走出危机的道路。因为当今时代没有人可以要求获知行动定向问题、乃至终极的意义问题的答案。而当我们无所定向的运动的后果通过科学和技术而被提升到无法忽视的程度时，这种禁止定向就更具压迫性。也许哲学——作为还原到某种精神科学的哲学——可以满足某种重要的代偿功能，并借此减缓当前的定向匮乏。但借此，这种定向匮乏还远没有被消除。相反：倘若哲学在精神科学的航道中满足于单纯的代偿功能，那么，长此以往就会强化以下这种印象，亦即哲学是一种牧歌式的、最终是无能的知识。从这样一种被精神科学所过滤的哲学出发，很难设想它能够真正符合我们时代的挑战。在传统人性的符号和文化意义资源的渗透之下，重新产生的是以下这个问题：做什么？

通过对马克思的那句著名格言的挑战性颠倒，人们一度说道，仅仅

改变世界是不够的，因为即便没有我们的意愿和协助，世界也会自行改变。毋宁说，重要的是恰当地阐释和调控这种改变，以便让世界不是作为没有我们的世界而自行实现，就像没有君王的“人类王国”。如果这样一种阐释和调控乃是哲学的根本使命，那么，我们就理应即刻重拾哲学的这一“实践”要求，这种要求自柏拉图和亚里士多德开始就隶属于哲学，随着近代与现代哲学朝向精神科学的制度化而遗失了。在这一方向上的首要贡献乃是问题的转变：“做什么”变成了当今时代更为急迫的问题“让什么”。

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Jure Zovko

Technê and Hermeneutics in the Context of Platonic Philosophy

Abstract: This article explores the interplay between *technê* and hermeneutics within Platonic philosophy. It begins by delving into the origins of hermeneutics, stemming from the Greek term *hermeneutikê technê*, and how Plato's dialogues serve as a model for philosophical hermeneutics. It discusses the practical nature of Socratic knowledge and the role of *technê* in Plato's works, emphasizing the unity and diversity of virtues and the ethical implications of professional and virtuous knowledge. The article also examines the hermeneutical significance of *technê* in Plato's works and its influence on philosophers like Schleiermacher and Heidegger. Schleiermacher's mistranslation of *poiêsis* as poetry instead of creation is highlighted, along with Heidegger's interpretation of *technê* as a bringing-forth, revealing the deeper hermeneutical dimension of Platonic *poiêsis*. The article concludes by reflecting on the relevance of hermeneutics in our technological society, emphasizing the need to incorporate modern technology into our understanding of the world.

Zusammenfassung: Dieser Artikel untersucht das Zusammenspiel zwischen *technê* und Hermeneutik innerhalb der platonischen Philosophie. Der Artikel vertieft sich in die Ursprünge der Hermeneutik, die vom griechischen Begriff *hermeneutikê technê* stammt, und wie Platons Dialoge als Modell für die philosophische Hermeneutik dienen. Er diskutiert die praktische Natur des sokratischen Wissens und die Rolle der *technê* in Platons Werken, wobei die Einheit und Vielfalt der Tugenden und die ethischen Implikationen des beruflichen und tugendhaften Wissens betont werden. Der Artikel untersucht auch die hermeneutische Bedeutung der *technê* in Platons Werken und ihren Einfluss auf Philosophen wie Schleiermacher und Heidegger. Schleiermachers Fehlübersetzung von *poiêsis* als Poesie statt als Hervorbringung wird hervorgehoben, ebenso wie Heideggers Interpretation von *technê* als ein Hervorbringen, das die tiefere hermeneutische Dimension der platonischen *poiêsis* offenbart. Der Artikel schließt mit einer Reflexion über die Relevanz der Hermeneutik in unserer technologischen Gesellschaft und betont die Notwendigkeit, moderne Technologie in unser Verständnis der Welt zu integrieren.

摘要: 本文探讨了在柏拉图哲学中技艺 (*technê*) 和诠释学 (阐释与理解) 之间的相互作用。文章首先讨论了诠释学的起源, 表明它源自希腊术语 *hermeneutikê technê*, 以及柏拉图对话如何成为哲学诠释学的典范。

作者进而讨论了苏格拉底知识的实践性质以及 *technê* 在柏拉图作品中的作用，强调了德性的统一性和多样性以及专业知识和道德知识的伦理内涵。此外，文章还探讨了柏拉图作品中 *technê* 的诠释学意义及其对施莱尔马赫和海德格尔等哲学家的影响。施莱尔马赫将 *poiêsis* 误译为诗而非创作，而海德格尔则将 *technê* 解释为“产出” (*hervorbringen*)，这些都揭示出柏拉图 *poiêsis* 的更深层次的诠释学维度。最后，作者反思了诠释学在我们技术社会中的重要性，强调了将现代技术融入我们对世界的理解之中的必要性。

Keywords: Hermeneutics, Technology, techné, Plato, Dilthey, Schleiermacher, Heidegger

I.

One of the most influential epistemologists of the 20th century, Roderick Chisholm, became famous for his assertion that the most important epistemological questions had already been largely clarified in ancient philosophy: “Most of the problems and issues constituting the 'theory of knowledge' were discussed in detail by Plato and Aristotle and by the Greek skeptics. There is some justification, I am afraid, for saying that the subject has made very little progress in the past two thousand years.” (Chisholm, 1982, 109)

Hermeneutics as a universal discipline of epistemology in the humanities is derived from the Greek term *hermeneutikê technê*, and as such means the art of interpretation and understanding. The structure and context of Plato's dialogues was an inspiration for all thinkers of philosophical hermeneutics, from Schlegel and Schleiermacher to Dilthey and Gadamer, who all considered Plato's dialogues as a model of hermeneutical reflection. In his classic essay ‘Origin of Hermeneutics’ (1900), Dilthey wrote that Friedrich Schlegel and Schleiermacher were particularly fascinated by Plato's philosophy because for Plato, reflection on life was the most important guiding principle of his philosophising:

“Plato must be understood as a philosophical artist. The goal of the interpretation is the unity between the character of Plato's philosophizing and the artistic form of Plato's works. Philosophy is here still part of life, life intermingled with conversation, and its literary exposition is only a way of fixing it for memory. So it had to be dialogue, and a dialogue of such an artistic form that it requires its readers to

recreate the living interchange of thoughts. Yet at the same time, according to the strict unity of Platonic thought, each dialogue must be a continuation of something earlier, must prepare for something to come, and thus spin out the threads of the various parts of philosophy. When one follows the relations of the various dialogues to each other, there comes into view the overall nexus of the main works, which reveals Plato's innermost intention. According to Schleiermacher, a real understanding of Plato can only be achieved by grasping this skillfully constructed nexus." (Dilthey, 1924, 328).

Hermeneutics as practical philosophy always starts with the concrete situation in which we find ourselves and then asks what is reasonable there, what is to be done in the sense of what is right. We ourselves must determine what is to be done by consulting others and entering into an exchange of experience with each other. We cannot control our praxis by means of schematic instructions; praxis always implies the choice of different possibilities and we must make our decision instantly most of the time. Gadamer admitted in his self-portrayal written in 1975, that he learned the most important things from Heidegger, especially in the Freiburg lectures "Ontology – Hermeneutics of Facticity" (1923): "At that time, '*phronesis*', the *aretê* of 'practical reason'... became a true magic word for me" (Gadamer 1986, 485).

In order to understand the hermeneutic context of the Greek term *technê*, Socratic knowledge (*epistatai*; ἐπίσταται) is important, which implies practical, non-propositional knowledge. It is understood in terms of the practical ability to know how to swim, ride a horse, play the harp, dance well or know how to treat a patient. In explaining this principle, Socrates refers to an analogy between the knowledge of virtue (*aretê*), which motivates us to achieve a moral way of life of ethical excellence, and the knowledge we find in specialists, experts in certain skills (*technê*). Bruno Snell claims that in contrast to the Ionian dialect, where the words for knowledge and cognition had a theoretical implication, Socrates already "got hold of the model of the craftsman with the Attic word for knowledge *epistēmē*... as well as knowledge and skill, which is also applied to the skills of the trades" (Bruno Snell, 1955, 252). This form of craftsmen's knowledge, of which Socrates is enthusiastic, implies not only practical knowledge,

but also dispositional skills, expertise and familiarity. Someone who “knows” how to repair a machine, an appliance or some tool, has practical knowledge, just as someone who “knows” how to dance well, play the piano or steer a ship. An expert (*technikos*) who knows and understands his work remains a role model for Socrates when assessing a concrete situation with regard to moral action. Socrates, as described by Plato in the early dialogues, often cites as an example the knowledge of cobblers, shipbuilders, cooks, tailors and, above all, doctors, for each of them understands the work he is doing and knows how to do what is expected of him. The fundamental characteristic of the medical, building, pottery or other craft is that it is not primarily for the person practicing it, but for the general benefit of others. A person who has specialized practical knowledge (*technê*) always has an advantage over a person who does not have such knowledge. The same applies to someone who has integrated a certain virtue, i.e. has ethical knowledge, he usually has an advantage over a person without virtues. Reflections on *technê* accompany Plato’s work from the *Apology* to the *Nomoi*. Plato unfolds the philosophical meaning on various levels.

In the *Gorgias*, Plato even explains the linguistic relationship that exists between professional and ethical knowledge. A person who knows about construction (*ta tectonika*) is rightly called a master builder (*tektonikos*) because he is qualified for such an activity. A person who is able to judge what is just (*ta dikaia*) and to shape his life according to this judgment and to serve as an example to others is called just (*dikaios*). The fundamental characteristic of professional and virtuous knowledge is that it is not imbued with egoism, but primarily has the general benefit in mind. The goal of medical skills is not personal gain and one’s own livelihood, but the health of others. For practical knowledge related to *aretê* and *technê* to be truly effective, a prerequisite is its correct application, i.e. its proper use (*orthê chrêsis*; *Men.* 88a; *Euthd.* 280b-281e), which is achieved through education. In order to emphasize the unity and diversity of the virtues (*aretai*), in the dialogues Plato deliberately contrasts Socrates, who argues that virtue is knowledge, with people who are known as experts on the topic dealt with in the dialogues.

Closely related to Socrates' ethical principle of the identity of virtue and knowledge is his famous argument of functionality, which is presented in detail in the first book of the *Republic*. Using the example of functionality, i.e. efficiency (*ergon*), Socrates attempts to explain that everything that has a certain function also has a virtue. We can only see with our eyes if they are healthy, we can only use our bodily organs if they are healthy, we can only weave on a loom if it is in good condition. Applying this analogy to the human soul, Socrates will say that its functioning is manifested in the practice of life and that justice is its main virtue (*aretê*), a virtue that guarantees success. From this, Socrates concludes that the one who lives well and virtuously will be happy and content, and the one who lives the opposite will remain unhappy and restless. So the same fate awaits him as anything that is inadequate or deficient (*kakia*) in any way and cannot fully achieve its goal due to its dysfunctionality.

Schleiermacher sees the analogy between *technê* as the production of artifacts and the poetic activity that produces literary works as an intention in the spirit of Socratic philosophizing. In the early dialogues, the Platonic *technê* has an intentional and teleological relationship to its object: it is directed towards something for something or for someone. The goal to be achieved through the performance of the *technê*, the *ergon*, is ultimately always functionality as the intention of the *technê*. We will encounter a similar argument later in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (1095a 16), when he explains human virtues using an analogy with the correctness and functionality of objects. A well-built ship has its functionality because you can travel on it on the sea or river. For Plato, the doctor, the gym teacher and the helmsman are representatives of different types of technical expertise. Such specialist knowledge only fulfills its purpose when it has to prove itself in a specific individual case.

The skill of medicine is a particular focus of Plato's reflections: Just as the medical skill (*technê*) is necessary to restore the disturbed natural order in a sick organism, so analogously, according to Plato's Socrates, intellectual care is necessary to restore to the soul the original order (*taxis*; *kosmos*) that it has lost through its unvirtuous lifestyle (cf. *Gorg.* 503d-507a).

German Expert for Ancient culture Werner Jaeger (1888-1961) argues that medicine had a significant impact on philosophical reasoning in Plato's time because it became part of the general culture of education. The physician's task, Jaeger argues, is first to try to restore the natural state of things, i.e., disturbed symmetry and proportion in the human body. This was later expressed by the sentence of Juvenal "mens sana in corpore sano," which is already found indirectly in Plato's *Apology*. According to Jaeger, Plato uses this when he speaks of a healthy soul and a healthy *polis* as ideals to be established according to the natural order of things: "Nature strives to attain that intelligible standard (for that is how we must describe it); and from that point of view it is easy to understand how Plato can call strength, health, and beauty the 'virtues' *âperai* of the body and speak of them as parallel to the ethical virtues of the soul. What he means by *aretê* is that symmetry of parts or forces in which, according to medical ideas, normal health consists." (W. Jaeger 1957, 27). Plato transferred another dimension from medicine to philosophy: a physician cannot distance himself so much from his professions that he ceases to be a physician. His professional competence determines him as who he is. Furthermore, the reference to practice is of enormous importance for medicine, which Plato transferred to philosophy. In Plato's dialogues the medical doctor, the gymnastics teacher, and the helmsman are representatives of different kinds of technical knowledge (*technê*). Such specialized knowledge fulfills its purpose only there, where it must prove itself in the concrete individual case. For this reason, it can never be fully captured in general rules or laws. For it is a knowledge that belongs to the type of skills and abilities.

The physician who knows the rules of his profession only *in abstracto* is far from mastering his discipline. The same is true for the philosopher, who knows the ethical norms, but does not strive to apply them in practice, is not yet a true philosopher. In a beautiful ship metaphor, Plato tries to show what happens when populists are at the helm of the ship, especially in the danger of sea storms. It is not democracy and the vote of the people that will help us here, but the expertise of the helmsman. We can learn this in practice from medicine, where the competent doctor treats the disease and tries to cure the sick person.

Socrates, as the founder of European philosophical morality, compares the ethical activity of the actor, known as moral intellectualism, with the activity of the physician, who always acts by striving for practical knowledge or good diagnosis. Health is the term Plato uses most often when arguing about the effects of virtue on the soul of the individual. For example, in the Republic (*Rep.* 610 d-e) it is explained how injustice (*pleonexia*) harms the soul, and as such it has been compared to disease, which destroys our organism, while righteousness of the soul is compared to health which restores natural condition.

Plato wants to emphasize that the original aim of philosophizing is the establishment of the unity of the human person and the elimination of everything that makes this impossible. In the context of cultivating one's own personality, Socrates regards virtue as an integrated part of the soul. The virtues are not only an essential characteristic of the human soul (cf. *Apol.* 20a), but also a fundamental determinant of his actions.

In the dialogue *Protagoras*, Socrates asks the respected sophist Protagoras to clarify his position on knowledge (*epistêmê*), namely whether knowledge is decisive (*archikon*) for most people or whether anger, lust (*hedonê*), suffering or perhaps fear prevail among them. In distinguishing between good and evil, will we be guided primarily by knowledge and wise judgment (*phronêsis*; cf. *Prot.* 252 b-c), and not be guided by our emotions.

In the Socratic early dialogue *Ion*, the interpretative activity of the rhapsodist is described as a *technê* right at the beginning of the dialogue. *Technê* is mentioned here as the "skill of specialists" (530 b; 531 e; 532 c; 537 d, e; 538 a, e, 540 e) or as "practical knowledge, skill" (532 e; 533 d, e; 534 b, e; 537 d, e, 538 a, 540 b; 541 a). Furthermore, *technê* is defined as an art in the sense of skill (530 c; 532 e) or as a "methodical activity based on knowledge" (532 c, d; 536 c, d; 537 a, c). Furthermore, a connection is made in the dialogue between *technê* and *epistêmê* (532 c; 541), whereby the adjective *technikos* is also used in the sense of "equipped with practical knowledge" (542 a, b).

After Socrates' ironic remark that he has always admired the rhapsodes for their art of interpreting great poets, especially Homer as the greatest of them

(530 b), in the context of the Socratic elenchistic examination the theme of understanding (*dianoia*) is placed in the foreground. A physician understands his art in order to be able to practice it, i.e. to help the sick; the same applies to the shipbuilder and to experts in other *technai*. Accordingly, Socrates makes an analogous claim that “no one can be a rhapsode if he does not understand (*ei me syneiê*) what the poet means” (530 c).

The intention of the Socratic elenchus is to prove, with the help of the explication of the structure of *technê*, that Ion has by no means ‘presented many beautiful interpretations of Homer’ because he is unable to make a correct judgement on the Homeric text, which he should do as an alleged expert. The competent interpreter should proceed like an expert (*technikos*) in his *technê* and be able to distinguish between what is right and wrong, good and bad. Anyone who wants to be an expert in a particular technique must be trained for it: the same applies to anyone who wants to be an interpreter, *hermeneus*, of the Homeric text, to understand (*synienai*) the intention (*dianoia*) of texts, and not just individual words without context. In the course of the conversation, Socrates convinces Ion that because he does not understand the text sufficiently, he is also unable to judge whether Homer is telling the truth. In other words, Ion does not have a general professional art of interpretation in the sense of a skill (*technê*).

The argument of the Socratic elenchus consists in the assertion that it is only ‘because of art (*technê*) that one can speak well of Homer,’ not because the interpreter is moved by divine power and enthusiasm (cf. *Ion* 533 d 1-3). In contrast to the poet, who produces excellent poetic works through divine power and enthusiasm of the soul, the interpreter should soberly grasp the meaning and intention of the text. In the later dialogue *Phaedrus*, Plato claims with regard to interpretation that the written text, *logoi gegramenoi*, has a substantial disadvantage in that it cannot protect itself from misunderstandings and deliberate misinterpretations: ‘And if the writing (*graphê*) is insulted or undeservedly insulted, it always needs its father’s help (*boêthou*); for it is neither able to protect itself nor to help itself.’ (*Phaedrus* 275 e)

As the founder of modern hermeneutics, Schleiermacher analyzed both passages from the Platonic dialogues *Ion* and *Phaedrus*. In his lecture, delivered on August 12th, 1829, at the Prussian Academy of Sciences “On the Concept of Hermeneutics, With reference to F. A. Wolf’s Allusions and Ast’s Textbook,” Schleiermacher analyzes the hermeneutic procedure of the Platonic rhapsodist and claims that “the interpreter puts himself as far as possible into the whole constitution of the writer and therefore not infrequently behaves in fact like the Platonic rhapsodist, who however confesses very naively that he is able to explain Homer excellently, but often does not really want to elucidate another poet or prose writer” (Schleiermacher 2002, 612). The purpose of putting the interpreter in the author’s position is to reconstruct his creative intention.

Following on from Plato, Schleiermacher recognised that human understanding consists of two segments: on the one hand, the meaning of words or the sense of sentences is explored in the context of the wholeness of language. On the other hand, hermeneutics consists of the realisation that in the process of understanding, individual thought formation is thoroughly explored and reconstructed. The focus on the general and universal aspects of language is characterised as grammatical interpretation, while the ‘technical’ or interpretation is primarily aimed at the author’s thought process or individual production. In his *Lectures on Ethics* (1812/13), Schleiermacher emphasized this twofold dimension of language as the basis of hermeneutic interpretation:

“Viewed from the side of language, however, the technical discipline of hermeneutics arises from the fact that every speech can only be regarded as an objective representation, inasmuch as it is taken from language and can be understood from it, but that on the other hand it can only arise as the action of an individual, and as such, even if it is analytical in its content, nevertheless carries free synthesis in itself from its less essential elements. The balancing of both elements makes understanding and interpretation an art.” (Schleiermacher, 1990, 116).

The process of understanding the reconstruction of the author’s thought development expresses the dual function of understanding, firstly the intentional

reference to the language through grammatical interpretation and secondly the recording of the thought formulation through “technical” or psychological interpretation. Both forms of interpretation are interdependent and form the unified act of understanding. Understanding is made possible by the “togetherness” of these two elements of interpretation, whereby the grammatical and the “technical” interpretation are “completely equal” to each other (cf. Schleiermacher 2012, 121).

In his *Lectures on Dialectics*, Schleiermacher takes up Plato’s topos from the dialogue *Phaedrus* that the task of the interpreter is to help the text. Schleiermacher points out the essential difference between a text to be interpreted and a dialogue partner present: the book cannot ‘answer for itself,’ whereas the person with whom one is discussing can do so at any time. Therefore, it remains the hermeneutical responsibility of every reader and interpreter to deal with the work as with a dialogue partner in an appropriate effort to understand it and ‘to place oneself entirely in the author’s point of view and soul’ and to take responsibility for the text in such a way that the author, ‘if he himself were present, would not be able to say anything against [...] objections’ (KGA Schleiermacher, II/10, 2, 403).

As a translator of Plato’s dialogues, Schleiermacher recognized that it is no coincidence that the semantic fields of ability to perform art (*technê*) and knowledge (*epistêmê*) overlap. In any case, the concept of knowledge also encompasses its non-propositional forms. It is therefore possible for Plato to see a form of knowledge in the competence of the skilled craftsman.

Schleiermacher saw an analogy between the productive activity of the craftsman and that of the poet. Just as the shipbuilder constructs a ship out of wood with his *technê*, the poet creates a poetic work of art from the universal language, the special feature of which is a particular style. Both works are characterized by a specific, unique form. Schleiermacher sees reconstructing this creative process of the thinker and poet, the creative unfolding of his thoughts, as the task of “technical interpretation,” which is derived from the original meaning of the value *technê*. According to Schleiermacher, the primary task of technical interpretation in hermeneutics is to reconstruct the author’s individual style. The task

of technical interpretation is the complete understanding of style in the context of written language. In the compendium-like presentation of hermeneutics from 1819, Schleiermacher writes: “We are accustomed to understand style as the treatment of language. But thought and language merge everywhere, and the peculiar way of conceiving the object merges into the arrangement and thus also into the treatment of language” (Schleiermacher 1974, 104). Thoughts are individualized forms of language that are reconstructed and grasped through technical interpretation. The construction process, which Schleiermacher derived from the Grecian *technê*, remains the primary task of hermeneutic understanding, i.e. the reconstruction of technical or artistic production (cf. Schleiermacher 1974, 31). Metaphors, allegories, word and language games are, according to Schleiermacher, characteristics and peculiarities of an author’s technical production. In contrast, Schleiermacher claims that “there is no technical interpretation for myth, because it cannot originate from an individual” (Schleiermacher 1974, 81). Plato wrote dialogues because he wanted to reproduce the lively conversations of his teacher Socrates and produced works of art from them. Plato’s choice of the form of dialogue was decisive for the emergence of hermeneutics in Friedrich Schlegel and Schleiermacher because the main task of the Platonic dialog is to appeal to the reader’s self-activity and to enter into conversation with him. The Platonic dialogue is an invitation to hermeneutic reflection.

Schleiermacher brings the hermeneutical dimension of *technê* to light paradoxically through his mistranslation of the famous passage from Plato’s *Symposium* (205 bc.) For the sake of plausibility, we first give the Greek text, then Schleiermacher’s translation and finally my English translation of the Greek text:

Symposium 205 cd: οἴσθ’ ὅτι ποιήσις ἐστὶ τι πολὺ. ἢ γάρ τοι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὄντι ἰόντι ὀτρωοῦν αἰτία πᾶσά ἐστι ποιήσις, ὥστε καὶ αἱ ὑπὸ πάσαις ταῖς τέχναις ἐργασίαι ποιήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ τούτων δημιουργοὶ πάντες ποιηταί.

Schleiermacher:

„Du weißt doch daß Dichtung etwas gar vielfältiges ist. Denn was nur für irgend etwas Ursache wird aus dem Nichtsein ins Sein zu

treten ist insgesamt Dichtung. Daher liegt auch bei den Hervorbringungen aller Künste Dichtung zugrunde, und die Meister darin sind sämtlich Dichter.“ (*Platon Werke, Band 3: Phaidon. Das Gastmahl. Kratylos*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1990, 325)

“You know that the ‘*poiêsis*’ [creation] is manifold: after all when something comes into existence which has not existed before, the whole cause of this is ‘creation’ [*poiêsis*]; so that the production of every kinds of expertise [*technai*] are creations [*poiêsis*]; and their craftsmen are all creators”.

It is curious that Schleiermacher translates *poiêsis* here as poetry, which in itself is a misunderstanding of the meaning of the word. Consequently, he goes on to translate *technê* as the poet’s artistic activity. In Schleiermacher’s sense, it is a technical, i.e. artistic activity according to which the poet is the master of the producing art, of poetry. Hermeneutic understanding is a reconstruction of the author’s creative process. One of the important achievements of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics is the insight that in the process of understanding, individual thought formation is thoroughly analyzed and reconstructed. The focus on the general and universal aspects of language is characterized as grammatical interpretation, while the “technical” interpretation is primarily aimed at the author’s act of thought or his individual production. Language, in its universality, proves to be the substantial *hypokeimenon*, the basis on which individual creations and thought developments take place. This happens mainly in the creativity of poets and poetic philosophers like Plato.

If we interpret *technê* as *poiêsis* in the sense of the cause, that something that was not before becomes something through production and then is, as Heidegger did in his epochal essay “The Question Concerning Technology (1954),” we open up the deeper hermeneutical dimension of Platonic *poiêsis*:

“It is of utmost importance that we think bringing-forth [*Hervorbringen*] in its full scope and at the same time in the sense in which the Greeks thought it. Not only handicraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical bringing into appearance and concrete imagery, is a bringing-forth, ποιήσις. Φύσις, also, the arising of something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, ποιήσις. Φύσις is indeed ποιήσις in the highest sense (Heidegger, 2000, 12).

An account of Heidegger's hermeneutic relevance of *technê* requires special analysis because it is a condition for understanding his practice-oriented hermeneutics. Heidegger's lectures on the Platonic dialog *Sophistes* testify to how he discovered in the Greek understanding of non-propositional segments of being-in-the-world: "In the case of *τέχνη*, knowing oneself is directed towards the *ποιητόν*, towards what is yet to be produced, i.e. what is not yet". (Heidegger 1992, 40).

Heidegger's "Hermeneutics of Dasein" implies first and foremost the analysis of the being that we ourselves are and that "is understood in its existence (being) in relation to this being and as such exists in the world." For Heidegger, "being-in-the-world" as an existential, represents a process of cognition in which everyone analyzes their possibilities "in the world," whereby understanding is not limited to being, but also to getting to know the "things" that are an integral part of our existence in the world. This implies that "recognizing" the "mode of being of the human being as being-in-the-world" also presupposes our practical, everyday exploration of the world, whereby the horizon of understanding is conditioned by the understanding of certain things in the world that are of particular significance for our world as that which is available to us.

Understanding as the articulation of the meaningful-functional context of things in the world is only possible thanks to the fact that the "self-interpretation" of one's own possibility is an essential part of the being of Dasein. The articulation of meaning represents the framework in which the understanding of one's own existence and practical action in the world takes place by getting to know and discovering things in their original usefulness. Heidegger speaks metaphorically of the circle of understanding, in which the "positive possibility of original knowledge" is contained, and poses the question of how one enters it in the first place so that the process of understanding can take place:

"The 'circle' in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein that is, in the understanding which interprets. An entity for which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an issue, has, ontologically, a circular structure." (Heidegger 1962, 195)

Through the ontologization of hermeneutics, Heidegger brings about a complete transformation of traditional hermeneutics. The question of the meaning of the text, what is the main subject of discussion in the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and F. Schlegel, is transformed in Heidegger's philosophy into the question of being, i.e. existence (*Dasein*). 'Being-in-the world' (das In-der-Welt-Sein), as an existential, for Heidegger means the process of grasping in the course of which the *Dasein* explores its potentialities 'in the world,' where its understanding is not limited to the existence, but also relates to cognising 'the things' of which our very existence in the world consists (Heidegger 1977, 71).

When Heidegger claims that 'cognisance' (*Verstehen*) is the human's 'modus of being as the being in the world,' this implies our practical, everyday coming to terms with the things, our orientation in the world, where the horizon of understanding rests on the understanding of individual entities in the world that do not amount to insignificant, empty pieces with no relevance for the world in which we live; they are the given that marks us existentially.

The world I cognise and grasp by existing is indeed a significant, internally connected totality in which the individual objects assume their significance through their practical use, and also refer to each other. Heidegger's famous example of a hammer shows that even the most ordinary Thing (*Zeug*) earns a special hermeneutical dimension by its practical use, by hammering a nail into a piece of wood, as it discloses the world as "the totality of references" (*Verweisungszusammenhang*).

In this context, Heidegger refers to the practical significance of the Greek word *πράγματα* (*Being and Time*, §15). A hammer may be an ordinary thing we do not understand, but those who are aware of its practical purpose and use will clearly see in it the hammering of nails, the pieces of wood, the house-building, the hammering of horse-shoe, or the shoemaker's practice. Heidegger's idea of „understanding how to do something“ („Sich-auf-etwas-Verstehen“) implies a type of „know-how“ of competent, practical dealing with things.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger cites examples and practices from everyday life that illustrate our hermeneutic relationship to the things that are at our disposal. Man exists every day by grasping the door handle and opening the door. The door

handle is not just an object, it is on the door, the door is in the house, the house is my home in the city where I live, with known and unknown people. The world that I know and understand by existing is in reality a coherent whole of meaning in which certain things receive their meaning through their practical use and at the same time refer to one another. Heidegger's famous example of a hammer shows how the most ordinary thing (*Zeug*) in the world acquires a special hermeneutical dimension through its practical use, the hammering of nails into boards, because it reveals the world as a "context of reference" (*Verweisungszusammenhang*). A hammer can be an ordinary object that we do not understand, but for those who get to know its intended purpose (*Worumwillen*) and understand its practical use, it becomes clear that in the hammering of a hammer we recognize nails, boards, the building of a house to live in, the making of shoes or the shoeing of a horse.

Heidegger's hermeneutic discovery is contained in the insight that the meaning of words comes from the practice of life and represents the articulation of practical dealings with things as they are arranged in their functional context. It can therefore be said with full justification that man is a hermeneuticist from birth who, in living together with other people, tries to get to know, know and recognize the concrete meaning and diverse role of "things" in the world in which he lives.

If you take a smartphone instead of a hammer as an object of daily use, it becomes clear how much this device determines people's everyday lives today. Many people carry a device with an internet connection with them at all times. This has led to a sharp increase in the use of social networks and instant messaging in everyday life, as well as web search engines, online maps and navigation systems, online shopping and mobile payments. The smartphone has thus become the epitome of the digital lifestyle, determining our way of being in the world (*das In-der-Welt-sein*).

Hermeneutic reflection, in other words, if it is going to remain a relevant approach to our technological society, ought to incorporate products and achievements of modern technology as an integral part of our concept of a "world." Our everyday "being-in-the-world" would be unthinkable without the sophisticated products of technology familiar to us today, from cell phones to the worldwide web and cloud computing. Our understanding of the contextuality and interrelationships of the things which determine our "being-in-the-world"

today is not made possible only or even primarily by the hammers and nails, handles and doors which Heidegger has analyzed in detail in *Being and Time*, but first and foremost by laptops and cellphones, e-mails and the Internet (cf. Zovko, 2023). Our Being-in-the-world is also the world of technological instruments, which have also character of *Zuhandensein* (the Ready-to-hand) because they are available to us in our practical life

In his essay “The Question Concerning Technology” (1954), Heidegger sums up his explication of the original meaning of the term τέχνη:

“Τεχνικόν means that which belongs to τέχνη. We must observe two things with respect to the meaning of this word. One is that τέχνη is the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. Τέχνη belongs to bringing-forth, to ποίησις; it is something poetic. The other thing that we should observe with regard to τέχνη is even more important. From earliest times until Plato the word τέχνη is linked with the word ἐπιστήμη. Both words are terms for knowing in the widest sense. They mean to be entirely at home in something, to understand and be expert in it. Such knowing provides an opening up. As an opening up it is a revealing.” (Heidegger 2000, 14).

This reflection by Heidegger on the structure of modern technology, which should be thought through in the future from the original meaning of the Greek word τέχνη, opens up new dimensions for the design of technology in the future of our life-world.

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V A R I A

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论狄尔泰解释学的三层次¹

摘要：狄尔泰对精神科学的奠基经历了从心理学到解释学的转变，但是我们对于狄尔泰解释学的研究不能仅限于他的后期思想，他对于精神科学的理解活动的反思都可纳入解释学中，即使没有使用“解释学”一词。狄尔泰对于解释学一直持有传统的方法论观念，但他模仿康德探讨精神科学如何可能，这是一种认识论研究，不同于一般的方法论。同时他又是以生命哲学的立场来思考精神科学认识问题，已经涉及到存在论层面。为了澄清其思想，可以将狄尔泰的解释学分为方法论、认识论和存在论三个层次，其中认识论层面的解释学是核心，解释学方法论是从认识批判中引申出来的，而回答认识论问题不可避免地又涉及到存在论层面，正是这些存在论内容影响了后来存在论解释学的发展。他的探索至今仍能为寻求存在论－认识论－方法论相统一的解释学提供有益的启示和借鉴。

Zusammenfassung: Diltheys Grundlegung der Geisteswissenschaften vollzog einen Übergang von der Psychologie zur Hermeneutik, aber unsere Untersuchung von Diltheys Hermeneutik kann sich nicht auf seine späteren Gedanken beschränken; seine Überlegungen zur Verstehenstätigkeit in der Geisteswissenschaft können in die Geschichte der Entwicklung der Hermeneutik einbezogen werden, auch wenn der Begriff „Hermeneutik“ in jenem Kontext noch nicht verwendet wurde. Dilthey hat immer ein traditionelles methodologisches Konzept der Hermeneutik vertreten, aber seine kantische Herangehensweise zu der Frage, wie Geisteswissenschaft möglich ist, blieb eine erkenntnistheoretische, im Unterschied zu einer frei methodologischen. Zugleich denkt über das Problem des geisteswissenschaftlichen Verstehens vom Standpunkt der Lebensphilosophie aus nach, die bereits eine ontologische Dimension beinhaltet. Um seine Ideen zu verdeutlichen, kann man Diltheys Hermeneutik in drei Ebenen einteilen: die methodologische, die erkenntnistheoretische und die ontologische, wobei die erkenntnistheoretische Hermeneutik im Mittelpunkt steht, die hermeneutische Methodologie aus der Erkenntniskritik abgeleitet wird und die Beantwortung der erkenntnistheoretischen Frage zwangsläufig die ontologische Ebene einbezieht. Es ist dieser ontologische Gehalt, der die Entwicklung der ontologischen Hermeneutik in späteren Jahren geprägt hat. Überlegungen dazu sind nach wie

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vor eine nützliche Quelle für Inspiration und eine wichtige Referenz für die Suche nach einer ontologisch-erkenntnistheoretisch-methodologischen Einheit der Hermeneutik.

Abstract: Dilthey's grounding of the human sciences made a transition from psychology to hermeneutics, but our study of Dilthey's hermeneutics cannot be limited to his later thoughts; his reflections on the activity of understanding in the human sciences can be included in hermeneutics, even if the term "hermeneutics" is not used. Dilthey has always advocated a traditional methodological concept of hermeneutics, but his Kantian exploration of how human sciences are possible was an epistemological study, as opposed to an ordinary methodological study. At the same time, he reflects on the problem of understanding in the human sciences from the point of view of the philosophy of life, which already contains an ontological dimension. To clarify his ideas, Dilthey's hermeneutics can be divided into three levels: the methodological, the epistemological, and the ontological, whereby the epistemological hermeneutics is at the center, the hermeneutic methodology is derived from the critique of knowledge and the answer to the epistemological question inevitably leads to the ontological level. It is this ontological content that shaped the development of ontological hermeneutics in later years. His reflections continue to be a great source of inspiration and an important reference for the philosophical inquiry into an ontological-epistemological-methodological unity of hermeneutics.

Keywords: 生命, 解释学, 存在论, 认识论, 方法论

在解释学史上狄尔泰是一位重要的承前启后的人物,一方面他继承了施莱尔马赫建立普遍解释学的努力,将解释学从文本解释的方法论发展为整个精神科学的基础。解释学和他的生命哲学融合在一起,不仅涉及文本解释,而且涉及人的行为、社会实在、历史以及各种精神创造物的理解和解释,总之囊括了人类文化生命的一切表现形式。另一方面他对于生命和历史实在的强调影响了二十世纪以海德格尔、伽达默尔为代表的哲学解释学的发展,虽然他们都批评狄尔泰的解释学仍局限于科学方法论。

值得注意的是,狄尔泰并没有专门致力于发展一种解释学,他毕生追求的理论目标是为精神科学奠基的所谓“历史理性批判”。不过很遗憾,狄尔泰的思想经历了不断自我调整和批判,加之他本人学术兴趣广泛,研究内容涉及众多领域,历史理性批判计划最终没有完成,出

版的著作只占计划中的一小部分，大量想法保存在手稿中。在他的历史理性批判中历史主义、心理学、生命哲学、实证主义和解释学等都对他产生了影响，因而其思想显得非常庞杂，许多想法是不完善的、探索性的。解释学在狄尔泰思想中到底处于一个什么地位，作用如何，他的哪些思想可以归入“解释学”名下，这些思想有什么样的层次关系，是值得深入研究的问题。

一、狄尔泰解释学的范围和层次

当前学界许多研究者将狄尔泰的学术生涯大致分为三个时期：从1850年到1876年是早期，这一阶段受到自然科学和实证主义的影响，代表作品有《施莱尔马赫传》（第一卷）（1870）、《从人类、社会、国家的角度看科学史研究》（1875）；从1877年到1900年是中期，这一时期以关注精神科学和心理学方法为特征，代表作品有《精神科学引论》（第一卷）（1883）和《描述与分析的心理学观念》（1894）；从1900年到1911年去世是后期阶段，这一阶段关注意解释学、世界观学说，并且受到胡塞尔现象学的影响，代表作品有《解释学的兴起》（1900）和《精神科学中历史世界的建构》（1906）。¹中期和后期可以说是狄尔泰创立自己思想的时期。狄尔泰的“历史理性批判”计划成型于19世纪80年代的《布雷斯劳手稿》时期，十年后在柏林期间进行了某些修改，称为“柏林计划”。从他的庞大计划来看，狄尔泰正式发表的作品并不多，很多计划中的内容是以片段的手稿形式保存下来，比如他中期为精神科学奠基的重要作品《精神科学引论》，只发表了计划中的前两卷，内容只涉及奠基的准备工作，而真正主要的思想内容保存在手稿中。晚年的重要作品《精神科学中历史世界的建构》也只发表了一部分。对于未发表的部分，狄尔泰显然觉得自己还未思考成熟，但从今天的眼光来看，其中包含了丰富的思想，具有重要的理论价值。

早期对施莱尔马赫的研究涉及到施莱尔马赫的解释学及其与解释学传统的关系，显示了狄尔泰对于解释学史的渊博知识。然而直到1900

1 参见查尔斯·巴姆巴赫：《海德格尔、狄尔泰与历史主义的危机》，李果译、卓立译校，江苏人民出版社，2021年，第126页。

年以发表《解释学的兴起》为标志，解释学才重新成为关注对象，并且和精神科学奠基联系起来。也就是说，解释学在狄尔泰的中期似乎是缺失的，在这一时期发表的《精神科学引论》中解释学这个词甚至都没有出现过。根据莱辛 (Hans-Ulrich Lessing) 的研究，狄尔泰的精神科学观念更突出了历史和社会现实的领域，而非传统解释学涉及的神学、文学等文本领域，因而要为精神科学奠基，认识论和心理学比起解释学来更有相关性。² 由于把解释学和精神科学奠基关联起来出现在后期的文本中，米施 (Georg Misch) 和博尔诺 (Otto Friedrich Bollnow) 甚至认为狄尔泰为精神科学奠基表现出从心理学基础到解释学基础的转变。但现在的研究更强调狄尔泰思想中认识论 - 心理学 - 解释学的统一性，狄尔泰后期的解释学转向不能视为与早先作品的决裂，而只是重点的转换。³ 在后期的作品中，描述心理学和解释学是互补的，且解释学被赋予了优先性。⁴

然而，如果区分狄尔泰中期的心理学阶段和后期的解释学阶段，那么他中期的重要作品是不是就应排斥在解释学范围之外呢？显然不能这样。他的中期思想已经涉及到精神科学不同于自然科学的特点和研究方式的重要论述，对于解释学的发展具有重要意义，理应属于解释学，一般解释学史也会涉及到这方面的内容。实际上解释学作为一门学科，其学科界定远没有达到清晰的程度，广义地讲，一切对于理解和解释活动的反思都可纳入解释学的范围，并不存在独一无二的解释学，许多不同的构想都可被归为解释学，哪怕没有使用“解释学”这个名称。因此我们对狄尔泰解释学的研究不能局限于狄尔泰自己使用“解释学”一词时所涉及的内容，而是要从他的整个思想对解释学的影响和意义的角度进行研究。也就是说，虽然很多思想狄尔泰未将其归入“解释学”名下，但也可以看成是解释学的。

其实，狄尔泰对于“解释学”一词的使用在不同的语境中有不同的含

2 参见Hans-Ulrich Lessing, *Wilhelm Dilthey: Eine Einführung*, Köln: UTB-Böhlau Verlag, 2011, 42.

3 参见查尔斯·巴姆巴赫：《海德格尔、狄尔泰与历史主义的危机》，第127页。

4 参见约翰·德·穆尔：《有限性的悲剧》，吕和应译，上海三联书店，2013年，第241页。

义。比如他说解释学是“解释文献的技艺学”⁵；“阐释的最高形态就是对于人类存在的文字记录所做的解释。这种艺术是语文学的基础，关于这门艺术的科学就是解释学。”⁶这是将解释学限定在书面表达的解释技艺，是继承了施莱尔马赫的解释学观念。有时他更为宽泛地将解释学作为包括了其他生命表现（如姿势、动作、艺术品等）的解释技艺。他的理论雄心是要为精神科学奠基：“由于综合精神科学的认识论、逻辑学和方法论，这门解释理论成了哲学和历史科学之间的重要联系环节，成了奠定精神科学基础的重要部分。”⁷狄尔泰的弟子米施和格罗图伊森（Bernhard Groethuysen），将狄尔泰就理解活动所说的一切都归入解释学，从而促进了解释学这一概念的扩展，研究狄尔泰的文献也将其关于理解活动的思考以及对理解和说明的区分，都归入解释学。⁸这样来看，从狄尔泰青年时代所写的获奖论文《从早期新教解释学看施莱尔马赫的解释学体系》到他中年发表的《精神科学引论》，再到他晚年未完成的《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，还有众多的论文、演讲、手稿中都包含有丰富的解释学思想。

在一般的解释学史的叙事中，狄尔泰的解释学被归于方法论解释学，并且与二十世纪由海德格尔、伽达默尔发展起来存在论解释学相对立。确实，不管是前期还是后期，狄尔泰对解释学始终抱有一种传统的方法论观念。传统的解释学是解释文本的技艺和方法。伽达默尔认为：“当我们今天讲到解释学，我们是处于近代科学传统之中。与这个传统相适应的‘解释学’这个用语的使用正是随着现代方法学概念和科学概念的产生而开始的。”⁹狄尔泰所处的时代是自然科学昌盛，精神科学的

5 狄尔泰：《解释学的兴起》，洪汉鼎译，载《理解与解释——诠释学经典文选》，洪汉鼎主编，东方出版社，2006年，第78页。译者的原标题为“诠释学的起源”。

6 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，安延明译，中国人民大学出版社，2010年，第217页。

7 狄尔泰：《解释学的兴起》，洪汉鼎译，载《理解与解释——诠释学经典文选》，第92页。

8 参见G.肖尔茨《哲学诠释学历史中的变革》，杨栋译，载《世界哲学》2021年第5期，第102页。

9 汉斯-格奥尔格·伽达默尔：《真理与方法》（下卷），洪汉鼎译，上海译文出版社1999年版，第715页。译文有改动。

独立意识逐渐明确并极力摆脱自然科学模式影响的年代。由于自然科学的发展及其成功取决于科学方法的运用，他对于精神科学的奠基就是要模仿自然科学，发展独特的精神科学的方法论。他最终从解释学传统中获得了启示。

可以说方法论从古代到狄尔泰都是解释学的主流。二十世纪发展的哲学解释学是一种关于人的历史性生存和存在理解的哲学，这就形成了从方法论解释学到存在论解释学的“转向”。虽然哲学解释学批判狄尔泰的解释学思想过于狭隘，局限于科学方法论，但我们应看到，他对解释学的方法论观念是他那个时代普遍具有的。他将解释学作为精神科学的一般方法论，表明他进一步推进了方法论解释学，扩展了其范围。另一方面，我们应该看到，他对于精神科学的奠基其实已经超出了方法论解释学，涉及到更为基础的人的存在问题。因为他是以生命哲学作为基础来思考精神科学问题的，精神科学的对象是生命的表达，对它们的理解和解释归根结底是生命理解自身的意义和目的，而这些都是生命在其历史中所经验到的。可以说，狄尔泰的解释学已经涉及到存在论层面。正如格朗丹 (Jean Grondin) 指出的，“狄尔泰的解释学批判者忽略了狄尔泰自己很大程度上发展了一种哲学解释学的轮廓（没有使用解释学这个术语），因为他把精神科学的理解视为植根于生命本身的意义追求以及它的历史本性中。”¹⁰

此外，狄尔泰处于新康德主义的学术氛围中，他要模仿康德对于自然科学的可能性的研究，对精神科学进行认识论奠基。在我们的解释学史的叙事中，认识论和方法论这两个概念常常混为一谈。海德格尔、伽达默尔之前的解释学几乎都被概括为方法论解释学。这是广义的方法论概念。当然狄尔泰本人也没有明确区分方法论和认识论，他在写给约克的信中论及《精神科学引论》（第一卷）的下一步工作时写到：“我的真正目的是一种精神科学的方法论。”¹¹但是狄尔泰的解释学明显地不同于传统方法论解释学，因为他试图模仿康德对先天认识能力的

10 Jean Grondin, “Dilthey’s Hermeneutics and Philosophical Hermeneutics”, in: *Interpreting Dilthey: Critical Essays*, edited by Eric S. Nelson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, 254.

11 H.P.里克曼：《狄尔泰》，殷晓容、吴晓明译，中国社会科学出版社，1989年，第269页。译文有改动。

探究，回答精神科学如何可能的问题，这就不同于仅提供方法论规则的解释学，而更多地属于认识论工作。为了明晰起见，我们可以对方法论解释学和认识论解释学作出区分。如果说（狭义的）方法论解释学是对解释方法和规则的总结，那么认识论解释学则是通过人的认识能力的考察回答理解如何可能的问题。相比（狭义的）方法论解释学，认识论解释学更深刻、更富有哲学性。

狄尔泰本人非常重视认识论。在他看来，哲学的功能在于对生活的科学反思，而我们的生活中已经有了各种意识和知识。哲学作为从事认识的最高努力，是对各种意识的意识，是一切知识的知识，因此认识论成为哲学的核心。“哲学首先是作为一门基础性学科或一种认识论来完成其任务的。它的对象就是那些由造就有效的知识这一目的所决定的思想过程。归根到底，它的任务就是要回答这样的问题：“知识是否并且在多大程度上可能存在。”¹²实际上，狄尔泰在更多的地方将自己从事的“历史理性批判”工作称为精神科学的认识论奠基。在晚年的《精神科学中历史世界的建构》中他写到：“我目前的工作乃是 1883 年的《精神科学引论》（第一卷）的继续。那部著作的出发点是历史理性批判这一任务。它紧密联系着由历史学派组织起来的各种实际存在的精神科学，并且努力探寻它们的认识论基础。”¹³

当然，从认识论上考察人的理解活动时也会涉及到理解的方法问题，或者提出理解的方法时也会涉及它们在认识论上的根据，因而认识论解释学和方法论解释学是紧密联系的。同时，在考察人的理解能力时也会扩展到人的生命存在的考察，因而总是牵连到存在论层面。这在狄尔泰的思想中体现得很明显，他的解释学涉及不同层面，可惜他并没有做出清楚的划分，因而思想内容比较庞杂，呈现出矛盾的张力。为了更清楚地窥见其解释学思想全貌，我们可以从方法论、认识论、存在论三个层次分析狄尔泰的解释学思想。当然这是为了分析的方便，思想的运动总会突破界限，这三个不同层次在狄尔泰的论述中总是混为一体的。

12 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第7页。

13 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第105页。

将狄尔泰解释学分为三个层次也可以从他历史理性批判的计划草稿中找到线索。根据穆尔的研究,在狄尔泰1880年代的布雷斯劳草稿中,核心的第四、五、六编依次包括精神科学的认识论、逻辑学和方法论三个部分,而在1890年代的“柏林计划”中第四编致力于描述和比较的心理学,这包含了某种生命哲学,第五编中原本分开的认识论、逻辑学和方法论合并在一起,成为认识论逻辑和方法论的探究,第六编不再致力于方法论,而是处理精神科学的融贯性和界限。¹⁴前后两个计划最大的改变是“重点由认识论变成了存在论……柏林计划的核心是生命存在论”¹⁵。可以说在狄尔泰的计划中,为精神科学奠基是有存在论、认识论和方法论三个层次的。这三个层面都涉及到理解问题,因而可以和解释学关联起来,这样对他的解释学可以分为三个层次进行分析。

二、作为精神科学一般方法论的解释学

在现代科学发展中,方法论具有重要地位,是科学研究之科学性的基本保证。里克曼指出:“与认识论相比,方法论更具体、更接近实际,因为它更直接地涉及到不同学科的研究方法……方法论本身不可能使人成为有成就的研究者。就像训练手册不能使中年弱者成为奥林匹克的获奖者一样。但是,方法论能够为研究提供原理,并根据认识论原理来考察成功的和失败的研究,为检验研究的有效性提供标准。这便是哲学何以能促进自然科学和人文科学之进步的原因。”¹⁶方法论是对于实际研究方法的总结,它作为理论和科学实践有着紧密的联系。狄尔泰也非常强调方法和实践的关系,他说:“方法的有用性在于它们的使用,正像刀子的检验在于它能否切割一样,或者换句话说,理论追随者实践。”¹⁷方法论层次上的解释学更接近于实际的理解和解释的过程,其目的在于导向正确的、完善的理解,避免误解。解释的

14 参见约翰·德·穆尔:《有限性的悲剧》,第30-31页、第408-409页。

15 约翰·德·穆尔:《有限性的悲剧》,第31页。

16 H.P.里克曼:《狄尔泰》,第270页。

17 Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften. Bd. 18*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1977, 1. (在引用狄尔泰德文全集时,以下简称GS)

方法问题一直是古典解释学探讨的中心，在长期的神学、古典语文学以及法学这些特殊领域的解释实践中，人们已经积累了丰富的解释学方法。作为精神科学方法论的解释学是对实践中的精神科学方法的总结。

在狄尔泰看来，思想是由意志推动去把握实在的，把握实在的程序包含在每个思想行动中：“就我们意识到这种程序，并有意识地使用它而言，我们称之为方法。”¹⁸方法可以从总体上分为两类，一是出现在人类知识的每个领域和解决每个问题的共同方法，二是针对特殊问题的特殊方法。狄尔泰并不否认自然科学和精神科学有共同的一般方法，如观察、抽象、比较、分类、分析和综合、归纳和演绎、假说和检验等等，但他更注重精神科学方法不同于自然科学方法的方面。方法的区别与它们研究的对象有着密切关系，他明确提出：“我们说明自然，我们理解心灵生活。”¹⁹在他看来，自然科学的对象是从外部呈现给意识的事实，是现象和个别的东西，而精神科学的对象是从内部更原始地出现的生命关联。在自然科学中自然的关联要借助假说和推论才被构造出来。相反，在精神科学中心灵生活的关联构成了源始的基础，个别部分的区别是随后而来的。自然科学研究中研究者处在外在的、旁观者的角度来观察个别现象，将某一类现象分解为一定数量的要素，再试图规定这些要素间的因果关系，为此要提出假说性的规律，并且进行批判性的检验，这就是说明的过程。精神科学研究的是人类精神创造物，研究者要调动自己的生命体验，去把握对象所体现的内在生命。理解生命不是为了获得规律性的认识，而是根据心灵生活的内在结构去描述精神现象。

值得注意的是，注重各学科相互联系的狄尔泰并没有将理解和说明对立起来，因为人的精神存在和物质存在毕竟是不可分的两个方面，人的精神受到生理条件、地理－历史环境、经济政治状况等方面的影响和制约，并且要在自然中找到实现自己的手段，因此精神科学需要

18 Wilhelm Dilthey, *Selected Works. Vol. 1*, edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991, 431. (在引用狄尔泰英文文集时，以下简称SW)

19 Wilhelm Dilthey, GS 5, 144.

借鉴自然科学的成果。对于社会和历史实在的研究也要用各种自然条件进行说明。不过，对人类事务的说明限于可严格确定的、特别是在量上确定的外在事实。同时，他也强调精神科学的独立性，因为人不仅仅依赖自然条件，也能够通过服从自然而支配自然。因此，虽然精神事实依赖于自然事实，但并不意味着前者可以等同于后者，精神事实是人的自由创造，包含了人的目的、价值、意义。“精神科学工作固然要处理这些外在事物，但是它关心的仅仅是外在物中的那些获自于精神活动的含义和意义，以及它如何才能有助于理解它们中间的含义和意义。”²⁰ 总体来看，狄尔泰有一种科学的整体主义观念，他并没有像人们通常认为的那样严格区分精神科学和自然科学，而是强调不同科学的相互依存的关系，同时也没有否定精神科学的特殊性。²¹

如果将理解作为精神科学的特殊方法的总括，那么理解可以说是一个“从外向内”的过程，即从外在感官给定的东西进入到超感官的内在之物，这也被称为自身反思（Selbstbesinnung）。在狄尔泰思想的中期，这种向内部的运动是对他人内心状态的把握。“理解就其首先应用于个体内心状态而言，表示对于在心理生命整体关联中并受到环境限制的心理状态的解释。”²²理解是从他人的外部表现出发，设身处地通过想象和同情将自己的内在经验移入到这些表现中。通过理解，外在经验的对象与我们的内在经验产生了联系，内在经验通过类比被赋予了一个外在经验中的对象。问题是这种心理学意义上的理解如何使精神科学的陈述具有普遍有效性？精神科学要通过对个别物的客观把握推出普遍的合规则的规律的联系，这样我们才能重新把握人类的整个过去，吸收过去的文化。而且精神科学的科学性要求对个别物的理解要避免主观任意性，而心理学的解释对此很难避免。正是由于心理学理解的不足，狄尔泰晚年转向解释学传统，从解释的规则和技术中寻求理解的普遍有效性，但这并不意味着放弃了心理学的理解；不如说狄尔泰力图将传统解释学的技术和心理分析结合在一起，既克服理解的主观

20 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第106页。

21 参见Rudolf A. Makkreel, “Dilthey and Universal Hermeneutics: The Status of the Human Sciences”, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 16:3, 236-249.

22 Wilhelm Dilthey, SW 1, 439.

任意性，同时又保留理解与内心体验的关联。在《解释学的兴起》中他说：“理解的分析与内在经验的分析彼此相联，它们两者为精神科学给出了其普遍有效认识的可能性和界限的证明，因为这种普遍有效的知识是由心理事实原本被给予我们的方式所制约的。”²³

在狄尔泰晚年未完成的《精神科学中历史世界的建构》中，精神科学研究的东西是生命（体验）的表达，理解是通过表达深入到他人的内心世界，通过重新体验把握他人的精神。“体验－表达－理解”成为解释学分析的模式。和中期思想一样，理解是由外向内的运动，外在的东西是体验的表达，但内在的东西不再是心理的，而是精神性的，也就是说体验包含了客观意义的觉知。受到黑格尔的客观精神学说的影响，狄尔泰认为虽然理解的对象总是具体的个别的事情，但是个别的总是处于历史的整体中，这个整体是人类价值和目的的源泉，具有客观的精神。语言、法律、宗教等属于文化的一切都是客观精神的领域。从这种共同性的基础上，我们可以在某一个生命表达和某种精神内容之间建立起联系。帕尔默指出：“表达根本不是像在心理学分析中的那种个人的表达，而是在体验中被揭示的社会－历史的实在之表达，是体验自身的社会－历史实在之表达。”²⁴

理解被区分为基本形式和高级形式。基本理解是对单一的生命表达的理解，它源于实践生活的需要，比如在生活交往中对于姿态、表情、行为等进行解释，面部表情表现出快乐或痛苦，伐木显示出某种目的等等。基本理解似乎是直接的，并不需要追溯到整个生命关系。实际上在这种理解中存在着一种类比推理过程。它的前提是一种特定的文化领域中存在着已经确定下来的规则，它们表达了人们的共同性。这里生命表现和精神性内容具有规则性联系。当我们对某一行为进行理解时，可以根据这些规则进行类比从而理解其意义。“如果我们考察基本理解的逻辑结构，那就可以看到，特殊事例中的表现与被表现者之间的联系是从联系的共同性中推演出来的。在这种共同性基础上，我们可以说某一生活展现表现出某种精神内容。在此，我们看到

23 洪汉鼎主编：《理解与解释——诠释学经典文选》，第78页。

24 理查德·E帕尔默：《诠释学》，潘德荣译，商务印书馆，2012年，第149页。

了一种类比推理。在这种推理中，我们根据某一共同境况中的一系列有限事例，而将一种属性或然地归之于一个主体。”²⁵

但是面对更复杂的社会现象，生活表现和精神内容脱离了规则性联系，生命表现的意义不是那么明显直接，这就要采取理解的高级形式。高级理解建立在基本理解之上，这时我们要考察诸多生活表现和生命关联总体的关系，还要考虑到与意义密切联系的环境变化。从特殊的生活表现追溯到生命关联总体，具有归纳推理的特点。“在此，我们所从事的乃是一种从特殊生活到完整的生命关联体的归纳推理。”²⁶由于个别表现是有限的，这种推理不可能最终完成，并要根据新出现的事例进行修正，因此它得出的结论是或然的。当我们以通过归纳获得的生命关联总体的认识为基础，考察一个人在新情况下会如何行动，就是进行演绎推理。²⁷由于前提是不确定的，通过这种推理所获得的知识也只能是一种预见，只具有可能性而不是确定的。实际上我们对文本、历史和他人的理解大多是高级理解，高级理解的特点是从生命表现出发，通过归纳推理的方式理解一个生命关联整体。在这个过程中就需要运用移入 (Hineinversetzen)、再创造 (Nachbilden)、再体验 (Nacherleben) 的方法。移入是指理解他者的个体性时要基于我们自己的体验，将自己移入他者，在此精神生命的整体参与到理解的过程中。在移入的基础上人们可以再创造或再体验内在关联总体。虽然再体验离不开移情的心理活动，但狄尔泰突出了它的理解功能，即展现了超越理解者自身生活界限的广大的可能性领域。

在狄尔泰对于理解的论述中，理解的基本形式涉及到类比推理，高级理解形式涉及到归纳推理、演绎推理，而且狄尔泰并不排斥一般规则以及将个别实例归入一般规则之下，这些都类似于自然科学的说明，这也表明理解和说明不是绝对对立的。伽达默尔甚至认为：“不管狄尔泰是怎样急切地想维护精神科学在认识论上的独立性——人们在现代科学里称之为方法的东西仍是到处同一的，而且只有在自然科学

25 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第192页。

26 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第193页。

27 “如果我们想要推论，一个我们已经理解的生命单元在一种新的情况下将会如何行动，那么这种推论便应该被看做是演绎推理。”狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第193页。

中才得到其典范的表现。精神科学根本没有自己特有的方法。”²⁸这种判断当然有失偏颇。值得注意的是，被狄尔泰称为理解的最高形式的再创造和再体验是需要个体性的天才的，这表明理解本身包含有不能用方法论涵盖的方面。但是天才不是人人都同样具有的，它需要丰富的生命经验和个人的敏感性，而理解对于精神科学而言又是一项持久的重要任务。为了弥补天才的不足，就需要制定普遍的理解的方法规则：“我们将一定规则指导下的、对持久固定的生命表现所做的理解称为解释。”²⁹使用技术方法的前提是有持续稳定的生命表现，因而可以不断返回这些表现进行检验。由于精神生命只有在书面语言中得到充分的、可以客观把握的表现，所以解释的最高形态是对文字记录的解释。虽然对于生命表达的解释超出体验的狭隘范围，但我们也不能将理解活动简单看成方法论化的逻辑运作，理解总是联系着体验，因而理解活动中总是存在着非理智成分：“人们试图用认知意义上的确定的推理过程说明理解活动。但是，任何这样的推理都不能取代再体验的那种终极的（尽管是非常主观的）可靠性。根本说来，以逻辑的方式处理理解活动，一定要遭遇这样的界限。”³⁰

除了对理解和解释的一般论述外，狄尔泰对具体的解释学方法论论述很少。穆尔认为：“狄尔泰写作《批判》，更多是为了从存在论－认识论的角度给现存的释义学方法奠基，而不是为了给精神科学制定一种方法论，因为在他看来，施莱尔马赫和德罗伊森等哲学家和历史学家基本上已经为精神科学制定好了方法论。”³¹肖尔茨也认为：“对他而言，有趣和重要的不再是诠释活动的诸种规范和准则，而是客观的理解活动和诠释活动的种种条件。”³²狄尔泰之前的解释学史对理解方法的探讨已经很充分了，尤其是施莱尔马赫的解释学方法论对狄尔泰产生了很大影响，他基本赞同施莱尔马赫对语法解释和心理学解释

28 汉斯-格奥尔格·伽达默尔：《诠释学I:真理与方法》，洪汉鼎译，商务印书馆，2021年，第17页。

29 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第198页。

30 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第200页。

31 约翰·德·穆尔：《有限性的悲剧》，第278页。

32 G.肖尔茨：《哲学诠释学历史中的变革》，杨栋译，载《世界哲学》2021年第5期，第102页。

的区分，也区分了预感的方法和比较的方法。狄尔泰的贡献在于探讨理解的条件，这些条件是认识论—存在论层面上的。不过我们从狄尔泰的众多论述中可以总结出对精神科学研究具有重要意义的方法论原则。³³（一）个别性原则。自然科学从个别事实出发通过归纳概括达到抽象普遍的规律，个别的事实只是作为普遍规律的特例，其本身并没有特殊的意义。而精神科学的目的本不是寻求普遍的抽象的规律，而是要对个别事实进行理解，即使在进行概括的时候，个别的存在仍有价值，因此精神科学所达到的普遍性是具体的普遍性，它承认历史和个人的特殊性和差异性，以及个别存在的不可通约性。（二）整体与部分原则。虽然解释把焦点集中于个别对象，对于整体的理解和把握仍是必需的。要理解个人就不能不具有一般的人类本性的知识以及对个人所处的社会关系和时代环境的了解。理解一句话不能离开上下文，同样对某个行为的理解也不能离开对生命整体、目的和相互联系的认识。整体与部分的关系构成了一个等级层次，较小的整体相对于较大的整体又成为部分。整体与部分的解释学循环一直是解释学的基本问题。狄尔泰强调要进入循环中，在来回运动中使部分和整体都逐渐清晰。（三）复杂性原则。我们面临的实际经验是复杂的，不能从还原主义的方式把复杂的经验归结为简单的、低级的过程，如心理学研究中不能用从动物的观察试验得到的简单过程来解释人的活动。由于人是在社会和文化中形成的，是复杂的、矛盾的、具有多向度的存在者，因此要从人的高度发达的精神状况出发解释人类现象。（四）知识循环原则。知识的探索没有抽象的起点，而总是包含循环。比如我们要认识一个群体就要认识群体中的个人，同时个人的特征又被其所属的群体所规定。要了解个人的心理不仅要借助心理学知识还要借助社会学知识，而研究社会和历史又离不开心理学的知识。不同的知识体系是相互依存的，构成了一个知识整体。没有哪门学科能成为绝对的基础，在研究某个学科的问题时总是需要借助其他学科知识使问题得以澄清，使理解更为完善。（五）双焦原则。必须把人看成具有两重性的存在者，人既是主体又是客体，既是环境的产物又能改变环境，人的活动既受外在条件的制约又能主宰自身。因此对人的研究一

33 参见H.P.里克曼：《狄尔泰》，第269-304页。

方面可以用自然科学的因果律研究人的行为被外在条件决定的关系，另一方面又要用解释学的方法认识到人的创造性和自由。双焦原理还表现为当我们运用解释学方法的时候既要考虑到解释者的观点又要考虑到被解释者的观点。解释者面对的是被解释者的生命表达。这种生命表达本身就包含着被解释者的理解，因此解释者的工作就是对理解的理解。在理解和解释中解释者与被解释者之间的时间间距问题就凸现出来了。如果距离不可克服那么交流就不可能，但如果没有距离也不可能有真正的理解。因为被理解者总是处于一定的历史情境中，他的生命的表达有时是无意识的，而且由于历史的局限性，这种生命表达的意义并没有被充分地认识到，而理解者对历史的概观和对各种生命关系的考察有可能使这种意义更充分地显现出来，这也说明了理解不是完全重构作者的原意，而是包含着反思和批判的过程，正是在这个意义上狄尔泰才主张要比作者更好地理解作者。

应该看到，所有这些方法论原则都是调节性的原理，它们不像具体的科学方法具有直接的可操作性。即使在理解中运用到归纳法和比较法，这种运用也与其在自然科学中的运用有很大的不同，需要其他的心理条件，比如个人的机敏、经验。实际上在理解过程中，我们总是要调动我们各种知识和精神能力进行体验、反思，使对象的意义向我们显现出来。我们更多的是在从事一种创造性的活动，而不是按照某种固定程序活动，因此狄尔泰和施莱尔马赫一样强调理解要建立在个人的创造性之上。理解虽然具有超方法的一面，但对理解方法的反思又是不可缺少的。方法植根于理解现象本身中，任何一种理解都具有一定的方法，无论是有意识的还是无意识的。只不过我们不一定要将方法看成是一套非常具体的固定的程序，而是可以作为一般的指导原则。理解的方法论是由精神科学的性质、任务、目的所规定的，因而植根于精神科学认识论的反思之中。

三、作为精神科学认识论的解释学

对于精神科学进行认识论奠基一直是狄尔泰学术努力的方向，并且和“历史理性批判”的构想联系在一起。狄尔泰明确地宣称他的历史理性批判是对康德的批判哲学的继续。康德在《纯粹理性批判》中探讨

了自然科学的认识如何可能的问题，但并未涉及精神科学领域，狄尔泰的工作就是要把康德的批判工作引入到历史的精神科学的领域。可以说，狄尔泰继承了康德的事业，他的立场是康德式的认识论立场。在《精神科学引论》的序言中，他写道：“所有科学都是从经验出发的，但是，所有经验都必须回过头来与它们从其中产生的意识条件和意识脉络联系起来，都必须从这样的条件和脉络之中把它们的有效性推导出来——也就是说，它们必须与我们的本性所具有的总体性联系起来，它们的有效性必须出自这样的总体性。我们把这种立场称为‘认识论’立场，它始终如一地承认对这些条件的背后进行探索是不可能的……从这种立场出发，就可以证明我们关于自然界的整体的观念只不过是某种隐含的实在所投下的阴影而已；相形之下，只有就通过内在经验给定的各种意识事实而言，我们才能切实地把握实在。精神科学的核心任务就是对这些事实进行分析。”³⁴

狄尔泰的认识论立场是要对科学所依据的经验的意识条件和意识脉络进行分析，这里可以看出他的认识论受到从笛卡尔到康德的近代意识哲学的影响。在狄尔泰《精神科学引论》未出版的第二卷手稿中，他提出了两条主要的哲学原理：现象性原理和总体性原理。它们可以看成是中期思想中两条主要的认识论原理。“哲学的最高原理是现象性原理，据此我们所遭遇到的任何事情都是处于成为我们的意识事实的最一般条件之下。”³⁵根据现象性原理，每一个事物只是作为意识事实或意识过程的关联呈现给我，只有在意识中才在此。这并不是贝克莱式的主观观念论的观点，而是想表明只有通过意识事实我们才能通达对象。不仅意识事实在其根源上就具有与对象事实的关联，而且只有意识事实对于我们才具有自明性。意识事实是先于自我意识的反思的，这里没有主体和客体、内容和形式的对立，显现给我的东西具有直接的、确定的联系。现象性原理导致狄尔泰对心理学研究的重视，也使他在解释过程中注重对心理过程的考察。

心理生命的总体性原理直接与现象性原理相关，它强调意识事实及其关联都源于人的心理生命的总体，对意识事实及其关联的解释必

34 狄尔泰：《精神科学引论》，艾彦译，译林出版社，2012年，第4页。

35 Wilhelm Dilthey, GS 5, 90.

须以心理生命总体的考察为前提。“包含诸意识事实——包括知觉、记忆、对象、对象的表象以及概念——的关联是心理学的关联，它包含在心理生命的总体中。因此，对这一关联——知觉和其他心理过程都存在于这种关联中——的说明必须建立在对作为一个总体的心理生命的分析基础上。”³⁶心理生命的总体性原理旨在破除传统形而上学特别是近代自笛卡尔以来将人作为一种理性存在物，把世界作为认识对象，从孤立的理智出发来考察世界的认识论模式。狄尔泰接受了康德对于人的三重划分，心理生命作为一个总体不仅是理智，也包括情感、意志。狄尔泰强调这三者相互联系，在任何意识活动中这三者都同时存在。由此他批判近代意识哲学包括康德的认识论的理智主义倾向。³⁷我们的认识不是单纯地靠理性，而是人性的总体力量发挥作用的结果。我们需要从生命总体出发来考察我们的精神科学的认识活动。对于精神科学的反思必须将其内容和人类本性的总体联系起来，精神科学各部分的联系也可以从生命总体出发而得到阐明。总体性原理也使生命经验超出了意识的范围，而进入到与意识相互作用的社会历史的世界。心理生命总体是在现实生活里自我和世界的共同所予中被经验到的。把握这种心理生命总体需要描述心理学，它植根于内在经验关联的统一体，并且构成了理解更大社会历史文化世界的基础。总体性原理在解释学方法的运用中就涉及理解的整体性以及整体与部分的循环问题。以上这两条原理意味着认识论分析的对象都是意识本身，里德（James Reid）指出：“只有对意识事实的认识论的自我反思才决定了解释学对于其他精神科学在方法论上的优先性。”³⁸

36 Wilhelm Dilthey, SW 1, 264.

37 “洛克、休谟和康德所设想的认识主体的血管之中并没有流淌真正的血液，而毋宁说只存在作为单纯的思想活动的、经过稀释的理性的汁液。对于整个人类的历史探讨和心理学探讨，使我开始根据某种具有意愿、感受和思维的存在的多方面的力量，来对知识及其各种概念（诸如外部世界、时间、实体以及原因）加以说明；而且尽管存在知识似乎是由来源于感知过程、表现过程和思想之单纯内容的各种概念交织而成的事实，我仍然在坚持这样做。”狄尔泰：《精神科学引论》，第5页。

38 James Reid, “Dilthey’s Epistemology of Geisteswissenschaften: Between Lebensphilosophie and Wissenschaftstheorie”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Volume 39, Number 3, 2001, 414.

虽然狄尔泰的精神科学认识论强调对意识的分析，并且突出了心理学在精神科学中的基础地位，但是不能将精神科学认识论还原为描述-分析的心理科学，否则就会陷入心理主义。在他看来，心理总体构成了认识过程的基础，认识论只有基于这种心理关联的描述才能建立起来。“知识论的各种抽象都源自于体验——在体验中，知识以双重形式，并且通过不同的阶段逐渐发展起来。这些抽象以对于一些过程的透彻洞察为前提……对知识起源过程的这种描述-分析的研究乃是我们的第一个任务，乃是建立知识论的前提。”³⁹ 由于认识产生于心理体验中，认识论就涉及到认识过程中相关心理条件和功能的抽象。我们可以从心理描述中获得准备性的心理知识，对认识论的分析会使用心理学的概念，如认知、情感、意愿等，心理关联总体也需要输送到认识论中，但认识论是要回答普遍有效性知识如何可能的问题，必须与如何把握客体的任务联系在一起。

由于我们的认识植根于我们的生命关联总体，认识论要对这种关联总体进行反思才得到发展，狄尔泰据此反对认识论的先天立场，力图从我们的生命存在及其历史发展出发回答认识论问题。“我们所有的人都必定会向哲学提出的各种问题，是不可能通过有关某种严格的认识论先天之物的假定而得到回答的，毋宁说，只有通过从我们的存在的总体性出发的某种发展史，这些问题才能得到回答。”⁴⁰ 康德认为，知识的可能性条件在于思维的综合能力，这种能力是先验的、形式的、非历史的。而在狄尔泰看来，“康德的先验性是死板的，因为这些先决条件（按照我的理解，它们确实制约着我们的意识）乃是活生生的历史过程的组成部分，它们发展着，并有自身的历史……历史之充满活力的过程甚至还影响着我们将进行思想的那些表面上看来是僵硬的和死板的条件。”⁴¹ 认识的先验条件要从人的历史性中寻找。

狄尔泰所重视的认识的心理条件其实就具有历史性。个人的心理关联整体是动态变化的，身体的变化、物理环境的作用、精神世界的影响等都被心理结构吸收，促进其发展。人的心理关联整体在适

39 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第8-9页。

40 狄尔泰：《精神科学引论》，第5-6页。

41 Wilhelm Dilthey, GS 19, 44.

应环境的过程中日益分化，形成“获得性心理关联整体”（erworbener Zusammenhang des Seelenslebens），它成为个人的认识和行动的基础。可见，虽然人与人有共同的人性，但由于性格、环境、文化等不同，他们也表现出很大的差异，而历史的距离使得这种差异更加明显。当然，狄尔泰认为人性是相同的，一切生命经验的基本特征是相同的，只是在不同的人那里呈现出不同的形式，它们只有心理程度的差别。在理解中“仿佛试验性地将自己的活力转移进一个历史环境中去，解释者可暂时强调和强化某些心理过程，使其他进程推为背景，从而在他自身复制他人生命”⁴²。我们从别人那里看到的只是生命经验的某一个方面或某一突出的特征，通过理解他人，我们可以突破自己现实经验的局限性，认识到自己生命的某些潜在的方面和力量。

认识的条件除了心理方面之外，还有社会文化方面。狄尔泰继承了维科的思想，人只能理解自己创造的东西。在精神科学中认识对象和认识者具有同一性，都是社会历史文化的一部分。晚年的狄尔泰越来越倾向于超越早年的心理学倾向，他意识到我们对社会历史的理解不能完全归结为心理学体验和重构的过程，而是要把握具有客观意义的精神世界和精神构成物。“我打算使用‘精神科学’一词，而且我是在孟德斯鸠的法的精神、黑格尔所谓客观精神，以及伊埃琳所谓罗马法的精神之同一意义上使用‘精神’一词。”⁴³精神科学是对精神的理解，“对于这种精神的理解不是心理认知。它是在逆溯地走向一个具有自身结构和规则的精神构成物。”⁴⁴客观精神构成了我们每个人生活于其中的文化世界，我们从小就受到客观精神的影响并内化于我们个人的生命中，形成我们个人主观的精神世界，而反过来我们个人生命活动又是形成客观精神的基础。客观精神与人的主观的心理生命在本质上是统一的。精神的客观化物包含了对“你”和“我”而言共同性的东西，这样理解才是可能的。“理解是对于‘你’中之‘我’的再发现，精神在关联体的更高层次上重新发现自身。精神的本我性存在于我和你之中，存在于

42 李超杰：《理解生命：狄尔泰哲学引论》，中央编译出版社，1994年，第101页。

43 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第78页。

44 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第77-78页。

一个共同体的每一主体之中，存在于每一文化体系之中，也存在于精神和普遍史的总体之中。它使精神科学的各种功能有可能彼此合作。在此，认识主体和他的对象乃是同一物；这一点发生在主体的客观化的所有阶段上。”⁴⁵ 以客观的、共同的精神为中介，人与人的相互理解才成为可能。这种理解其实是精神的自我发现。理解主体和客体的同质性使得狄尔泰接近于德国观念论的同一哲学。而且由于以社会公共领域的客观精神为基础，他对于精神科学和理解的认识接近于反主体主义的伽达默尔，他们都认为理解不能归结为个人主观行为，而是社会的成就，这已经涉及到了解释学的社会存在论基础。⁴⁶

当然狄尔泰并没有抛开心理学，理解和心理体验是相互依赖的。理解以体验为前提，理解也扩展了体验。“理解要以体验为前提；但是只有当理解引导我们走出体验的狭隘性和主观性，并且进入到整体性和普遍性的领域，体验才变成生活经验。进而言之，为了理解某一特殊个人，我们必须具有系统知识；同时系统知识又依赖于对特殊生命单元的活生生的把握。”⁴⁷ 如果说体验代表了主观精神，具有个性特点，那么作为理解对象的精神构成物则属于客观精神。人类的精神世界是主观精神和客观精神的统一，客观精神也体现在主观精神中。所以即使狄尔泰后期强调理解是要把握生命表现所具有的某种客观意义，也离不开个体性的体验。“客观精神和个人的力量共同决定了精神世界。历史建立在对此两者的理解之上。”⁴⁸ 理解既包含对客观精神的把握，也包含对主观精神的把握，这两方面共同构成了活生生的历史图景。

精神科学的研究者并不是仅仅把历史生活作为认识对象的抽象的思维者，他作为具体的有血有肉的人也是被历史的生命运动所推动的。历史世界的构造是具有历史性的生命过程的产物。“与解决历史的知性认知问题相关的第一个重要的结论是：历史科学的可能性的基本条件在于，我本身是一个历史的存在物；历史的研究者也即是历史的创造

45 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第177页。

46 参见Max Engleman, “Reassessing Dilthey’s Social Ontology”, *Axiomathes*, 2021, 1-18.

47 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第126页。

48 洪汉鼎主编：《理解与解释——诠释学经典文选》，东方出版社，2001年，第101页。

者。”⁴⁹ 精神科学的研究要求研究者与生活的活生生的关联，要基于自身的体验和生活经验，这样精神科学的研究者不可避免地带有成见，他们的判断“要受到他们的个性、他们所属的民族、他们生活的时代的影响”⁵⁰。

虽然强调人的存在的历史性，因而认识具有成见和视角性，狄尔泰并不否认我们可以达到普遍有效的、客观的知识。精神科学要成为科学必须有意识地追求这种普遍有效性，这也是他的精神科学认识论致力的目标。但这里存在着生命和科学的冲突。狄尔泰也意识到了这种冲突，并且希望精神科学的系统发展能解决这一冲突。他强调人性的共同性，通过同情的理解超越自身的有限性，以及运用科学的方法（如比较法），这些都对达到普遍有效知识有所帮助。总之，人的历史条件性并不损害精神科学认识的普遍有效性。伽达默尔认为，狄尔泰虽然反对黑格尔的思辨观念论，但是并不反对精神的内在无限性：“对于狄尔泰来说，有限性的意识并不指意识的有限化和局限性。有限性的意识其实证明了生命在力量和活动方面超出一切限制的能力。”⁵¹ 人的精神具有超越自身历史局限性的能力，历史理解就植根于精神的整体和无限性，使得精神科学的普遍有效性得以可能。当然由于理解具有整体—部分的循环特点，整体永远不能完全给出，因此没有最终的确定物，理解是一种永无止境的追求确定性的努力。⁵² 在许多人看来，生命的有限性和科学的普遍性追求之间的冲突是狄尔泰始终未能成功解决的难题。

狄尔泰的认识论还有一个很大特点，就是模仿康德提出了精神科学的范畴学说。这种范畴学说属于精神科学的逻辑，类似于康德的先验逻辑，但也有很大不同。狄尔泰认为康德提出的范畴，如原因和结果、实体和属性、必然和偶然等等只是形式范畴，它们是我们认识世界所

49 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第252页。

50 “即使他们自以为是在毫无成见地工作，也仍旧会受到他们的视野的限制。如果分析过去时代的概念，我们可以发现，它们当中的许多内容都出自当时时代的成见。”狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第121-122页。

51 汉斯-格奥尔格·伽达默尔：《诠释学I:真理与方法》，第332页。

52 “理解就成了一种需要付出最大努力的思想过程，一种不可能完全成功的过程。”狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第206页。

必需的思维框架，这些范畴出现在一切思维过程中，既适用于自然科学，也适用于精神科学。但这些形式范畴对于精神科学来说是远远不够用的。对精神世界的把握还需要生命、价值、手段-目的、整体-部分、内-外、意义等特殊的范畴。这些范畴不是先验的知性形式，而是源于总体生命本身，是在历史中形成的，狄尔泰称之为实在范畴或生命范畴。它们是研究人类现象时的基本概念，我们借助于它们才能理解生命（生活）。“我们必须借助一些与自然无关的范畴，去理解生活的本质。关键在于，这些范畴并非某种被先验地用之于生活的外在物；相反地，它们就存在于生活的本质之中。它们以抽象的方式所表达出的态度为我们理解生活提供了唯一的出发点。”⁵³ 遗憾的是，狄尔泰并没有完成他的范畴学说，也没有像康德那样列出一个详细的范畴表。通过范畴学说，狄尔泰可以避免由于对体验的强调而被误解为心理直觉主义。体验不是完全被动的，在体验中就具有反思的因素。理解总是力图运用恰当的概念表达体验。通过生命范畴我们把内在的体验转化为世界经验。“世界经验能使现实出现新的、迄今为止没有出现的一面。这就是生命范畴创造性的特点，这一特点是它同文学的想象力分享的。”⁵⁴ 生命范畴不同于客观的认识形式，具有相对的、不确定性的特点，但这不是其弱点而恰恰证明了其解释学的能力。我们总是需要通过生命范畴进行理解，构造和占有人的精神世界。这是一种不断进行新的尝试，不断发展，没有终结的过程。

总体上，狄尔泰的精神科学认识论对于康德认识论既有继承的一面，也有批判的一面。他继承了康德认识论的提问方式，通过对心灵诸能力和活动的考察寻求精神科学认识如何可能的根据。他认为知识的全部形式都是在意识中给予我们的，超出了意识的任何存在都无法得到表达，这表明他和笛卡尔-康德的近代意识哲学存在着联系。批判的一面体现为他强调认识能力的整体性和历史性，因而涉及到对人的存在的探讨，正是这一方面使他的认识论具有存在论维度。

53 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第211页。

54 费迪南·费尔曼：《生命哲学》，李建鸣译，华夏出版社，2000年，第99页。

四、作为精神科学的存在论基础的解释学

学界以前有一种普遍看法，认为海德格尔把理解引入此在的生存论结构从而实现了解释学的存在论转向，由此开创了哲学解释学，而狄尔泰被定位成认识论－方法论的解释学。这种看法越来越受到人们的批评。当代的许多研究者更强调狄尔泰解释学的存在论维度。如穆尔认为，狄尔泰的哲学是一种先验的－历史的生命哲学，他的解释学可称为生命解释学：“狄尔泰对康德的探究的修正，其重要意蕴是从认识论探究向存在论探究的转变；而这种修正的意义只有在讨论海德格尔对存在问题的分析之后才完全清晰可见。”⁵⁵巴姆巴赫也说：“我认为狄尔泰的核心关切是一种基于体验的历史生命的存在论，而不是认识论。”⁵⁶其实海德格尔早就指出：“狄尔泰的哲学的真正目标是建立某种‘生命’存在论。”⁵⁷不过，说狄尔泰的哲学是要建立生命存在论，或其解释学具有存在论基础，这并不意味着他的解释学就是存在论解释学。他本人对于解释学一直持有方法论观念。但正如前面所说，他的解释学思想不能局限于他自己的解释学观念，而是要涵盖他对于理解活动的一切反思。那么他的思考是否蕴含着某种存在论解释学？从海德格尔－伽达默尔发展的哲学解释学来看，存在论解释学有两大特征：一是将理解作为人的存在的基本方式，二是认为存在者的存在是在理解过程中向人所显现的。我们可以从海德格尔－伽达默尔的解释学思想来反观狄尔泰思想中的相近之处。⁵⁸

对于理解活动在人类生活的地位，狄尔泰有充分的认识。他说：“理解首先产生于实际生活的需要。人们注定要彼此交往，他们必须彼此

55 约翰·德·穆尔：《有限性的悲剧》，第380页。

56 Charles Bambach, “Hermeneutics and Historicity”, in: *Interpreting Dilthey: Critical Essays*, 101.

57 海德格尔：《存在与时间》，陈嘉映、王庆节译，商务印书馆，2016年，第345页，注释1。

58 西语中的“存在论”一词ontology通常翻译成“本体论”，但是ontology的原意是关于存在的学说。在海德格尔看来传统的形而上学是用实体、本体规定存在，对存在的研究变成了对存在者的研究，这样就遗忘了存在，他要恢复ontology的原意，通过追问存在本身的意义，祛除形而上学对存在的遮蔽。因此在海德格尔的语境中，ontology译成“本体论”就不合适了，而伽达默尔继承了海德格尔的立场，他们的解释学称为“存在论”解释学更为恰当。

了解。”⁵⁹ 生活交往的需要产生了解的基本形式，由此我们可以直接地把握一个人的行为和言谈举止的意义。只有当表达和意义的关系不甚明了时，才需要高级的理解，即通过考察多种的生活表现和总体的生命关联，以确定某个特殊的生命表达的意义。“实际生活中的交往过程也要求我们，有能力对某些人的人品和能力做出判断……商业和贸易、社交生活、职业以及家庭生活等都要求我们，看清周围人们的内在本质，从而确定可以在多大程度上信任他们。”⁶⁰ 理解是我们人类生活的必要条件。狄尔泰后期对于体验－表达－理解的关联总体的分析不仅是为精神科学奠基，也是对于我们人类生活的描述，因而具有存在论意义。穆尔指出：“狄尔泰对体验－表达－理解的结构性关联总体的分析具有一种存在论意义和一种人类学意义；这种分析揭示了人类生存的基本结构。”⁶¹ 也就是说，对体验进行表达以及对表达的理解是人类生活的基本特点，是人类生命的存在方式。

生命本身就具有反思性，在形成科学理论之前，自然的生命过程中就已经有了对自身的理解，它们和体验是直接结合在一起的。这些自发的理解性知识客观化为生命表现形式，如艺术、宗教、习俗、道德、法律等。生命本身具有的自我理解倾向表现了生命对于稳定性的追求。生命需要在时间的流转变化的过程中寻求自身的统一性和稳固的基础，通过理解，短暂的、片段的体验上升为一般的生活经验。可以说，理解是生命的内在倾向，精神科学的认识是生命的这种自然倾向的完成。精神科学借助于系统的研究和方法，实现了生命把握自身的自然倾向，克服了生命的不确定性和不可靠性。就此而言，精神科学不仅建立在我们的生活和体验之上，而且对于我们的生活发挥着重要作用，也就是说精神科学作为理论具有实践的意义。它们给我们提供关于人类、社会和历史的知识，帮助我们确立价值、确定目的、建立规则，也极大影响了我们在生活中的理解和经验。狄尔泰认为：“生活、生活经验和精神科学三者紧密相连，并且不断相互作用。精神科学的基础不在逻辑思维，而在对于一种整体心理状态的前反思的意识以及在再体验

59 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第190页。

60 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第193页。

61 约翰·德·穆尔：《有限性的悲剧》，第276页。

中对于它的再发现。在此，生活把握着生活。”⁶² 伽达默尔指出：“对于狄尔泰来说，意义不是一个逻辑概念，而被理解为生命的表现，即这种流逝着的时间性，是以形成永恒的意义统一体为目标。生命本身解释自身。它自身就有诠释学结构。所以生命构成精神科学的真实基础。”⁶³ 理解不仅作为精神科学的特殊方法，而且首先应被看作人类生命的基本特征，精神科学中的系统理解（解释）基于人类生命的这个特征才能得到发展。海德格尔区分了在生活经验中作为生存论环节的理解和科学研究中受方法论支配的理解，前者是本源性的，后者是衍生性的，而狄尔泰已经有了这种思想的萌芽。里德指出，正是为了完成其认识论任务，狄尔泰要挖掘方法论调节的科学解释背后理解的自发运动，这种自发运动交织到生命的运动中。⁶⁴

前科学的生活经验中的理解与我们的生命交织在一起，对于人的存在具有重要意义。因为对于他者的理解展现了可能的世界，弥补个人经验的局限性，促成自我的扩展，并开启了新的理解视野。“每个人在其生命行程中都会受到各种制约，这些制约同时也限制了他们的各种内在可能性。他的本质的塑造始终决定着他的进一步发展。简而言之，当考虑自己境况的固定限制，或者自己的固有生命关联体的形式时，人们总会发现，他的生活的新的前景，他的存在的内在变化等在范围上都明显地受到限制。但是理解为它展开了一个广大的可能性领域，其范围超出了他的实际生活的界限。”⁶⁵ 理解活动不仅是人的存在特征，而且对于克服人的存在的局限性至关重要。

对于狄尔泰来说，我们理解的对象归根到底是生命本身，一切精神科学的研究归根到底是生命对自身的把握。“我们通过体验和理解去把握‘生活/生命’这个囊括了全部人类的整体。这个广泛至极的实在物不仅是精神科学的出发点，而且也是哲学的出发点。”⁶⁶ 可以说无论中期

62 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第120页。

63 汉斯-格奥尔格·伽达默尔：《诠释学I：真理与方法》，第323页。

64 参见James Reid, “Dilthey’s Epistemology of Geisteswissenschaften: Between Lebensphilosophie and Wissenschaftstheorie”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Volum 39, Number 3, 2001, 432.

65 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第197页。

66 狄尔泰：《精神科学中历史世界的建构》，第116页。

诉诸心理学，还是后期转向解释学，贯穿狄尔泰思想的主题都是生命。他在不同时期发展出的不同方法论是为了达成同样的目标，这赋予了其著述以统一性。⁶⁷当然狄尔泰所说的生命（生活）也是有不同的层次的。我们理解生命的出发点是体验，体验是生命的个别性的、主观性的形式。通过理解，体验走出了主观狭隘性，进入到更具有普遍性和整体性的生活经验。生活经验不仅包含个体的生活经验，也包含普遍的生活经验，即共同体的生活经验。共同体的普遍生活经验可以修正和扩展个体生活经验的视角，而且其可靠性也超越个人生活经验的可靠性。共同体有多种形式，如家庭、教会、国家，而且在共同体中形成了具有独立性的文化系统，如艺术、哲学、宗教。各共同体又构成人类全体的部分。这样从个体到共同体和文化系统，再到人类全体，构成了完整的关联体。它们都是历史的逻辑主体，处于历史的演变当中。历史不是人类为了共同的目的进行共同工作而形成的，而是无数个人的相互作用形成了历史。每个个体都是以自身的存在为依据，但他们作为历史存在物受制于时空位置，以及在文化系统的共同体中所承担的角色。狄尔泰认为：“人只有在历史中认识自己，而绝不能通过内省认识自己。从根本上讲，我们都在历史中寻找人。”⁶⁸人要认识自身就要对以往人类历史的经验进行解释，而我们面对的人类经验材料并不是纯粹客观的，它本身就包含着前人的理解。个人始终生活在历史中，与无数前代人的经验共存，因此解释者的观点也不可能是纯粹客观的，而是被他拥有的传统和时代所渲染。

不仅对人，对于客观事物的认识其实也离不开人的理解活动。在《精神科学引论》中狄尔泰将认识的实在归结为意识的内容，这意味着我们的知识不可能超出现象的范围。由于我们关于实在的知识是精神活动的产物，因此我们所认识到的实在的某些特征要归之于认知主体的本性和活动，认识论就是要对此进行探究。但狄尔泰批评康德和大部分认识论者将认识主体作为纯粹理智主体。他强调认识主体是有

67 参见Amnon Marom, “Continuity and Discontinuity in Wilhelm Dilthey’s Thinking: A New Suggestion for Resolving an Old Controversy”, *Epoché*, Volume 18, Issue 2 (Spring 2014), 439-451.

68 Wilhelm Dilthey, GS 7, 279.

血有肉的人，人是通过全部感官、意志和思维和实在接触，我们的一切知识都来源于通过与实在接触产生的经验。他批判经验主义的经验是狭隘的、抽象的，而他要恢复经验的完整性和丰富性。虽然狄尔泰区分了外在经验和内在经验，并分别将它们作为自然科学和精神科学的基础，但源于总体生命关联的内在经验具有基础性。从康德式的先验视角出发，外部世界呈现在我们的意识中，其自然规律服从于意识的条件。外部世界只是因为与内在经验相关联，才可以宣称其实在性。由于精神科学直接与内在经验相关，所以相比自然科学更具有基础地位。麦克瑞尔（Rudolf A. Makkreel）在《精神科学引论》英译本导言中指出：“狄尔泰在第二卷和第四卷中证明，精神科学比自然科学更加基本，因为它与我们的原始生命关联体关系更为紧密——在概念知识的层面上，精神科学依旧依赖于自然科学。然而，在前反思的‘知识’层面上，精神科学有其优越性。”⁶⁹ 内在经验已经预示了后来伽达默尔所说的原初的解释学经验，它是一切科学的基础。虽然自然科学的研究采取说明的方法，将经验抽象化和客观化，但这种说明过程背后蕴藏着解释学因素，因为人与世界的更原初的关系是一种理解关系，并由此形成了原初的内在经验。

狄尔泰后期的世界观学说也具有解释学特点。他认为生命充满了矛盾、偶然性、受到各种非理性力量的支配且不可捉摸，但人的心灵总有一种力求去把握生命总体、认识生命真相的冲动，这就是人的形而上学冲动。从这种冲动中产生了宗教、哲学、文学，它们都为我们提供了某种世界观。哲学世界观的特殊之处在于，它是通过批判的反思形式去把握生命，不仅为我们提供了首尾一贯的关于世界整体的图像，而且也影响着我们对于世界的态度和我们的行为方式，为我们提供解决生命中各种问题的答案。和黑格尔不同的是，狄尔泰认为哲学并不是绝对的终点，也不具有绝对的自明性。哲学就植根于人的生活经验中，它不是脱离现实的对于绝对真理的思辨，而是与其他的文化形式有着千丝万缕的关系，并且受到哲学家个性的影响，因此哲学也是生命的一种表现形式。

69 Wilhelm Dilthey, SW 1, 12.

狄尔泰还提出了著名的三种世界观类型的学说，这三种世界观是根据人的心理结构的三个方面，即思想、意志和情感进行划分的。自然主义的世界观包括从古代德谟克里特、伊壁鸠鲁到近代霍布斯、百科全书派、孔德为代表的唯物主义和实证主义传统，这种世界观表现了人的冷静的理智和切实的风格；自由唯心主义突出了人的能动的意志和道德责任，古代的柏拉图、亚里士多德，中世纪的基督教传统，以及近代康德、费希特等人都属于这条传统。客观唯心主义则突出人的情感，它对世界的反思是建立在审美的幻想的态度上的，以天人合一和泛神论为特征的斯宾诺莎、谢林、黑格尔的哲学是其代表。不同类型的世界观体现了人们看待世界的不同的方式，它们植根于人的生命中，突出了人的心理生命不同方面。这充分说明对世界整体存在的揭示离不开源于生命的理解活动，并且不可避免地带有解释学视角，这些视角打上了生命特征的烙印。

狄尔泰的世界观类型说提出后遭到诸多批评，被指责为历史主义的相对主义和怀疑主义，而狄尔泰更多地看到了这种历史主义思维的积极意义：使人摆脱独断而僵化的思想体系。其实，用历史主义的眼光来看世界观，只是探讨世界观如何形成的问题，并没有否认世界观中的真理性。狄尔泰的目的是要比较各种世界观的优劣得失从而避免怀疑主义。哲学的世界观特别是其中影响广泛、时间久远的，是经过系统论证的理论体系，因此都具有一定的合理性。但它们都从自己的时代出发，希望通过唯一的方式回答和解决生命的问题，因此又具有一定的片面性。狄尔泰力图“检讨单个世界中的真理，并统一这些真理”⁷⁰。所有世界观都是片面的，但狄尔泰的目的恰恰是要克服世界观的相对性，通过把它们联系起来，提出一个具有普遍真理的科学的哲学。但可惜的是，他终其一生都没有达到这个目标。

总体来看，狄尔泰不仅探讨了理解活动对于人的存在的重要意义，而且揭示了对人和世界的认识离不开理解活动，具有解释学视角，这是由人的存在的历史性和有限性决定的。可以说，狄尔泰已经表达了存在论解释学的基本观念，尽管没有将其充分展开。但另一方面，狄

70 Wilhelm Dilthey, GS 8, 148.

狄尔泰又始终坚持一种科学主义的态度，追求科学的真理。他相信认识者运用科学方法论能够克服人的历史局限性，赋予研究以科学性。伽达默尔认为：“支配他的认识论的笛卡尔主义却表现得如此强烈，以致在狄尔泰这里，历史经验的历史性并不起真正决定性的作用。”⁷¹无疑，存在论解释学容易破坏科学的客观性理想，导致我们将一切认识只是看作某种解释而非确定的答案，从而陷入相对主义。狄尔泰一方面从存在论解释学观念出发肯定了认识的相对性，另一方面又希望克服这种相对性，这两种倾向在他的思想中始终存在着矛盾和张力。后来存在论解释学的发展则将人的历史性和有限性提升到决定性的原则高度，但又并不否认真理，而是在现象学基础上将真理与历史性统一起来，力图克服客观主义和相对主义的二元困境。

结语

以上对于狄尔泰解释学三个层次的划分在他的论述中并不清晰，我们是以现在的眼光反观他的思想才做出这种划分。总体上看，狄尔泰对于解释学方法的论述寥寥无几，非常薄弱。他力图模仿康德，为精神科学进行认识论奠基，致力于回答精神科学认识如何可能的问题，所以认识论层面的解释学才是他的解释学的核心，解释学方法论是从认识批判中引申出来的。而回答认识论问题不可避免地又涉及到存在论，正是这些存在论内容影响了后来存在论解释学的发展。

早年的海德格尔非常认可狄尔泰把生命作为哲学问题的核心，赞赏他从生命出发理解生命的努力，但也批判他未摆脱新康德主义的先验立场，从生命的形式化的结构关联、可能性条件去理解生命，有将生命作为客观化物的倾向。从“内在经验”和“意识事实”出发理解历史生命也表明狄尔泰缺乏哲学彻底性，仍受到近代意识哲学影响。海德格尔赞同约克对狄尔泰的批评，即狄尔泰用取自自然科学尤其是心理学的客观化范畴来理解生命，仍然是从外部观察和把握生命，不能实现从历史生命自身去理解它的目的。为了正确对待“实际性的生存”，他将狄尔泰的生命解释学发展为此在解释学。伽达默尔在《真理与方

71 汉斯-格奥尔格·伽达默尔：《诠释学I：真理与方法》，第345页。

法》导言中将狄尔泰作为与胡塞尔、海德格尔并列的对她影响最大的哲学家，并赞赏狄尔泰广阔的历史视域。他在继承海德格尔的解释学的基础上重新思考精神科学认识论问题，以获得对精神科学及其真理性的充分理解。他认为狄尔泰致力于发展精神科学的方法论，寻求历史知识的客观性和普遍有效性，表明其未摆脱自然科学模式的影响。在狄尔泰那里科学的客观化和生命哲学基础之间存在着矛盾，这也反映了科学主义传统和浪漫主义传统之间的矛盾。伽达默尔试图证明，精神科学的科学性及其真理要求其实是超方法的。解释学不应只提供精神科学方法论，而是要成为一种哲学，对人类的理解活动进行存在论反思。

海德格尔—伽达默尔认为狄尔泰采取的传统哲学方式（寻求客观知识的认识论—方法论）无法实现其哲学目的（理解历史性生命本身），为此目的必须在一种现象学化的解释学中找到更恰当的研究方式和概念工具。他们的解释学不过是发展了晚年狄尔泰已经透露出的存在论解释学的倾向，在这个过程中他们贯彻了人的存在和认识的历史性与有限性，克服了狄尔泰的科学主义倾向。格朗丹甚至认为，海德格尔—伽达默尔的哲学解释学只是狄尔泰所设想的哲学的延续和实现。⁷²这种观点有一定道理，也有一定的片面性，没有看到狄尔泰追求精神科学客观性的努力所具有的意义。其实存在论解释学自身也面临着一些问题。存在论解释学虽然主张为科学研究奠基，但它如何能够确保科学的有效性，如何能与科学知识贯通起来？在精神科学研究中如何区分正确的理解和错误的理解？这是海德格尔和伽达默尔回避了的问题。存在论解释学本身就蕴含着认识相对主义的倾向。仅仅表面上让认识论—方法论从属于存在论，并不能克服狄尔泰面临的困境，在认识论—方法论和存在论之间的裂痕并没有消除。

其实在后伽达默尔时代，寻求精神科学知识的客观性和理解的普遍有效性仍然是人们不懈的追求。实现存在论、认识论和方法论的统一成为当代解释学发展的趋势，这在哈贝马斯、保罗·利科等人的解释学努力中体现了出来，他们可以说是力图在更高层次上返回到狄尔

72 参见 Jean Grondin, "Dilthey's Hermeneutics and Philosophical Hermeneutics", in: *Interpreting Dilthey: Critical Essays*, 265.

泰。⁷³当然这一工作至今仍没有令人满意地完成。由于狄尔泰的广博的知识、开阔的历史视野和思考的复杂性，他的探索至今仍能为寻求存在论 - 认识论 - 方法论相统一的解释学提供有益的启示和借鉴。

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73 参见何卫平：《西方解释学的第三次转向——从哈贝马斯到利科》，载《中国社会科学》2019年第6期，第45-62页。

弗里德里希·威廉·冯·赫尔曼
(Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann)

潘易植 / 译

此在与此-在

——从《存在与时间》到《哲学论稿》¹

摘要：此-在概念并非是在《哲学论稿》中才出现的，毋宁说，在前期海德格尔的《存在与时间》中就已经出现了带有连字符的此-在，并且《存在与时间》中的所有“此在”都可以理解为“此-在”。此在中的“在”意味着生存，而其中的“此”意味着展开状态，亦即澄明，并且包含了“自身性质的-绽出的”和“绽出的-视域的”两个维度。而在《哲学论稿》中，海德格尔在本有历史的设问之下进一步拓展了此-在的含义，尽管此-在之此仍意味着澄明的具体的、历史性的照亮方式，但澄明本身并不会穷尽于这一含义。然而，不可忽视的是，本有和此-在之间存在着互相建基的关系。有鉴于此，必须重新思考前后期海德格尔之间的思想关联。

Zusammenfassung: Der Begriff des Da-seins kommt nicht erst in den “Beiträgen zur Philosophie” auf. Vielmehr gibt es den Begriff des Da-seins mit Bindestrich bereits im früheren Werk Heideggers “Sein und Zeit”, in dem “Dasein” auf jeden Fall als “Da-sein” verstanden werden kann. Das “Sein” in “Dasein” bedeutet Existenz, während das “Da” die Erschlossenheit d.h. Lichtung meint und zwei Dimensionen umfasst: die “selbsthaft-ekstatische” und die “ekstatisch-horizontale”. In den “Beiträgen zur Philosophie” erweitert Heidegger die Bedeutung des Da-seins im Kontext der ereignisgeschichtlichen Ansetzung. Obwohl das Da des Da-seins immer noch die konkrete, geschichtliche Weise bezeichnet, in der die Lichtung gelichtet wird, ist die Lichtung selbst nicht auf diese Bedeutung beschränkt. Es ist jedoch nicht zu übersehen, dass zwischen Ereignis und Da-sein eine wechselseitige Begründung besteht. Angesichts dessen muss die gedankliche Verbindung zwischen dem frühen und dem späten Heidegger neu gedacht werden.

Abstract: The concept of Da-sein does not first appear in the “Beiträge zur Philosophie”. Rather, the concept of Da-sein with a hyphen already exists in

1 本文译自冯·赫尔曼先生的德文未刊稿Dasein und Da-sein in “Sein und Zeit” und in den “Beiträgen zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)”。本文由潘易植翻译，王宏健校对。

Heidegger's earlier work "Sein und Zeit", where all instances of Dasein can be understood as Da-sein. The Sein in Dasein means existence, while the Da refers to "Erschlossenheit", that is, "Lichtung", and encompasses two dimensions: the "selbsthaft-ekstatische" and the "ekstatisch-horizontale". In the "Beiträge zur Philosophie", Heidegger expands the meaning of Da-sein in the context of the "ereignisgeschichtlichen Ansetzung". Although the Da of Da-sein still refers to the concrete, historical way in which the Lichtung is "gelichtet", the Lichtung itself is not limited to this meaning. However, it is important to note that there is a reciprocal grounding relationship between Ereignis and Da-sein. In light of this, the philosophical connection between the early and later Heidegger must be reconsidered.

Keywords: 海德格尔, 此在, 此-在, 现象学, 本有

《存 在与时间》导论第2节“存在问题的形式结构”的第9段在其分析过程中首次提出了“此在”（Dasein）概念：“这种存在者，就是我们自己向来所是的存在者，就是除了其它可能的存在方式以外还能对存在发问的存在者。我们用**此在**这个术语来称呼这种存在者。”²自此以后，这一术语就被称之为“此在”：“存在的意义问题的突出而透彻的提法要求我们事先就某种存在者（此在）的存在来对这种存在者加以适当解说。”对于这个被称之为“此在”的存在者之存在，导言第4节第4段引入了一个术语名称：“此在能够这样或那样地与之交涉的那个存在，此在无论如何总要以某种方式与之发生交涉的那个存在，我们称之为**生存**（Existenz）。”因此，“此在”似乎只是那个通过存在领会而与众不同的“存在者”的名称，而“生存”则是对这一存在者之“存在”的称呼。

然而，将这种领会着存在的存在者把握为“此在”，其原因是什么？这个词作为术语的含义是什么？当它被标识为“此在”时，它如何标记着那个领会着存在的存在者？着眼于领会着存在的存在者自身，“此在”这一术语应被称作什么？“此在”这个名称是对那个领会着存在的存在者——对它而言，这造就了“存在者”并使之与其“存在”相区别——的把握吗？

2 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*. GA 2, hrsg. von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979. 关于作者对此处所引用和解释的文本的讨论，参见Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins. Ein Kommentar zu „Sein und Zeit“*. Bd. 1, §§ 1-8; Bd.2, §§9-27; Bd. 3, §§ 28-44, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987, 2005, 2008.

一、超越的-视域的此-在概念

在引入“生存”这一术语后，我们接着在《存在与时间》第4节第4段中读到：“这个存在者的本质规定不能靠列举关乎实事的‘什么’来进行。它的本质毋宁在于：它所包含的存在向来就是它有待去是的那个存在；所以，我们选择此在这个名称，纯粹就其存在来标识这个存在者。”因此，“此在”就是某个“纯粹的存在表达”，这个关于“存在”的表达，乃是领会着存在的存在者被标识为“此在”的出发点和落脚点。因此，“此在”这一名称就和生存这一概念——作为存在领会着的存在者之存在——紧密相邻。“此在”于是也和生存一样，与那被标识为此在的存在者之存在有关。然而，人们不得不问，“此在”这个词与生存之间还有何种超出词语层面的进一步的关联？

第28节“专题分析‘在之中’的任务”对“此在”这个词的术语含义作出了解释，而这一解释在此在的整个生存论-存在论分析中是决定性的。第5段讲到：“本质上由在世组建起来的那个存在者其本身向来就是它的‘此’（Da）”。在这里，“此在”这个词的两个音节是分开的，并体现在它的术语含义上。“此在”意味着，领会着存在的存在者越是在其作为在世本身的基本建构之中，它就越“在”其“此”。这个“在”意味着“生存着”，因此“此在”这个词中的“在”就具有“生存”的含义。既然如此，那么“此在”的“此”的术语含义是什么？

第5段给出了回答：“这个（越在其此的）存在者在它最本己的存在（在其生存）中秉有解除封闭状态（Unverschlossenheit）的性质。”此在”中的“此”并不意味着“这里”或“那里”，也不是“在场”和“在手”，而仅仅是“解除封闭状态”，也即“开敞状态”（Aufgeschlossenheit）这一现象的名称。但这是一种什么样的“开敞状态”？“‘此’这个词意指着这种本质性的（wesenhafte）展开状态（Erschlossenheit）。”“此在”的“此”具有“展开状态”的纯粹存在论的含义，它被称作“本质性的”。第5段的最后一句给出了对“展开状态”及其内在建构的本质性解释：“通过这一展开状态，这种存在者（此在）就会同世界的此-在（Da-sein）一道，为它自己而在‘此’”。换句话说，“此在”之此的特定含义在展开状态中得到了充实，借助展开状态，被标识为此在的存在者“为它自己而在”，

为它自己而“展开” (erschlossen)，更确切地说是与“展开之存在” (Erschlossen-sein) 以及“会同世界的此在”一道。

因此，此作为展开状态被描绘为两个层次：为-它-自身-展开存在 (Für-es-selbst-erschlossenein)，以及世界的展开存在。为-它-自身-展开存在描述了被论述为自身存在的生存的自在且自为的敞开方式。我们将它称之为“自身性质 (selbsthafte) 的展开状态”。在这种自身性质的展开状态中，生存同时也被理解为在世界的展开存在中放浪 (entrückt)。作为自身而被敞开的、自身性质的展开状态放浪于自身，也就是说，于自身绽出 (ekstatisch)，就此而言我们可以将它称作自身性质的 - 绽出的展开状态。生存着的自身以绽出的方式展开的何所向，首先就是“世界”，它在第 18 节中被规定为意蕴整体。海德格尔将绽出着的展开存在 (Erschlosseneins) 的何所向称作“视线范围”意义上的“视域” (Horizont)。而世界视域也包含了生存论的为何之故，它处于每一具体的、有内涵的生存可能性的形态之中。为了生存 (及其自身) 的自身性质的 - 绽出的展开状态的世界之展开状态因此就被把握为绽出 - 视域的。这样，(此的) 展开状态的建构就可以被描述为两个维度：自身性质的 - 绽出的展开状态 (selbsthaft-ekstatische Erschlossenheit)，以及绽出的 - 视域的展开状态 (ekstatisch-horizontale Erschlossenheit)。

我们可以说，展开状态 (或者说这个此) 作为整体就是自身性质的 - 绽出的 - 视域的。在自身性质的 - 绽出的展开状态中，生存与其构成性的生存论环节得以敞开；而在绽出的 - 视域的展开状态中，生存着的自身被理解为放浪的，世界则作为意蕴与一切非生存论的、从而就是范畴论的存在方式 (如上手状态和在手状态) 而敞开。只要生存着的存在者将一切非合于此在的存在者 (nichtdaseinsmäßige Seiende) 理解为世内存在者——处于之前所说的意蕴世界与范畴性的存在方式的绽出的 - 视域的展开状态之中的世内存在者——那么绽出的 - 视域的展开状态 (此) 就其自身而言就现显示出某种广度，它所囊括的就不只是周围世界之内的存在者，而是存在者之整体 (das Ganze des Seienden)。

从第 28 节第 6 段中我们能提炼出这一表述：生存着的存在者“以是

它的此的方式存在”。因此这样的存在者在术语上就被称作“此在”，而“此在”说的就是：以是它的此、是它的展开状态的方式存在。物主代词它的“可能会引起一种观点，认为这个此只不过是生存着的存在者及其生存论环节的生存之展开状态。然而这种广为流传的观点是错误的。生存着的存在者是“它的”此，“它的”展开状态，这是因为作为展开状态的此仅在“它的”存在（存在实行）之中并随之一道而敞开。但展开状态的敞开并不只是自身性质的 - 绽出的，而是在某种与之一同的绽出的 - 视域的展开状态，尽管它本质性地属于自身性质的 - 绽出的展开状态，但就区别而言，它是自身性质的 - 绽出的展开状态的展开着的何所向。“此在就是它的展开状态”，其方式是，以自身性质的 - 绽出的、视域的方式接合的展开状态本身在生存着的存在者之本已存在的实行中敞开。

在第 6 段中，展开状态也被首次称作“澄明”（Lichtung）。生存着的存在者在它的生存及其在世的基本建构之中并随之一道被“照亮”（gelichtet），甚至“它本身就是澄明”。第 28 节往后的第 29 节和第 31 节分别强调了一种基础的生存论环节，在这之中，澄明得以照亮，而展开状态得以敞开。第 9 段谈到：“我们将在**现身**（Befindlichkeit）与**领会**（Verstehen）中看到组建此在去是它的‘此’的两种同等源始的方式”。现身的生存论结构是被抛状态（Geworfenheit），而理解的生存论结构则是开抛（Entwurf）。“被抛状态”意味着，生存着的存在者一向已经被摆在实际性的展开状态（澄明）中了。在被抛状态的存在方式中，展开状态的实际性的自身展开（Sicherschließen）得以发生。在这一被抛着的（geworfenen）展开状态中，生存着的存在者在其开抛方式中的实行性的展开也得以实行。展开状态的实际性的自身展开与实行性质的（vollzugshaftem）展开，从两者的同等源始的发生中，这个此得以开放（offen），澄明得以照亮，展开状态得以敞开，尽管是作为自身性质的 - 绽出的和绽出的 - 视域的展开状态而敞开。

要充分理解“此-在”这一术语，第 28 节是关键，它最为清楚地谈到，“此在”这个术语作为生存着的存在者所需的名称，也同样、并且恰恰必须被解读和理解“此之存在”（Sein des Da）。然而，仅仅将这个此不加区分地解读为“展开状态”是不够的，还要使得与此在（此之存在）分

析同行的诠释学-现象学阐释看到这一点，也即这个此就其自身而言由自身性质的-绽出的和绽出的-视域的展开状态组成。既然“此-在”只不过是意味着“此之存在”，那么显然就需要用连字符来书写“此-在”而非“此在”。海德格尔已经这样做过一次，就在第28节第5段的最后，他谈到了“世界的此-在”。而海德格尔也在撰写这些章节的标题时用了连字符，在这些标题中，生存之基础的并且同等源始的存在方式（在这些存在方式中，生存着的存在者被看成是作为展开状态而开放的此）得以被揭示：第29节：“作为现身的此-在”；第31节：“作为理解的此-在”；第34节：“此-在于话语，语言”。

《存在与时间》中“此在”中间连字符的写法总是被忽略。在文献研究中人们经常这样说：海德格尔在《存在与时间》中所写的“此在”是不加连字符的，带连字符的“此-在”第一次出现于《哲学论稿》中，因此也是在有关存在历史之思的著作中。这一论点基于一种外部的、谈不上正确的考察，因为它忽视了《存在与时间》中也有连字符的写法。除了这一论点，人们还会说，在《存在与时间》中，“此在”只是**生存着的存在者**的名称，而首次出现在存在历史之思中的带连字符的“此-在”则具有“存在（存有）之澄明中的持立（Hinausstehen）”意义上的“此之存在”的含义。这一观点还认为，“此-在”中的“此”在存在历史之思中获得了“澄明”的含义。但这一广为流传的、似乎不言自明的观点忽视了（尽管第28节已非常明确！），在《存在与时间》中“此”就已经具有解除封闭状态、展开状态和澄明的含义了。

《存在与时间》还谈到了生存着的存在者之存在，它作为自身性质的-绽出的存在，处于视域的澄明中。如果海德格尔将被抛着-开抛着的展开（geworfen-entwerfende Erschließen）规定为一种超逾（Übersteigen），也即绽出的-视域的展开状态中的存在者的超越，那么我们就可以将它称为展开状态或者澄明的超越的-视域的维度与建构机制。但只有当我们在作为澄明的此的内在构造中得出与之相反的洞见，我们才能看到并且思考《存在与时间》与《哲学论稿》中此之存在的区别。而生存着的此之存在的基础存在论的结构，和它的本有历史的结构之间的共性则在于对于澄明的开放。我们必须首先抓住这一共性。因为在视域的展开状态中的自身性质的-绽出的放浪（Entrücktsein），

本身就是对于视域的澄明的、绽出的开放。

第31节第10段的开头写到:“开抛始终关涉到在世的整个展开状态”。“整个展开状态”这一措辞非常重要。我们也能称它为“整体性的”展开状态。“整个展开状态”这一说法所针对的是生存之自身性质的 - 绽出的展开状态和世界的视域的展开状态之间的区分。“整个”展开状态不只是生存及其在世存在的展开状态,而且连同着那些并非自身性质的、而是视域的展开状态,生存及其生存论环节就在其中放浪(它就是为此而开放的)。第28节的第5段最后那个意味深长的句子就着眼于“整个”展开状态和它的内在区分:“通过这一展开状态,这种存在者(此在)就会同世界的此-在一道,为它自己而在‘此’”。

然而,视域的展开状态不只是关于在世之中的世界的展开状态维度,而且也关于“一般存在”(Sein überhaupt)、关于存在与存在方式,这些存在方式并不是生存,但它们被处于视域的展开状态维度的放浪的生存所理解(存在领会)。第31节第16段开头讲到:“‘此’展开在领会中,这本身就是此在能在的一种方式。此在向着为何之故开抛它的存在,在此合一地也就是向着意蕴(世界)开抛它的存在。在这种开抛状态(Entworfenheit)中,有着一般存在的展开状态。在向可能性开抛之际,已经先行设定了存在之领会。”也就是说,在生存对于某种生存可能性(此在为其之故而生存)的开抛状态(展开状态)中,也在一并归属的对作为意蕴的世界的开抛状态(展开状态)中,就有开抛状态以及“一般存在的”展开状态,不只是作为生存与世界的存在的展开状态,同时还是“一般”存在的展开状态,此外也是非生存性的、范畴性的存在的展开状态(比如上手状态和在手状态)。也就是说,此在的此不只是生存的展开状态和世界的展开状态,而且也是一般存在(整体)的展开状态,基础问题所问的就是它的意义。这一提示非常重要,因为它清楚地讲到,“时间与存在”的论题,也即在时态意义对一切范畴性存在的追问,其位置并不位于此在分析所揭示的“此-在”之外,而是内在于此在之此、在视域的展开状态中,而它又返过来与自身性质的 - 绽出的展开状态相关。因此,作为此之存在的此在意味着,生存的自身性质的 - 绽出的展开状态的存在,世界的视域的展开状态的存在,以及一般存在的视域的展开状态的存在。

由于《存在与时间》中的“此在”自始至终都具有“此之存在”的术语含义，因此海德格尔在第一次引入这一概念时，以及在其整个著作中都可以用连字符方式把它写成“此 - 在”。尽管《存在与时间》前一部分尚未明确指出展开状态和澄明（作为此的存在论含义）之基本现象（首次谈到展开状态是在第 16 节第 10 段），但“此-在”的连字符写法从一开始就一直指示着，这个词必须完完全全脱离其通常的含义，并获得一种全新的含义。琼斯坦堡 (Joan Stambaugh) 对《存在与时间》所作的出色的新英译本听从了海德格尔的提示，也即“此 - 在”具有“此之存在”的存在论含义，因此用连字符来书写这个未加翻译的“此 - 在”一词³。当她以有别于海德格尔的连字符写法的方式，将“在” (-sein) 的开头字母大写时，她也因此把握住了海德格尔将“此在”说明为“此之存在”的写法，对此没什么可以反对的。在“此-在”中，即便是大写的“存在”也并不意味着一般存在，而只是生存的存在。然而，当译者将“此”译作“there”（比如在饶有意味的第 28 节第 5 段），那么鉴于我们在这里对“此”的含义的解释，这种翻译就是不可接受的了。因为“此”从一开始就被赋予了展开状态的纯粹的存在论含义，因此“there”就根本不能出现在翻译中。

我们已经详细讲解过这个句子，“此”这个词意指着这种本质性的展开状态。通过这一展开状态，这种存在者（此在）就会同世界的此在一道，为它自己而在‘此’”，它被琼·斯坦堡这样翻译：“The expression ‘there’ means this essential disclosedness. Through disclosedness this being (Da-sein) is ‘there’ for itself together with the Dasein of the world”。但倘若“此在”这个名称被未经翻译地采用，那么此 - 在中的此也应被保持为未经翻译的样子。在这种情况下，英译本应该要这么说：“The expression ‘Da’ means this essential disclosedness. Through disclosedness this being (Da-sein) is ‘da’ for itself together with the Da-sein of the world”。将此 - 在中的此翻译为 There，却未经翻译地采用此 - 在这个概念，这是一种前后不一贯的举措。尤其是（第五章的）分章 A 的标题“此的生存论建构”，它被“there 的生存论建构” (The Existential

3 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time. A Translation of Sein und Zeit*, trans. Joan Stambaugh, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996.

Constitution of the There) 这一翻译所扰乱了。在这里这个此也应该保持为未翻译的样子。但如果想正确地翻译它，那么这个此无非意味着展开状态，而不是被称作展开状态或者展开的“*There*”。尽管海德格尔早就已经反复强调，“此在”这个术语是无法被翻译的，但人们必须清楚地看到，该术语的两个组成要素都有其含义，它是可翻译的并且已经被翻译过。此 - 在的“在”被翻译为 *being*，此 - 在的“此”因其展开状态的含义被翻译为 *disclosure*。因此人们可能会问，能否在“是展开状态” (*die Erschlossenheit sein*) 的含义中找到“此 - 在”的翻译？

此 - 在的此具有自身性质的 - 绽出的展开状态，以及绽出的 - 视域的展开状态的含义，而后者是生存、世界与一般存在的展开状态。从展开状态的这一基本现象来看，《存在与时间》第 44 节指出，作为澄明的展开状态构建起了“真理的源始现象”（参见分节 b：“真理的源始现象和传统真理概念的缘起”）。而既然“一般存在”意味着“整体的存在”，并囊括了生存、世界和范畴性的存在，那么一般存在的展开状态也指向了“存在之真理”，也即作为展开状态或澄明的真理。这就是诠释学 - 现象学的基础存在论的第四个基本问题，其论题隶属于《存在与时间》第一部第三篇《时间与存在》的主题，也即“存在之真理特征” (GA 24, S. 33)⁴。在第 44 节中，对此在的生存论 - 存在论分析为第三篇中的存在之真理论题作了准备。1927 年夏季学期马堡的讲座现象学的基本问题” (GA 24, S. 1) 给出了第三篇的“新”版本，也即第二个版本。因此我们应该注意：“存在之真理”主题的首次出现并非伴随着对存在问题之本有历史的讨论（首次出现于《哲学论稿》）。这个主题早就出现在对存在问题之基础存在论的讨论中。在一般存在之意义这一基本问题中也包含了“存在之真理”的基本问题 - ，它在《存在与时间》第三篇中得到了系统性的解答，只不过基础存在论以超越的 - 视域的方式将“存在之真理”结构化了，而本有之思中，“存在之真理”所具有的是本有性质的 (*ereignishaften*) 结构，而非超越的 - 视域的结构。这一内在转变所遵循的同时也是从超越的 - 视域的此 - 在概念到本有性质的此 - 在概念的转变。

4 Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. GA 24, hrsg. von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975.

二、本有性质的此-在概念

从超越的-视域的存在问题到存在历史或本有历史的存在问题，这一过程是借助思的经验而开启的，这种经验不只是处于在世的生存可能性之中的生存，而首先是存在之真理自身的历史性经验。正是这种经验，使得此在之“在”的历史性建基于作为存在之真理的“此”的历史性。作为真理的存在之澄明，它的历史性经验包括了对（在存在之真理或澄明中）被抛状态之源头的洞见，这一源头在于存在之真理的初始的自身抛掷（Sichzuwerfen）。照亮着（lichtende）的抛掷（Zuwurf）被标记为本有化（Ereignung）对于开抛着的此-在之存在的关涉（Bezug）。在这一居有着（ereignenden）的关涉中，开抛着的存在首先在自身抛掷着的存在之真理中被抛着，开抛着的存在作为一种被抛着的开抛，因此是一种出于居有着的抛掷而被居有（ereignete）的开抛。对开抛着的存在的居有着的关涉，以及被抛掷着（zugeworfenen）的存在之真理的开抛的、被居有的关系（Verhältnis）——居有着的关涉与被居有的关系之间的这种平衡，就被冠以“本有”这一术语名称（参见《哲学论稿》第122节，GA 65, S. 239）⁵。

根据这一被形式性地标记出来的“诸本有”（Ereignisses）的结构关系，也即“存在之真理”与“此-在”在本有性质上的共属一体，我们转向了《哲学论稿》第140节“存在之本现”的一处关键段落，并去澄清本有性质的——由于它是属于本有的——此-在概念，并将其与来自超越的-视域的此-在概念作区分。为了我们的目的而选用的这段文本开头如下：“存在之真理，因而也包括存在本身，唯有在此-在的地方和时候才本质性地现身（west）。”（同上，S. 261）我们首先要这样评注：真理是对于存在的真理，而存在本身是真理的存在——被这样理解的存在之真理只有在此-在所是的、也即所生存的“地方

⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*. GA 2, hrsg. von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979. 关于作者对此处所引用和解释的文本的讨论，参见Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins. Ein Kommentar zu „Sein und Zeit“*. Bd. 1, §§ 1-8; Bd.2, §§9-27; Bd. 3, §§ 28-44, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987, 2005, 2008.

和时候”中，才开展出它作为本现发生的本质发生（ihr Wesens- als ihr Wesungsgeschehen）。真理作为存在之澄明，它的支配（waltet）离不开此-在，离不开此之存在。原则上这也适用于对存在之真理以及此-在的基础存在论的讨论。

然而，在超越的-视域的设问（Ansetzung）中，存在之真理出现在此-在之此中，而在本有历史的设问中，此-在之此显示为照亮着的存在之澄明的每一具体的真理方式或照亮方式（die jeweilige Wahrheits- oder Gelichtetheitsweise）。但澄明乃是在某种历史性的照亮方式的每一具体居有着的抛掷中照亮自身。因此，有必要区分照亮着的存在之澄明与作为每一具体发生的照亮方式的此。照亮着的澄明本身并不会在每一具体的历史性的此-在之此中被耗竭。澄明的每一具体的、因此是历史性的或者说历史性地变化的照亮方式只不过是“被抛掷着和开抛着”（entworfenen）。真理作为存在之澄明，本质性地现身（支配）于居有着的抛掷中。然而，被抛掷着的照亮方式在开抛着的此-在之存在中被获得和被打开，这一点隶属于其本质历史。作为存在之澄明的真理的本现之发生包含了居有着的关涉，也包含从中被居有的、也只能如此被开抛的关系，亦即与被抛掷的照亮方式的关系。存在之真理的支配并不只是作为居有着的抛掷，它也离不开被居有的开抛。

但同样，“此-在唯有在真理之存在（存在之真理的本质性现身或支配）的地方和时候才‘存在’（生存）”。这意味着：只要真理之存在作为开抛着的存在，在居有着的开抛中照亮开抛着的存在，那么此-在就只能作为存在，作为此之开抛而生存。作为存在之澄明的真理，在每一具体的被抛掷的照亮方式中支配着，但这只是就这一点而言的，即这种被抛掷的照亮方式也在开抛着的存在中被开抛。

只有当此-在之存在的被抛掷的照亮方式作为被居有的开抛而被带入和被打开，存在之真理才在其居有着的抛掷中支配着；只有真理之存在是在对于开抛的照亮状态中被抛掷的，作为开抛着的此之存在才在颠倒中生存；这就是此句话的含义：“这一种转向恰恰显示着作为在自身中反冲着的本有的存在本身之本质现身”（同上）。此-在作为开抛着的此之存在并不生存于与存在之真理以及与本有的对立中，而是说，开抛着的此之存在隶属于作为被居有的开抛的本有，而这种被居

有的开抛与居有着的抛掷相反冲 (entgegenschwingt)。被居有的开抛与居有着的抛掷两者处于相反冲的关涉之中，这些关涉在其反冲中构建起了转向，也即构建起了在其自身中转向着的本有。

由此我们就可以说：“本有于自身中为此-在建基 (gründet)。”(同上) 它为此之存在建基，不是在自身对面，而是“于自身中”，因为这个此就是居有着的关涉中的被抛掷的照亮，并且是开抛着的存在，也即作为被抛着的、在被抛掷的照亮方式中的某种被居有的存在，它隶属于居有着的关涉并且因此构建起完满的、于自身中反冲着的、转向着的本有。颠倒过来也必须说：“此 - 在为本有建基”，也就是说，它在其开抛着的存在的实行中，为在本有化中被抛掷的照亮方式建基。在本有中有一种反冲着的双重建基：居有着的抛掷建基着，其方式是，在这种建基中它照亮着照亮方式。只要它承担起在本有化中被建基的照亮方式，并让它在开放中进行支配，那么它在这之中就被居有的开抛而建基。由于此和此之存在是被抛掷着的本有化所规定的，因此作为本有化的本有为处于自身中的此 - 在建基，并且，作为开抛着的存在的此 - 在为出于本有化而被居有的此建基。在这个意义上，此之存在为本有 (作为在这之中被居有者 (Ereignete) 的本有化) 而建基。

但为什么要将照亮方式的照亮着的开抛把握为“本有化”？在此它首要的含义是什么？对这一问题的回答是在《论稿》的第 143 节 (同上, S. 263)：“存有作为本-有 (Er-eignis)。本-有化 (Er-eignung) 把人规定为存有之本己性 (Eigentum)。”“本-有”，“本-有化”的连字符写法具有一种指示功能。它指示着这一点，“有” (-eignis) 与“有化” (-eignung) 必须根据“本己性”来被经验和思考。本-有将在其本-有化中的、合于此-在的人规定为其本己性，规定为本 - 有化着的存有的本己性。此之存在 (合于此-在的人之存在) 来自于在这种被抛中的照亮方式的本-有化着 (er-eignenden) 的开抛，以至于它作为开抛着的存在，只能从被抛而来并在照亮方式中得以发生。作为如此被抛着的此之存在 (照亮方式)，它来自于照亮着的本有化，并且是照亮着的 - 居有着的存有之首要的本己性。只有作为被居有的存有之本己性，此之存在才作为某种自身，在其自身之中并为其自身而打开。本-有化因此意味着“规定为本己性”，本-有化状态意味着“作为本己性的规

定状态” (als Eigentum Bestimmtheit)。本-有首先是作为“将此之存在规定为本己性”的本-有化，而反冲着的本-有化状态 (Er-eignetsein) 则是开抛着的此之存在的“本己性的规定状态”。

本有化与本有化状态的基本含义是：规定-为-本己性和本己性的规定状态；每一次将“本-有”这一基本词汇翻译为其它某种语言的尝试都必须最为严格地遵循这一点。帕维斯·伊曼德 (Parvis Emad) 对“哲学论稿 (自本有而来)”的英译很好地满足了这一不可避免的要求：“Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)”。在其“译者前言”中，他解释了对“本有”这个基础词汇迄今为止所作的诸种翻译尝试背后的原因：事件 (event)、转让 (appropriation)、转让事件 (event of appropriation)、相适 (befitting)，这些翻译都无法复现本己的运动，也即就“规定为本己性”这一意义而言的被标识为本有化的本有 (同上，S. XIX ff.)。这些语文学的、但最终也是思想性的见解使得译者抓住了动词 to own 来构词形成“Enowing”。为了解释“本有”，我们看到，第 143 节第一句话在英译本中是这样说的：“Be-ing as en-owning. Enownment determines man as owned by be-ing”⁶。给出 en-owning 之后，“本-有化”现在也被合理地翻译为“En-ownment”。这两种构词都非常接近德语概念，因此在给出和处理这些词的时候，它能以解释的方式抓住并且阐明在德语词“本-有”与“本-有化”中被指示的实质含义。然而帕维斯·伊曼德对《论稿》的英译不仅体现在某几个术语上，而且体现为向着这一著作之思想的某种整体性的地道的思之切近，这一点也由这一事实得以佐证，也即它一再地被其他许多语种的译作视为有力的帮助。

三、结语

最后，我们以超越的-视域的此-在概念和本有性质的此-在概念之间的比较对照来结束本文。在两个概念中，此-在都意味着：这个此存在，此之存在。因此，此之所是的存在，也即此之存在，具有放浪的绽出特

6 Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*. trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999. ——参见 Parvis Emad, *On the Way to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy*, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2007

征，或者说处于为了这个此的开放中的绽出特征。在基础存在论的此-在概念，一如在本有历史的此-在概念中，此都具有开敞状态、敞开状态、一般存在和整体存在之澄明这些含义。因此显而易见的是，不只是本有历史的，而且基础存在论的“此-在”概念也都是用连字符来写的。

在基础存在论的、也即超越的-视域地被表述的此-在中，此之存在被规定为在此之中的被抛，以及此的开抛。被抛着的开抛（开放）作为某种超越活动而在此的视域维度中发生，而这种超越活动在其自身之中作为自身性质的-绽出的此而被展开。因此，整体的此就是超越的-视域的展开状态。

在本有历史地被规定的此-在中，在此之中的被抛具有从照亮着的本有化而来的被居有特征。相应的，被抛着的开抛（开抛状态）就是被居有的。处于视域中的超越活动将自身转变为被居有的此之开抛，这一此之开抛作为历史性的照亮方式，来自于照亮着的本有化。视域，此的视域维度，在照亮着的本有化中消隐了。在这里，此-在的此，在照亮着的本有化中被抛掷，并在被居有的开抛中开抛着。这就是在本有化中被抛掷的、并在被居有的开抛中开抛的此。

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Book Review

孙周兴：《人类世的哲学》，未来哲学丛书，北京：商务印书馆，
2020年8月。

(Sun Zhouxing, *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene*, Future Philosophy
Book Series, Beijing: Commercial Press, August 2020.)

Zhaonong Wang

**Technological Domination and the Twofold of Human Existence:
A Review of Sun Zhouxing's *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene***

Abstract: Sun Zhouxing's treatise, *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene*, confronts the profound challenges posed by the technologically dominant Anthropocene while seeking to reconstruct our understanding of the life-world. This endeavor is central to his philosophy of the future, where the impact of modern technology on human existence emerges as a critical issue that must be addressed. Grounded in the philosophy of existence, Sun's work positions Nietzsche's concept of the overman (Übermensch) as the "Overman-Future Man" within a contemporary framework. Furthermore, drawing on Heidegger's analysis of the essence of modern technology, the transformation of natural human beings into technological human beings is elucidated. Most crucially, Sun's exploration highlights the twofold (*Zwiefalt*) nature of naturalness and technicality in human existence. It is through this revelation and the adoption of a stance of technological destinism that a unique solution is proposed for the redefinition of human existence under the conditions of technological domination.

Zusammenfassung: Sun Zhouxings Abhandlung *Die Philosophie des Anthropozäns* konfrontiert die tiefgreifenden Herausforderungen, die durch das technologisch dominierte Anthropozän gestellt werden, und versucht gleichzeitig, unser Verständnis der Lebenswelt zu rekonstruieren. Dieses Unterfangen ist zentral für seine Philosophie der Zukunft, in der der Einfluss moderner Technologie auf die menschliche Existenz als ein kritisches Thema hervortritt. Ein Thema, mit dem sich die Menschheit auseinandersetzen muss. Basierend auf der Existenzphilosophie positioniert Sun Nietzsches Konzept des Übermenschen als den „Übermensch-Zukunftsmensch“ und diskutiert diese Idee in einem zeitgenössischen Rahmen. Darüber hinaus wird anhand von Heideggers Analyse

des Wesens der modernen Technik die Transformation natürlicher Menschen in technologische Menschen erläutert. Besonders wichtig ist, dass Suns Untersuchung die Doppelnatur von Natürlichkeit und Technizität in der menschlichen Existenz hervorhebt (als *Zwiefalt*). Durch diese Offenbarung und die Annahme einer Haltung des technologischen Destinismus wird eine einzigartige Lösung für die Neudefinition der menschlichen Existenz unter den Bedingungen der technologischen Dominanz vorgeschlagen.

摘要：孙周兴的论著《人类世的哲学》直面技术统治下的“人类世”所带来的深刻挑战，将重建生活世界经验作为本己追求。这一追求构成了其未来哲学的基石，尤其是现代技术对人类实存的触动成为未来哲学必须解决的重要课题。这本论著以实存哲学为理论基础，为尼采的超人（*Übermensch*）概念取得了一个当代定位，即“超人—未来人”；进一步，孙周兴沿着海德格尔对现代技术之本质的分析，明确了自然人向技术人转变的现实境况；最重要的是，他以此阐述了人类实存之自然性与技术性的二重性（*Zwiefalt*）难题。而正是通过对二重性的揭示以及对一种技术命运论之立场的阐明，为在技术统治下对人类实存的重新规定提供了一个独特的方案。

Keywords: *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene*, Technological Domination, Overman-Future Man, *Zwiefalt*, Technological Destinism

The *Philosophy of the Anthropocene*¹ is a central work in Sun Zhouxing's "Trilogy of Future Philosophy," which explores his reflections on the philosophy of the future, described as the quasar of philosophy ("未来才是哲思的准星"²). Within the context of the Anthropocene, characterized by technological domination, modern technologies—such as nuclear energy, endocrine disruptors (环境激素), genetic engineering, and intelligent technology—pose significant threats to human existence. In this crisis, the role of philosophy becomes crucial. Sun highlights a key aspect of Heidegger's inquiry: the notion that modern technology touches the essence of human beings. Heidegger cautions that "the rule of enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of

1 孙周兴：《人类世的哲学》（transl. as *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene*），商务印书馆，2020年。

2 *Ibid.*, 69.

a more primal truth.”³ This leads us to ask: how does the *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene* reveal and address this potential threat?

This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the concept of “technological destinism” as presented in the *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene*, focusing on its implications for human existence. Central to this analysis is the philosophy of existence, which serves as the theoretical foundation of the philosophy of the future. The paper will address the following points: Firstly, how technological domination affects the essence of the human being and how Sun conceptualizes the transformation from “natural human beings” (自然人) to “technological human beings” (技术人). Secondly, how the philosophy of the future, grounded in the philosophy of existence, reinterprets Nietzsche's concept of the overman as the “future man” (未来人). Thirdly, how, within the framework of Heidegger's analysis of modern technology and the concept of “technological destinism,” Sun defines human existence in the twofold (*Zwiefalt*) of naturalness and technicality of human existence.

1. Technological Domination and Human Existence

In its original context, the term “Anthropocene” was introduced to describe a new geological epoch marked by human dominance. This concept suggests that human activity is exerting an increasingly significant influence on the planet, to the extent that it poses an existential threat through an uncontrollable geological crisis. Such a crisis, it could be argued, is beyond human ability to prevent or control. As a concept in future philosophy, it indicates the technological domination that results in this uncontrollable situation. What is meant by the term “technological domination”? Unlike political domination, which is rooted in the principles of philosophy and religion, technological domination represents a shift in power. Philosophy traditionally provides the foundational tenets for social institutions and organization, while religion offers moral and ethical norms, particularly in the West. However,

3 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology”, in: *Basic Writings: Ten Key Essays, plus the Introduction to Being and Time*, transl. by David Farrell Krell, New York: Harper Collins, 1993, 333.

both have been profoundly shaped by modern technology. The concept of the Anthropocene, therefore, signifies that “technological domination has overpowered political domination,”⁴ aligning with the core orientation of the philosophy of the future, which asserts that “the future has come”⁵ and points to the ascendancy of technological domination in the Anthropocene.

Sun’s interpretation of the transition from “natural human beings” to “technological human beings” emphasizes the impact on human existence. Since religion, philosophy, science, and technology are all human-made phenomena that reflect human existence, it can be argued that, “from the perspective of natural human beings,” the Anthropocene (literally in Chinese, “human-world”) represents a “non-Anthropocene” (literally in Chinese, “non-human-world”) era, symbolizing a disruption to natural-human civilization (自然人类文明) caused by technology and industry. This rupture has resulted in a new world order—a techno-human life-world (技术人类生活世界).⁶ In other words, the deeper crisis of the Anthropocene lies in the fact that technology has the power to fundamentally transform human beings, leading to a drastic alteration in their existence, which is no longer aligned with their natural state.

By taking the philosophy of existence as a critical premise for the philosophy of the future, Sun presents technological domination as a force that erases individuality. Under this domination, individuals are averaged, undifferentiated, and homogenized within the flood of technology and data, losing their uniqueness and diversity. Yet, recognizing the intrinsic differences between individuals is fundamental to the human experience; without this capacity, experience itself would lose the ability to differentiate one experience from another. Consequently, under technological domination, “our experience stands idle, we don’t know how to ground it, we don’t know how to grasp things, we don’t know how to

4 Sun Zhouxing, *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene*, 100.

5 孙周兴：《积极生活的理由：一种未来哲学的追问》（transl., *The Reason of Active Living: A Philosophy of The Future Inquiries*），商务印书馆，2023年，第33页。

6 Sun Zhouxing, *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene*, 102.

define what is around us,”⁷ leading to the hollowing out of life itself. This has resulted in the collapse of what Sun refers to as the “natural human spiritual expression system” (自然人类精神文明表达系统), causing a drastic transformation in both the life-world and life experience.

Based on this existentialist premise, the “philosophy of the Anthropocene” or the philosophy of the future is not merely a philosophy of technology; it is also a rethinking and redefinition of human existence. It begins with the philosophy of existence and extends to the development of a new philosophy of life,⁸ with the reconstruction of the life-world experience (生活世界经验) as its central task. This, in essence, represents one of the main ideas of Sun’s work.

2. Redefinition of Human Existence: The Overman-Future Man

In reframing the concept of human existence, Sun situates Nietzsche’s “overman” (*Übermensch*) within the contemporary context of the Anthropocene, envisioning the overman as the “future man” (未来人). This conceptualization raises several critical questions: How does this new understanding of human existence develop? Where might it lead? And how does it shape the philosophy of the future and our understanding of human existence?

The concept of the “overman” is built upon the premise that “God is dead,” which negates two core pillars of philosophical thought: the belief in essentialism and the construction of an essential world, as well as the foundational doctrines of theology and the ideal world. This dual negation signals “a decline in the natural human spirit.”⁹ Thus, the overman represents not only the transcendence of the self but also the necessity of overcoming humanity itself, as Nietzsche asserts that “man is something that shall be overcome.”¹⁰ Yet, this

7 Ibid., 242.

8 See Sun Zhouxing, “新生命哲学：如何筹划未来生命？”(transl. as A New Philosophy Of Life: The New Philosophy Of Life: How To Plan and Prepare for the Life of the Future?), *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene*, 327-335.

9 Sun Zhouxing, *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene*, 297.

10 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, SW 4, ed. by Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980, 14. (For the English translation of this work,

brings forth a complex challenge: How can we define our identity while simultaneously transcending essentialism? Nietzsche pairs the concept of the overman with that of the “last man” (der letzte Mensch), implying that any definition of the overman inherently involves a counter-definition of the last man.

Essentialism has provided a robust foundation for the natural sciences, enabling their growth and dominance through technological advancement. In this context, the last man can be understood as “technological human beings,” which refers to the essential transformation of natural human beings as they enter the technological-industrial realm.¹¹ The concept of “formal transcendence” (形式超越)—understood as a transcendence in ontology or existentialism that surpasses any individual or specific entity—and the notion of “divine transcendence”—referring to a transcendent God and divinity, constructed through linear causality—represent a unidirectional upward transcendence toward the supersensible world. In contrast, the overman’s transcendence is oriented “downward,” toward the earth, as Nietzsche expresses: “the overman shall be the meaning of the earth [...] remain faithful to the earth.”¹²

Sun analyzes that the concept of the “overman” represents a redefinition of human essence as existence. On one hand, the overman signifies “transcending past human beings and their natural state,” referring to the “transition from natural human beings to technological human beings” under the technological domination of the Anthropocene. From this perspective, on the other hand, Nietzsche’s call to “remain faithful to the earth” signifies a commitment to preserving human naturalness, as interpreted by Sun.¹³ Thus, the concept of the overman embodies a twofold (*Zwiefalt*) of naturalness and technicality, within which human existence is revealed.

Furthermore, Sun integrates the concept of the overman’s downward transcendence with Heidegger’s analysis of existence to formulate a definition of hu-

see *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for None and All*, transl. by Walter Kaufmann, New York: Penguin, 1978.)

11 Sun Zhouxing, *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene*, 291.

12 Friedrich Nietzsche, SW 4, 14-15.

13 Sun Zhouxing, *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene*, 312.

man existence for the philosophy of the future. In my view, this approach has the potential to reconcile essentialism and existentialism, as Sun advocates for the philosophy of existence while acknowledging that individuals can embody both essentialist and existentialist perspectives. The essentialist stance implies that “I am what I am,” defining human beings in terms of the roles they play, whereas from an existentialist viewpoint, “existence (*Ek-sistenz*) originally meant ‘out of place’” and “‘out of place’ is being creative.”¹⁴ Therefore, the only “essence” of human existence is the existence itself, and the transcendence of the overman is proved to be being “out of place”. This is how he combines Nietzsche’s notion of the overman with Heidegger’s reflections on human existence, asserting that “Nietzsche’s ‘overman’ must be the ‘new man,’ the ‘future man.’”¹⁵ And more importantly, this leads Sun to reconceptualize human existence within the framework of the philosophy of the future, emphasizing potentiality and freedom: human beings are free individuals, open to the future and capable of immediate action; they possess a free essence, constantly oriented toward the future; and as such, they must actualize their essence through creative acts.¹⁶

It seems to me that the author’s approach to the redefinition of human existence is particularly insightful, because it not only integrated Nietzsche’s concept of the overman with Heidegger’s thinking of human existence as the Overman-Future Man, but also reconciled essentialism and existentialism, redefining human existence as the Overman-Future Man from the perspective of the philosophy of the future, that is, within the context of technological dominance. This dual combination, on the one side, allows us to place Nietzsche and Heidegger in a contemporary context, and on the other side, provides existential philosophy with a more inclusive philosophical stance.

Still more importantly, Sun sees in overman both a facing up to technicality and the preservation of naturalness, which is, arguably, the twofold nature of the Overman-Future Man. Actually, he took his inquiry a step further, posing a cru-

14 Ibid., 229.

15 Ibid., 307.

16 Ibid., 229-230.

cial question: “Is it possible to achieve a balance between the twofold of naturalness and technicality inherent” of the Overman-Future Man? This dilemma can also be stated as: “What are the limits of the technologization (de-naturalization) of natural human beings?”¹⁷

3. The Essence of Modern Technology and the Twofold Nature of Human Existence

We may consider Sun’s question in the context of a more general perspective, as it reveals a fundamental contradiction between necessity and freedom, akin to the problem of free will in traditional philosophy. This enables us to gain insight into how Sun deals with this tension of necessity and freedom through a technological destinism (技术命运论)¹⁸ stance, even if he does not explicitly define it in these two traditional terms. More specifically, Sun’s question of the limits of technologization can be analyzed in terms of these two aspects, as this question is also discussed in the context of technological destinism.

From the perspective of necessity, Sun elucidates Heidegger’s analysis of modern technology, namely, that technologization is a consequence of the intrinsic nature of modern technology and exists as an inherent necessity within the very essence of modern technology. In other words, the technological destinism is not merely an attitude towards technology, but primarily an inquiry into the fundamental nature of technology. And from the perspective of freedom, the question arises as to how the kind of freedom open to the future by the overman-future man is possible, while “we are controlled by technology, thrown into this world by technology,”¹⁹ and as if already determined by technicality.

Although Sun does not explicitly state this, the aforementioned pair of frames allows us to discern that his objective is to delineate the boundaries of technologization by confronting the dilemma of “choosing between determinism and destinism” within the twofold of naturalness and technicality. And in my assess-

17 Ibid., 314.

18 Ibid., 125.

19 Ibid., 151.

ment, Sun's premise is that determinism is associated with the technicality of human existence, as it only focused on the necessity, whereas destinism implies grasping the inherent tension in the twofold between naturalness and technicality. This duality encompasses both necessity and freedom/possibility. So, as we can see, to clarify the boundaries of technologization, Sun must confront the dilemma of "choosing between determinism and destinism"²⁰ in particularly in the context of the twofold between naturalness and technicality. The following paragraphs will provide a detailed account of the means by which he achieved this.

The necessity of technologization stems from the essence of modern technology, which Heidegger describes as "enframing" (*Gestell*) in his analysis of the history of Being. This concept supports Sun's argument regarding the twofold challenge of human existence in an era dominated by technology. Heidegger further connects enframing with truth as unconcealment (*ἀλήθεια*), revealing the source of modern technology's dominance. Enframing brings objects into view, "concentrates man upon ordering the actual as standing-reserve (*Bestand*)"²¹, presenting them as resources. However, this process remains objectifying, revealing things as "for us," while perpetually concealing the essence or Being of things. Modern technology has exponentially amplified this process, leading humans, in their pursuit of what is present to them as resources, to find themselves endangered by enframing, as Heidegger said: "The essence of technology lies in enframing. Its holding sway belongs within destining. [...] the other possibility is blocked—that man might rather be admitted sooner and ever more primally to the essence of what is unconcealed and to its unconcealment."²² Sun interprets this possibility as "revealing and unconcealment in the sense of *techne*, i.e., in the sense of art and handicraft," which represents "the natural human life-world." In other words, "the natural human life-world and the cultural world have decayed as a result of this enframing of modern technology."²³

20 Ibid., 152.

21 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology", 324; Sun's discussion, for instance, *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene*, 140.

22 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology", 331.

23 Sun Zhouxing, *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene*, 141.

To address this, Sun adopts a stance of technological destinism. In Heidegger's exploration of technology, the concept of "destining" (*Geschick*) captures the twofold of necessity and freedom. Heidegger states, "Always the unconcealment of that which is goes upon a way of revealing. Always the destining of revealing holds complete sway over men. But that destining is never a fate that compels. For man becomes truly free only insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens, though not one who simply obeys."²⁴

Sun builds upon this notion of "destining," developing a theory of technological destinism. It is important to note that technological destinism, as elucidated here, does not equate to technological determinism or technological optimism. Determinism implies a passive response to the technological realm, characterized by avoidance and lamentation, while technological optimism suggests that all problems can be solved through technology, leading to a passive reliance on it. In contrast, technological destinism advocates for "the twofold of submission and resistance"²⁵—both to reawaken a sense of destining in the face of technological supremacy and to actively resist technological domination through art and philosophy. This approach holds the potential to mitigate the collapse of natural human civilization.

In this way, the naturalness of human existence is preserved, and technicality (of human existence) forms a twofold relationship with it, rather than a dichotomy, maintaining a balanced tension. Technicality is an intrinsic aspect of modern technology and an inherent element of the destining of human existence. As we have been "*thrown* into the world by technology,"²⁶ our bodies are technologized through endocrine disruptors and biotechnology, and our intellect and spirit are universally technologized through the internet and artificial intelligence.²⁷ The potential for the Overman-Future Man to initiate the future does not merely negate the dichotomy between naturalness and technicality of human existence.

24 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology", 330.

25 Sun Zhouxing, *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene*, 147.

26 Ibid., 151.

27 Ibid., 327.

On the one hand, human naturalness must be safeguarded to prevent its complete subjugation by technology. On the other hand, in the twofold of submission and resistance to technicality, it is imperative to proactively engage in envisioning the future and reconstructing the technological life-world.²⁸

Sun acknowledges that the technological destinism presented here, which addresses the challenge of the Overman-Future Man's twofold of naturalness and technicality and its possible balance, is open to misinterpretation, particularly regarding the "resistance" advocated through philosophy and art, which may appear somewhat pessimistic. Nevertheless, it provides several pathways for confronting these challenges, aiming to reconstruct new experiences of the life-world and continually respond to the risks and challenges posed by modern technology in a distinctive philosophical manner. In a subsequent discussion of his book, Sun sets the tone for the *Philosophy of the Anthropocene*: "Irrespective of whether this world is perceived as good or bad, it is imperative to understand it as a positive one."²⁹ In summary, the redefinition of human existence under technological domination, the potential emergence of the Overman-Future Man, and the inherent twofold nature of naturalness and technicality can only be fully comprehended through the lens of such a technological destinism.

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28 Ibid., 330.

29 孙周兴：《何为哲学的转向——关于〈人类世的哲学〉》（trans., "What is the Philosophical Turn: On the *The Philosophy of the Anthropocene*"），载《哲学动态》2022年第1期。

Interview with Conor Cunningham

Interviewer: Zhu Yiming

Eksistenz: An Imitation or an Elimination of God?

—Interview with Conor Cunningham

Conor Cunningham, the associate professor in Theology and Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Nottingham. His expertise includes: philosophical theology, systematic theology, the relationship between science and theology, phenomenology and metaphysics. Conor's first monograph was *Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of Nothing and the Difference of Theology* (Routledge: London and New York, 2002). It has Spanish and Chinese translations, and the Chinese translation was published by East China Normal University Press in 2022 (translator: Li Yun). His other works include: *Darwin's Pious Idea: Why the Ultra-Darwinists and Creationists Both Get It Wrong* (Wm B Eerdmans Publishing: Grand Rapids and Cambridge, 2010), which has been translated into Spanish, Russian, and Korean. At the moment, Prof. Cunningham is writing three-volumes under the title of (Under contract with Wipf & Stock): *Soul and the Marriage of Discourse: A Summa for Science after Naturalness*. Volume One: Body (Science), Volume Two: Soul (Philosophy), and Volume Three: Spirit (Theology).

“For the given-ness of the creature,
which resists destruction yet is itself an ecstatic opening,
possesses a qualitative infinity as an imitable example of the divine essence.

Furthermore, it proceeds within the circle of the divine procession.”¹

Conor Cunningham, *Genealogy of Nihilism*

1 Conor Cunningham. *Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of nothing and the difference of theology*. Routledge: London and New York, 2002. p. 263.

1. Introduction

In this epoch, Nihilism is our paramount context. Most readers may look with favour upon such a view that nihilism is the essence of modernity. However, isn't there any nihilism in the ancient world? In the majority, the nihilism has a pedigree going back to Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819). Instead, Conor's genealogy starts from Plotinus (205-270). He believes, that since Plotinus' works, for philosophy, the nothing as something has become everything. It argues that, on the one hand, in philosophies of nothing, it cannot speak without causing that about which it is speaking to disappear; on the other hand, theological discourse will enable us to say, to do, and to see². In a word, nihilism has been understood as plenitude - generating the excessive intelligibility from the negative in philosophies of nothing, but, for his theology, to admit the excessive directly in the activities themselves of to say, to do, and to see. The activities themselves are just imitations of God. In this sense, Conor re-examines the legitimacy of nihilism, and give us a unique way to overcome nihilism. Maybe it's the very moment that we take the gift from nihilism, whatever we taking care of ourselves in philosophical or theological practice.

Question 1

Zhu Yiming:

Professor Conor Cunningham, welcome to our interview. Thank you for accepting our invitation to talk about "Eksistenz" in an interview for the Journal *Eksistenz*. Now let's start off with the topic of "path". As we all known, you established a great reputation with that original and profound book *Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of Nothing and the Difference of Theology*. I am really interested in your path that led to specializing in Nihilism. How did you turn to studying Nihilism? For you personally, why is Nihilism so important?

Conor Cunningham:

Thank you very much for inviting me.

I alighted upon the study of nihilism from several directions. As a teenager, as is typical, I was replete with existential questions. On my bedroom wall I

2 c.f. Ibid. p.169.

had two photos: one of Samuel Beckett, the playwright, and the only other one was a newspaper cutting about the Hillsborough disaster, a fatal crowd crush at a football match at Hillsborough Stadium in Sheffield, on 15 April 1989. It occurred during an FA Cup semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest, and there were a total of 97 fatalities. I often stared at the newspaper cutting; in which several people could be seen pressing against an unforgiving and fatal fence, indeed, one man's cheeks were squeezing through it, as dough would a mold. The question that kept coming to me was: *Is this significant or not?* And that was another way of asking - *Is life meaningless or not?* If it were meaningless then the newspaper image was really nothing at all. To compound matters, at school I learnt about the holocaust (the Shoah), and this horrific phenomenon attached itself, permanently (like a tattoo, derived from the Tahitian word 'tatau', meaning to mark) to my mind's imagination, acting as an immovable and constant frame of reference. For if life was meaningless, in a sense, the holocaust did not really happen, because the horror it manifested requires meaning. I'll explain this later.

At school my peers never questioned me about such seemingly eccentric images on my bedroom walls – not asking where were the popstar and football posters? Mostly because I was good at sport, thankfully and they wanted me on their teams! Fast forward a few years, and during my first degree, I was reading Law, and in my 2nd year, I put my hand up in a Criminal Law class, which was almost a breach of protocol back then, unlike now (to ask questions in lectures was frowned upon). The Lecture had been about various laws against murder, manslaughter, and so on. With my hand raised, the professor asked me to speak. I asked, *why not murder?* The class laughed out loud, but the professor did not. After they quietened down, I addressed the question again to someone near me who had been laughing with a self-certain gusto. They managed only viciously circular regressive platitude: *life is precious*. I said, *tell that to the murderer*. And if it were so obvious then why did we have laws against it, have prisons, and so on. The professor said that after I had finished my Law degree that I should go and study philosophy, which I did.

So, for me, nihilism was and is a way to outflank bourgeois nonsense, mere chattering, as Soren Kierkegaard might put it; a chattering that undoubtedly emanates from comfortably full and safe stomachs. The precipice or indeed vertigo that nihilism presents can form part of a metaphysical grammar affording us the possibility to speak once again: the responsibility to speak and the responsibility that speaking bears, not to mention the infinity that lies within every utterance. I will come back to this.

2. What is Nihilism?

In this part, we hope to clarify the basic horizon of Conor Cunningham's research, like the limits of what Conor wants to do or of what his research is interested or involved in. These will help us only to pay all attention to what happens in his own problem domain.

Question 1

Zhu Yiming:

The first question is "What is Nihilism?" In *Genealogy of Nihilism*, you define "Nihilism" as "Nothing as Something", which, to some extent, is shared by both philosophy and theology. And for you, the difference of theology is turning to the transcendence, not the transcendental. As you say in the book, "In this way, being is not beyond thought; it is the beyond of thought." (p.260) I believe that this is like a fork in the road, isn't it? Philosophy heads for something beyond thought, but theology should turn to the abundant ways themselves of beyond. In this way, in philosophies of nothing, we hear of an elimination of God, in other words, a God without Being; yet for theology, *Eksistenz* itself, is an imitation of God, isn't it?

Conor Cunningham:

In terms of the notion of 'beyond', I hasten to point out that Plato's notion of 'beyond being' should not be understood as postmoderns do: A license for decadent self-determination, which entails a mastery over nature, all of which is dressed up in shallow terms of delay, indecision, ambiguity, non-totalizing hesitation,

‘humility’, overcoming metaphysics, mysticism, the apophatic - improperly understood - it should be said: *différance*, *differend*, erasure, event, and so on, these are the terms that populate some of the hymns of late Capitalism, in the guise of Parisian Left Bank inspired philosophies. All of whom, I would argue, are but conceptual prisoners of Alexandre Kojève’s reading of Hegel,³ which is tiresome, and does Hegel a great intellectual disservice, even though I have a chapter criticizing him in the nihilism book.

Plato was very much the first theologian – he coined the term theology, after all, which was later developed by another Platonist, his pupil, Aristotle, who termed it *First Philosophy*. Being is *aporetic*, because it is both from nothing, *ex nihilo*, and it is unfinished, which is to say, generative. But this is not to lead into a dark abyss, for such excess or sheer fecundity, is the fruit of bedazzlement, or what Plato called ‘Wonder’ – *thaumazein* - (*θαῦμα*).

To put it in drastically short terms, all knowledge, perception and cognition in having intercourse with that which is known, encountered or perceived, and thereby attaining the immanent (say, intelligible phenomena), already implicates transcendence, and does so by necessity, but one that is generous, or kenotic, accommodating our ignoring, or even violating, its very gift. Such intimation is there before us, because each phenomenon, each action, every cognition, does, as it self, in its very operation and in the fruit it bears, entails and presents a positive excess, an overflow, not to an otherworldly place, but the sheer there-ness of its presentation. Transcendence and immanence are precisely and necessarily not in competition, it is not a zero-sum game, to put it very generally. Instead, they are woven together.

In the *Philebus*, Plato designates the limit (*peras*) and the unlimited (*apeiron*) as the first two kinds of being, yet steps decisively beyond this Pythagorean opposition with the introduction of a third genus, namely, mixture (*mikton*), which is a distinctive mode of being, namely, ‘genesis’, or coming into being (*Phil.* 26d8). Im-

3 See Conor Cunningham, ‘Nothing is, so Something Must Be’, in *Theology and the Political: The New Debate*, eds.. Slavoj Žižek, et al. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2006), pp. 72-101

portantly, such genesis does not identify still another form of ideal being but rather the ‘real’ being of what comes to be, which is to say, being emerges as becoming. The *mikton* (the mix of blend) is interpolated between the ‘One’ and the ‘Many,’ or here between *peras* and *apeiron*. (Interestingly, it was this text that inspired Cantor in developing set theory) Plato’s example of just such a becoming is more than instructive. Spoken ‘sound which passes through the lips whether of an individual or of all men is one and yet infinite.’ (*Phil.* 17b). Our ability to discriminate unambiguously between myriads of spoken sounds is conditioned on the availability of an ideal system, that is, the phonemic system of the language. Physical utterances by individual speakers result in wide phonetic variations that only knowledge of a language’s phonological system can organise into distinct phonemes. Hence Plato’s formulation, ‘the knowledge of the number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian.’ (*Phil.* 17b). A *mikton* marks delineations in the realm of becoming relying on certain ideal structures that mix with sensory perceptions: the *mixt* of Being and Becoming. Accordingly, each *mikton* affords an area of knowledge: meteorology with the seasons, medicine with health/disease, and so on.

Echoing this, in Plato’s *Sophist*, the Stranger warns that ‘if one separates each thing off from everything, that completely and utterly obliterates any discourse, since it is the interweaving of forms that gives us the possibility of talking to each other in the first place’ (*Soph.*, 259e4-6). Understanding the world, Plato thought, required an ‘art of weaving’ (*huphantikē*) that resisted competitive models of knowledge. For Plato, the arts are divided into those that combine or separate, spin or card. But the art of weaving is different: It does both, combining union and difference (*Statesman*, 283B).

Aristotle’s idea of subalternation can also be interpreted as a form of *mixt*, or *weaving*, thereby echoing Plato. There, an operational discourse is replete with other modes of knowledge (e.g., optics employs geometry), what Plato calls an ‘interweaving’; modes that enable it to function, but of which it need not speak. Such ingredients are indispensable, to echo the *Quine-Putnam indispensability argument* for a Platonic interpretation of mathematics: science cannot do without mathematics, and therefore must ontologically commit to it. Theology will

argue that for mathematics transcendence is indispensable. Discourses are separable, yet it is not a matter of mere juxtaposition; there is marriage or union, in Henri de Lubac's sense: *L'union différencie*.

The intertwining of *peras* and *apeiron* to be found in reason invokes also the further marriage of beauty (*kalos*) and truth (*alētheia*). Plato calls beauty 'radiant to behold (ἰδεῖν λαμπρόν)' compared to the other forms and the 'most manifest (εκφανέστατον)' of them (*Phdr.* 250b5–6, d7), repeatedly linking beauty to knowledge and truth (e.g., *Rep.* 508e4–509a7). The beautiful is always co-present with that which is good, never separated: it is beyond being, but not substantially so, hence Plato uses *methexis* (participation) rather than *mimesis* – there is nothing to copy. The good is more vulnerable to impure imitation, the beautiful less so. 'It is beauty alone that has this quality' (*Phdr.* 250d). The beautiful both creates and surmounts the separation (*chorismos*) of form and appearance, being and becoming, and effective theory (a theory that works, but without the pretence or vanity of ever being complete, indeed, precisely the opposite- this is how most science works today, incidentally, for example the famous *Standard Model* of physics is an effective theory) signals just this relation to knowledge: beauty is the very possibility of effective theory. 'One might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.' (Wittgenstein)⁴

Aquinas tells us that 'every substance which comes after the first simple substance participates in *esse*. But every participant is composed [*componitur*] of that which participates and that in which it participates, and the participant is in potency to that in which it participates.'⁵ Moreover, *esse* is 'superior to life and to all other perfections.'⁶ It is 'among all principles the most perfect.'⁷ Here, it

4 Ludwig Wittgenstein *On Certainty (Über Gewissheit)*, eds. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans., by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969-1975), 248

5 *In VIII Phys.*, 21, 1153. 'Everything that has some quality by participation is reduced, as to its principle and cause, to that which has that quality by essence' *Compendium Theologiae* 1.68.

6 *ST I-II*, 2, 5, ad 2.

7 *De pot.*, 7, 2, ad 9 (see also *ST I*, 4, 1, ad 3).

is the idea of participation through perfection that provides a conceptual clue to a mixed relation: ‘Esse is the ‘actuality of all acts and thus the perfection of all perfections.’⁸ This understanding of *esse* pushes us to be cognisant of a mode of occurrence without change (*mutatio*, in terms of the divine). Analogously, we will see that God is most close yet most distant. ‘God is in all things, and innermost.’⁹ Yet at the same time Aquinas speaks of ‘the infinite distance of the creature to God’.¹⁰ Aquinas is here echoing St. Augustine, for whom God was not only higher to the soul than the highest heaven (*superior summo meo*) but nearer to the soul than it is to itself (*interior intimo meo*). This is the *complicatio-explicatio*, enfolding and unfolding, of *esse* in which we by way of a mixed relation analogically participate.

It is wise to clarify here what is meant by *esse*. *Esse* is the infinitive of the verb ‘to be,’ which we should translate as existence rather than as ‘being,’ as being is employed also to translate *ens*, or *ōv* and Latin *ens*, the present participle of the verb ‘to be,’ used as a substantive to mean a thing that is, or a being. *Esse*, or here existence is not a thing or a being, but the act in by which something thing is a being (*ens*). Accordingly, Aquinas distinguishes between the existential and the copulative usages of the term *esse*. For instance, *esse* ‘signifies the act of existing [*actus essendi*].’¹¹ *Esse* signifies, therefore, the ‘that it is’ or that by which it is (quo est) rather than the ‘what it is’ (*quod est*). As Aquinas says, ‘*Esse* itself does not signify the subject of existing [*essendi*], just as ‘to run’ does not signify the subject of running [*currendi*]. Next, just as we cannot say that to run itself [*ipsum currere*] runs, so we cannot say that *esse* itself is [*ipsum esse sit*]; but as ‘that which is’ signifies the subject of existing, so ‘that which runs’ signifies the subject of running; and thus just as we can say of that which runs, or of a runner, that it runs, insofar as it is subjected to running [*cursui*] and participates in it, so we can

8 *De pot*, q.7, a.2, ad.9: ‘esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum.’, *ST I*, 8, 1, resp.

9 *ST I*, 8, 1, resp.

10 *De ver*. 2, 11, ad 4.

11 *ST I*, 3, 4, ad 2.

say that a being [*ens*], or that which is, is, insofar as it participates in the act of existing [*actum essendi*].¹² Just as ‘to run’ (*currere*) is not a runner, a thing that runs (*currens*), so ‘to be’ (*esse*, that is, existence) is not a being, a thing that is (*ens*).

In contrast, modernity, postmodernity, Late Capitalism, and all the other progeny of nihilism, treat the gift of being (*esse*), first, univocally (*a univocity of being*) and then equivocally (*an equivocality of being*) – affording only nominal aggregations. In the wake of this catastrophic mistreatment of being – *esse*, all acts of cognition, all phenomena are mere givens, dead things, to be mastered, manipulated, exploited, abused, and most likely destroyed, and this has major implications. As philosopher Robert Spaemann tells us, ‘Nature becomes exteriority without selfhood (*Selbstsein*). Moreover, to know something as existing by nature means to objectify and thus alienate it, “to know what we can do with it when we have it.”¹² To know no longer means (in accordance with the classical axiom *intelligere in actu et intellectum in actu sunt idem*: understanding in act is identical to the thing understood in act) to become one with that which is known. In the Hebrew Bible, the same word is used for the cognitive act and sexual intercourse—“Adam knew his wife” (Gen 4:1). But this becomes completely untenable where the ideal of cognition is self-contained enlightenment. Every time we think, just as when we are, we enter into a relationship. As Aristotle says, “For the mind somehow is potentially what it thinks (*ta noēta*)”¹³—there is not domination, but intercourse. Again, “Knowledge that is activated is thus the same as the thing.”¹⁴ Once more, “Thus in general, the mind that is active is the objects.” ‘This is the soul and the world together, and for this reason, the soul “is somehow all things.”¹⁵ *Capax omnia*.

This intercourse between thought and thing, and though offered by someone, a thing or at least an animal is the dance of all that we do, see, and believe: we know, like Adam, that which we think. This relationship gives birth to all thought

12 Robert Spaemann, *Persons: The Difference Between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’*, trans. Oliver O’Donovan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 49. Spaemann, *Essays in Anthropology*, 9–10.

13 *De anima*, III, 4, 429b30–31.

14 *De anima*, III 7, 431b21

15 *De anima*, III 8, 431b21.

and in this way to all things also. For just as there is no matter without form (see below), and all forms, including souls, come into being only with matter, thoughts and things arrive together; yet any such arrival is always *in via* (on the way) that is, it never ends. In this way the thought of the simplest thing is analogous to the beatific vision, for there we will *know all of God's essence*, because God is simple (despite misguided thoughts to the contrary, all of which, I would argue, are self-undermining), but *we will never comprehend God's essence*. Here Gregory of Nyssa's notion of *epectasis* becomes the basis of all thought, of all things, for just as we must traverse eternity to know God, we must also traverse time to know the slightest thing—that's why Thomas Aquinas says that *we don't even know the essence of a fly*.¹⁶ Therefore, we can indeed, think of all knowledge as a form of marriage—we do become one with that which we seek to know, and this why Aquinas calls all thought *verbum cordis*.

Regarding such intercourse, as G. K. Chesterton says, 'The mind is not purely creative. ... But the mind is active, and its activity consists in the following, so far as the will chooses to follow, the light outside that does really shine upon real landscapes. That is what gives the indefinably virile and even adventurous quality to this view of life ... [R]eality and the recognition of reality; and their meeting is a sort of marriage. Indeed it is very truly marriage, because it is fruitful; the only philosophy now in the world that really is fruitful.'¹⁷ Maurice Blondel once said that *history is metaphysics in act*, and this is most certainly true: the horizontal (history) and the vertical (metaphysical) are conjoined and never more so that in the Incarnation, which acts as a meta-key by which to interpret Creation. To riff on Kant, *metaphysics without history is dumb, whilst history without metaphysics is blind*. Without this union all is not *just from dust and to dust it shall return, but remains dust throughout*.

Regarding nihilism, and as a quick aside, historically it is worthy of note that Jean-Baptiste Louis Crevier seems to have been the first to use the term nihilist in 1761. He employed the term to describe the 'disciples' of Peter Lombard. He

16 So "the essential ground of things are unknown to us" (*De anima* 1.1.1n.15); thus "we do not even know the essence of a fly" (*In Symb Apost prol.*).

17 Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*, 148.

pointed out that in *Libri Sententiarum*, Lombard argues that Christ ‘in as much as he is a man, Jesus Christ is not something, or, in other words, is nothing. This proposition is scandalous, and yet some of his disciples supported it and formed the heresy of the nihilists.’ In the sense in which it is generally used today, the term ‘nihilism’ was introduced by F. H. Jacobi in an open letter to Fichte (1799), in which he described the philosophy that followed in the wake of Kant as *Nihilismus*. The term did not enter common usage, however, and it was not until the writings of Nietzsche that nihilism came to prominence. Nietzsche diagnosed Europe as having fallen into nihilism for the simple but dramatic reason that, he said, God is now dead, and we have killed him by way of our incredulity, apathy, and *ressentiment*. Confronting such nihilism, which he saw as degenerate, it is generally agreed that Nietzsche endeavoured to overcome (*überwinden*) it, by constructing an entirely new way of looking at existence, employing concepts such as the ‘Overman’ (*Übermensch*) and the ‘eternal return’. In later sections we shall discuss those philosophers who were influenced and inspired by the claim that God is dead. One wider consequence of the advent of nihilism was a severe disenchantment of the world (described by Max Weber) and the rise of an all-encompassing materialism (nihilism’s great progeny), which sought to consummate the death of God (proposed in various forms within Marxism). In my book on nihilism, which has chapters on many towering philosophical figures (from Plotinus to Badiou), yet there is no chapter on Nietzsche, and for very specific reasons. The most important being that Nietzsche’s self-declared nihilism was more about *diagnosis*, than true self-characterization. Nihilism is much more insidious, and often *comes as an angel of light*, as it were, with all the posture of clever innocence, and an apparent bountiful supply for all our needs and desires.

As you mention, in the book I argue that Nihilism is an *invariant logic* which treats the *nothing as something*, which is a highly clever effort to retain that which is lost: people, ethics, trees, all phenomena, yet doing so without positing their irreducible reality. In short, if nihilism carried or presented a lack, then there was a logical space for its replacement: if it were a bare nothing, then a something could usurp its place. But if nihilism were the *nothing as something*,

there're was no place or space for its replacement, for it gave all that its apparent opposite would give. It is in this way that nihilism is plenitude, an ersatz one, no doubt, but plenitude nonetheless. Nihilism even gives us commentaries on scripture – think of some of the Continental tradition's contemporary leading lights, if that they be: Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, and Giorgio Agamben, to name but three, all offering commentaries on St Paul. Doing so, it should be noted, for two reasons: *First*, to present a positive nihilism and *second*, because the Parisian Left Bankers have run out of steam, and therefore must look elsewhere to gain, appropriate, or steal traction; a fully parasitic move, of course.¹⁸

Thus Nihilism can be seen in philosophy, in both its Continental and analytic variants, and in certain presentations of science, though there is some hope for science, if radically re-construed as a true art, something I'm trying to do at the moment in the aforementioned trilogy. For example, we often hear of the reduction of the person, or indeed their soul, to mind, and then the mind to brain, and the brain to a patchwork of neurons, synapses and so on. Such reductions tend to rest on *the fiction of a base element*: from Democritus' atoms, to Thales' water, to DNA, or, today, microphysics – elementary particles, which sometimes come in the guise of strings or quantum foam. The positing of a base facilitates (logically, culturally, and literally) the reduction of all that is to the base, the unique *terminus*. Consequently, quite literally, nothing gets off the ground, for it is always sucked back in, being but an epiphenomenon, a shadow cast by the real solidity of the *fundamentalia*: the fundamental base. The operation of a fundamentalist base look like this, which is highly transferrable across many disciplines, 1) *The Hierarchy thesis*: The universe is stratified into levels. 2) *The Fundamentality thesis*: There is a bottom level, which is fundamental. 3) *The Primacy thesis*: Entities on the fundamental level are primarily real and the rest are at best derivative, if they are real at all.

18 For a critique of some trendy figures of Continental philosophy- Alain Badiou, Giorgio Agamben, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Gianni Vattimo - in relation to nihilism see -'Nihilism and Theology: Who Stands at the Door?' in *Oxford Handbook to Theology and Modern European Thought*, eds. G Ward, and G. Pattison (Oxford: OUP, 2012), pp. 138-152. For a critique of Badiou's student, Quentin Meillassoux, see 'Divine Inexistence in the work of Quentin Meillassoux' in *Theology, Politics and Culture* (Wipf and Stock, Eugene, Oregon, 2012), pp. 138-152.

The great polymath genius, Henri Poincaré captures this nihilistic or scientific fundamentalism well: ‘Our body is formed of cells, and the cells of atoms; are these cells and these atoms then all the reality of the human body? The way these cells are arranged, whence results the unity of the individual, is it not also a reality and much more interesting? A naturalist who never had studied the elephant except in a microscope, would he think he knew the animal adequately? It is the same in mathematics. When the logician shall have broken up each demonstration into a multitude of elementary operations, all correct, he still will not possess the whole reality; this I know not what which makes the unity of the demonstration will completely escape him. In the edifices built up by our masters, of what use to admire the work of the mason if we cannot comprehend the plan of the architect? Now pure logic cannot give us this appreciation of the total effect; this we must ask of intuition.’¹⁹

Intuition may not be sufficient here, but it is necessary.

Regarding Poincaré’s point about the limits of the microscope, and the attitude that seems to attach itself to the use of such apparatus, Kierkegaard articulates a similar concern, doing so in more prosaic terms: ‘The researcher right away begins dissipating his brain on details: now someone is going to Australia, now to the moon, now into a subterranean cavern, now the Devil knows where in the arse after an intestinal worm; now we must have a telescope, now a microscope: who in the name of Satan can stand it!’²⁰ Well, possibly the Devil can, to answer Kierkegaard’s rhetorical question.

It is important to realize, that the arrival of such nihilism is a progeny of Descartes’ cataclysmic and tortured severing of the world into two parts: mind and matter – *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. Interestingly he himself being influenced by Francisco Suarez, a Jesuit, who was the first to abandon the commentary tradition (such as when a living figure, say, Aquinas, offers commentary on Aristotle’s *Meta-*

19 H Poincaré, *Science et méthode* (Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1908), p.436, italics mine.

20 Søren Kierkegaard, *The Diary of Soren Kierkegaard*, trans., G Anderson (London: Peter Owen Ltd, 1960), p.97; italics mine.

physics or *Physics*) and instead hubristically launches the modernist (non) tradition of auto-nomy – it is from here that the modern novel is born, and the Catholic church’s use of the term novel as almost synonymous with heresy is telling: heresy itself as a term stemming from the Greek word for choice (*hairesis* -αἵρεσις): I choose, says the modern, which is of course risible, as they will be even more open to near-total conditioning, as the 20th century proved to our great horror.

Interestingly, R.G. Collingwood argued that in the history of European thought there have been *three periods of cosmological thinking* when the idea of nature generated radically new approaches within science.²¹ *First*, the Greek understanding of nature, its physics (φύσις) was one of growth; nature was approached as if it were alive. This *Weltanschauung* was superseded by the *second* approach, what Collingwood called Renaissance cosmology, one that was corpuscularian and decompositional, which is epitomised by the separability principle of classical physics with its attendant microphysical fundamentalism – all wholes are reducible to their parts. Its formation, as mentioned, was partly generated by the Cartesian dualism of *res cogitans* (mind) and *res extensa* (matter). It is worth noting that this Cartesian divide began the modern accommodation of materialism as a feasible philosophical position. We should, therefore, take on board the philosopher Hans Jonas’s crucial insight: ‘the *res cogitans* was made perhaps more for the sake of the *res extensa* than for its own’.²² In other words, mind was made for the sake of matter, rather than the other way around. Any such dualistic pattern of thinking or of parsing the world, invites, because it accommodates, the cutting free of the *res cogitans*, which is rendered otiose, and if not redundant, it is absorbed by its opposite. An eventuality mirrored by the hyper-spiritualisation of the soul: Here, body as *mere* matter, and soul as *pure* spirit reflect each other. Robert Spaemann makes an identical point, arguing that materialist monism is dualist *malgré lui*.²³[5] Echo-

21 See R. Collingwood, *The Idea of Nature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945).

22 Hans Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), p. 54, n. 7.

23 Robert Spaemann, *Persons: The Difference Between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’*, trans. Oliver O’Donovan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 49.

ing this, John Haldane says, ‘Ironically, one might even say that it was Descartes’s dualism that made *scientism* possible by yielding everything publicly observable to reductionist explanation, thereby leaving the residue (mind) liable to elimination on grounds of empirical-cum-explanatory redundancy’.²⁴ Or as David Braine argues, ‘for materialism to get going at all in its main contemporary form it is an absolute condition that one should have established a dualistic pattern of analysis of what goes on in human life’.²⁵ Incidentally, scientism – that science is the only begetter of truth, which is of course an extra-scientific statement, is Friedrich Hayek’s term.

A casualty of a move such as this can be witnessed in the advocacy in (analytic) philosophy of a purely extensionalist world, wherein all intentionality, all properties, and so on, are vanquished; less to contend with, given such philosophy’s limiting remit, method, and metaphysics, namely ontological naturalism. We witness another victim of this mode of thinking, a surprising one, we would surmise, not faeries, souls, persons, normativity even, but material objects: They become *merely gerrymandered aggregates of matter*, whatever matter might be, except as a placeholder. Such aggregation is like the reverse of the child’s address: From home, to street...to the universe. Instead, books to chapters, to pages, syllables...to letters. But surely even more, for any lone unit, say, a letter (or a particle), is itself composed, so the letter ‘A’ would itself begin the process anew. The sense of our concepts lapses into nominalism, it would seem: A point brought home by both Plato and Aristotle.²⁶

24 John Haldane, ‘Common Sense, Metaphysics, and the Existence of God,’ *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 77, no. 3 (2003), p.383.

25 David Braine, *The Human Person: Animal and Spirit* (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1993), p. 23.

26 See Plato’s *Theaetetus* 203a–205e. If the syllable SO is just the letters S and O, then knowledge of S and O should be sufficient for knowledge of SO, and vice versa, but it is not [203d]. If SO is a new form arising from the combination of S and O, it ceases to have S and O as parts, and so can’t be composed of them [204a, 205b]. Socrates summarizes these points at 205d–e. For the so-called Syllable Regress see In *Metaphysics* VII.17.1673-1674. ‘The syllable, then, is something- not only its elements (the vowel and the consonant) but also something else; and the flesh is not only fire and earth or the hot and the cold, but also something else. Since then that something must be either an

We should ask, maybe, how atomism, reductionism or, for that matter, post-modernism is able to *utter* data at all, that is, to traverse a sentence, given its own terms. All components of said utterance would surely fall into disarray, if indeed they can fall. As Lynne Ruder Baker argues, given the prevailing nihilistic materialist logics, we cannot even speak of a car crash anymore, for all we are left are meaningless configurations or aggregations of matter, which we might term carwise. The ultimate crash is that there cannot be a crash at all. Likewise, we cannot say, Baker argues, that the Twin Towers fell, for nihilism, and its lackey, materialism renders such an occurrence or event impossible,²⁷ even more so than angels and miracles; after all, flavoured quarks, muons, and holes acting as particles, are all permitted, *all of which pop in and out of existence*, yet a cancerous tumour is beyond the purse of materialism's ontology, therefore nihilism prevails.

Like some latter-day doubting Thomas, we are incredulous—we need to see the wounds (and we can't even see them), we need to see the soul, to see the person—but where are the wounds for any such test, for wounds are surely impossible, cancer is impossible, likewise murder, rape, and genocide. Take cancer, which I just mentioned, well, one needs a rich enough ontology—in this case an ontology of oncology, if you will—to allow for such imperfections, such phenomena. Speaking purely through the lens afforded by nihilistic materialism, with maybe an auxiliary logic such as Darwinian survival, here, on the first count there is no real organism, as we know; and on the second, the “radical democracy” of Darwinism offers cancer as much suffrage as the bearer of this condition—pick your team and perhaps cheer: chemo vs. cancer. And it would be anthropocentric, colonial, or totalizing of us to oppose cancer; after all, cancer is merely trying to stop cells committing suicide (*apoptosis*), least that's how one

element or a compound of elements, if it is and element the same argument will again apply; for flesh will consist of this fire and earth and something still further, so that the process will go on to infinity.’ In *Metaphysics* VII, 17 (1041b 11-22).

27 Lynne Ruder Baker, *The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.7.

could moralize it, and why not, given nihilism. Serial killers are a poker tell in this regard.

It is sociological true to say that a great many Western humans say there is no soul, but all, or nearly all, act as if there is, especially with regard to their snatched prodigal portion (to echo Gerard Manley Hopkins), Of course serial killers may be thought to be an exception, but even they presume a soul; why else would you bother killing someone, when you might as well just watch the weather—it is, after all, more random or aleatory. This is just the mistake in the book and later movie ‘No Country for Old Men.’ A phrase, we speculate, borrowed by Cormac McCarthy from W. B. Yeats’ poem - *Sailing to Byzantium*. At least in the movie of the novel, the psychopath (Anton Chigurh) flips a coin in a gas station to decide whether to kill the owner or not. This is taken to be dramatic, radical even. But it is not; rather it is adolescent, the supposed revolutionary logic of which amounts to the equivalent of a domestic chore. It is wholly parasitic on what is taken, or contrived, to be its opposite, namely, meaningfulness, which it quite patently is not. Indeed, the killer’s lack of emotion is not exceptional, but par for the course, when compared to the profoundly indifferent systemic inequalities across the globe. Also the psychopath certainly gets some traction from their antics, again, in an adolescent manner.

Indeed, it is just such inescapable meaning that frightened St Augustine, when it came to his reminiscence of stealing pears when he was a child. Recently, listening on BBC radio to some apparently learned academic commenting on this event in Augustine’s life, and bursting into a gaudy laugh at the very notion of it amounting to anything serious, really was rather embarrassing. I didn’t know where to look. It is obvious that Augustine was perfectly serious. The stealing of pears was not the transgression of some cultural more, that is, it was not about something thing or other, for instance, theft. Rather it was all about nothing and that was his point. To unpack, it was all about nothing becoming something – that is, nothing, here representative of evil, becoming substantialised. It was here that the abyss of real evil, in an almost Manichean, gnostic sense raised its head: The Light as opposed to the now real and equal Dark, which is which the

question becomes. The pears represented nothing, the theft was without reason, it lacked sufficient reason, yet still it was; *still there arose the desire to commit the act*. Here Augustine hovered over the abyss, one that was full and plump: a positive nihilism, it would seem.

The Czech thinker, Vilém Flusser makes just the same point regarding both the Devil and ivory towers, deepening it with a telling vision of the world: ‘The murder of God and the Devil, which we perpetrated in our pride, has revealed itself as the suicide of our Will. In place of the golden throne, from which our creative Will was going to govern the illusory world, an ivory tower rises, chiselled and decorated with grotesque figures, from which the spectre of the decapitated mind spies, nebulously and vaguely, the nebulous and vague spectre of the decapitated world. The progress of the evolution of the mind has resulted in a macabre dance. It started from the lustful desire to delight in reality. The mind did not achieve the delight in reality and annihilated itself in the attempt.’²⁸ In more particular terms, this dance is the *danse macabre* of 0’s and 1’s.

It is not, in short, the Heavens that are under threat, but rather the Earth. For this is the very flat lining of reality, as only a Flat Earth ontology prevails. A consequence of which is that, as G. K. Chesterton put it, ‘*There is no such thing as a thing.*’²⁹ One Nobel-winning biologist, François Jacob, articulates this situation in stark terms: ‘*Biology no longer studies life.*’³⁰ A sentiment echoed by Harvard philosopher of science, Michael Ghiselin: ‘*If we ask the question when did human life begin? The answer is never.*’³¹ It is little wonder, then, that Michel Henry tells us “there is no person in science.”³² And Henry appears to be correct, for as Thomas Metzinger informs us, “no such things as selves exist in the world:

28 Vilém Flusser, *The History of the Devil*, trans., by R Maltez Novales (Minneapolis: Univocal Press, 2014), pp.201-202.

29 G. K. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy* (London: Fontana, 1961), 59.

30 François Jacob, *The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity*, trans. Betty Spillman (New York: Pantheon, 1973), 299.

31 Michael Ghiselin, *Metaphysics and the Origin of Species*, p.1.

32 Michel Henry, *I am The Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity*, trans. Susan Emanuel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 262.

Nobody ever was or had a self.”³³ In light of such logic, Gregory of Nyssa’s prescient words spring to mind, if mind there be, given reductive materialism, and its overarching meta-position, namely, nihilism: ‘*By their arguments they would prove that our life is nothing but death.*’³⁴ Or as Spaemann, points out, *the human has become an anthropomorphism to themselves.*³⁵

The wholly destructive, unnatural, Cartesian dualism is echoed or replicated again and again, for instance, reduction/emergence, or micro/macro. The Cartesian cut (between mind and matter, generating two immiscible substances; only one now remaining, due to cultural demand or for utilitarian, functional need) consolidates *corpuscularian atomism* – today’s microphysical fundamentalism – and remains mandatory and even constitutive for the exact sciences. Arguably, this fundamental bifurcation was itself facilitated by the previous substantialisation of matter (possessing its own form) – ‘matter’ being *now a stand-alone term* (thus seeming to render materialism coherent), *no longer a relative term* as it was for Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas (who was a lone voice fighting against such a move, during his time), to name but three, and is arguably the case today for physics.

Indeed, we now know that spacetime itself is emergent (something already insisted upon by Plato and Aristotle), thus it is by no means a reductive base. Materialism, consequently, is further exposed as incoherent babble, mere ideology, or wishful thinking, for those who specialize in cultural self-harm. From Plato and Aristotle to Hegel, it is quite obvious that materialism has *always been unable to point to, or pick out, its one key ingredient, namely, matter*, for it simply does not exist, at least not on its own, ever. Rather, there is always *something* material, thereby requiring *form*: matter only ever is when it is in-formed, for matter, metaphysically, is a co-principle along with form (form/actuality- ἐνέργεια – and

33 Thomas Metzinger, *Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 1.

34 Gregory of Nyssa, *De anima* 1. For a critique of such nihilism, see Cunningham, ‘Is there Life before Death?’ in *Death in Life*, ed. John Behr (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2015), pp. 120-151

35 Robert Spaemann, *Essays in Anthropology*, xxiv

matter/potentiality- δύναμις), and not something you can touch, hold, lick or kick – here, the philosopher George Berkeley was absolutely correct.

Regarding the emergence of spacetime, rather tellingly, the problem that faces Cartesian dualism – how to join that which is immiscible – mind and matter, what we might call the ‘hard problem’, to give a nod to David Chalmers, reappears, for we now have spacetime as the non-fundamental – comparable to mind, over and against the fundamental, which underlies it, and yet remains forever, it would seem, unknown, like some ghastly, diabolical, Kantian noumenal realm.

Question 2

Zhu Yiming:

Maybe it’s better for your efforts in that book *Genealogy of Nihilism* to be regarded as closer to continental philosophy. However, I would like to remind our readers that, you discuss Nihilism both in analytic and continental philosophy. Especially, in analytic philosophy, your works are also attractive yet profound. And I see, in *Wittgenstein after Theology* (1999), you mentioned that “Wittgenstein’s view dogmatically postulates the transcendent as the unutterable and inexpressible. Such a transcendent cannot really make a difference to finite reality... Thus Wittgenstein is the ally only of a dualistic theology and religion, by the same token as his philosophy in the end suppresses the various grammatical specificities of language.”³⁶[9] It usually seems more difficult to start an effective dialogue on Nihilism between the discussing way of analytic philosophy and the continental one, but, here, you make it possible, by distinguishing the transcendent and transcending itself. How do you think about it?

Conor Cunningham:

In one sense regarding both analytic and Continental traditions of philosophy, it is a case of plague on both houses, to nod to Shakespeare, for they, in the end, very often come sporting the same outfit but simply with a different tie,

36 Conor Cunningham. ‘Wittgenstein after Theology’. in: *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology*, John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward eds. Routledge: London and New York, 1999. p.86.

or in the case of the Continentals, the Parisian Left-Bankers, being apparently cool or trendy, no tie at all, but rather an open shirt, and with the analytics a bowtie, inevitably. But of course, to some degree I'm being facetious; as there is very good work to be found in both tributaries, especially in the last 30 years (though I think it made a nascent effort back in the late 1950's with Strawson's book - *Individuals*, and then made a notable appearance in 1990 with Peter van Inwagen's *Material Beings*), as metaphysics proper has made something of a renaissance. Maybe we should not be too surprised, after all, as the great Thomist, Étienne Gilson pointed out that *metaphysics always buries its undertakers*, thankfully. We see this across the board – in ontology, philosophy of chemistry, indeed of science generally, but also in questions surrounding beauty, ethics, and so on. A much needed espresso, if not always the recommended double, has been imbibed and people have woken up to the big questions, once again.³⁷

So, to answer your question, I think the distinction between *transcendence* and the *transcendental* is always hovering, the former properly making sense of the latter, whilst the latter left to itself, is apt to take a cheap shortcut, which is somewhat self-satisfied, as it gives a false appearance of depth or sophistication, when, generally, it's just being clever, like doing the Rubik's cube. Comparable to someone who can do all manner of tricks with a soccer ball, keeping it up in the air for an amazing amount of time, but isn't' actually any good at the game of soccer – a circus act, if you will.

Question 3

Zhu Yiming:

We cannot keep silent on Nietzsche while talking about Nihilism. However, you hardly ever talk about Nietzsche in *Genealogy of Nihilism*. Why? And we know, in his Weak Theology, John D. Caputo describes the possibility of a God even Nietzsche could love. In my opinion, it means that as absolutely compulsive

³⁷ See Conor Cunningham, 'Homo ex machina: The Nightmare Dreams', *Theology of Freedom: Festschrift for Alexei Bodrov*, ed. Языкова Ирина (Moscow: St. Andrew's Institute Press, 2022), pp. 93-132.

identity this God is already dead, yet as infinite creations and continuously repeatable revolutions this God is being alive. You will be totally opposed to this view, won't you? To be more specific, according to your *Genealogy of Nihilism*, is Caputo's belonging to the philosophical logic of nihilism, not theological one, isn't it? But when you are borrowing the unique expression "inexhaustible richness" from Merleau-Ponty (c.f. p. 259), it seems that there is still a possibility of a God even Nietzsche could love. So, the last question is that could your theological logic of nihilism tolerate Nietzsche's challenge?

Conor Cunningham:

Without meaning to be rude, but given their privileged positions within academia, I think there's a cultural mandate to say that I find the work of Caputo and his ilk to be highly decadent and desperately vulgar. Nietzsche would have offered such efforts only defenestration. It is just spoilt adolescent chatter, by my lights. Indeed, such writing is the equivalent of what Kierkegaard called 'Christendom', a mere civil religion, here the religion of the Western academic game.³⁸

Regarding Nietzsche not appearing in my nihilism book, I answer that question above. Like Kierkegaard, from whom he took nearly everything, there is of course a God for Nietzsche to love, and it is the God of creedal orthodoxy, the God who is Love, who is so utterly intelligible, because God is intelligibility, the most knowable, yet consequently is forever unfathomable, even in eternity; hence we are back with Gregory of Nyssa's notion of *epectasis*, mentioned earlier. To repeat: In eternity we will *know* God, because God is simple, but we will need to traverse eternity to *comprehend* God's essence. It is to this that Merleau-Ponty, the lapsed Catholic, speaks, when mentioning *inexhaustible richness*, one to be found in creation, being so because it is an analogical reflection or echo of its Creator.

Incidentally, if you want to read something truly radical, and not Late – white-Capitalist dross, go read Plato, Aristotle, Proclus, Maximus the Confessor, or Cyril of Alexandria, Hamman, or in the last century, Maurice Blondel (e.g., his

38 Again, for a critique of the notion of a weak god, see Cunningham, "Nihilism and Theology: Who Stands at the Door?"

L'Action) or Charles Péguy (for example, his last work, which I had translated a couple of years ago, with an excellent foreword by John Milbank: *Notes on Bergson and Descartes*). Resist the lobotomy of fashion, at all costs, for it only prepares the way for self-colonization by legion of ideologies.

3. Nihilism: The Consummate Philosophy?

When we were talking about the possibility of tolerating Nietzsche in Conor's theory, in fact, we were already talking about the limit of philosophy. In other words, Nihilism is the consummation of philosophical thoughts, but it should be noted firstly, not the theological ones. Now, in Part 3, we will focus on how "Nihilism" almost becomes a synonym for "Philosophy."

Question 1

Zhu Yiming:

Now it's time to go back to some vital arguments in *Genealogy of Nihilism*. So, for you, is nihilism the consummation of philosophy? And why? Is nihilism indicating the limit of philosophy - a special way to say the relation between identity and difference? On these grounds, could we be of the opinion that there is no difference between postmodern philosophies and modern philosophies?

Conor Cunningham:

To recall Blondel once again, 'Yes or no, does human life make sense, and does man [sic] have a destiny?' This is the question with which he opens his *magnum opus*, *L'Action*. After positing '*Il y a quelque chose*' (there is something), he argues that philosophy, any philosophy that does not reach the one thing necessary - *unique nécessaire* (transcendence)- is no longer philosophy, but rather, *ideology*. Nihilism is the consummate philosophy because in its positive form it grasps this conundrum, hence it attempts to generate its own faux, counterfeit god or 'transcendence', and here we are back with the contrived terminology, such as *différance* or a Badiouian event. Postmodernism was useful, for a spell, because it did point out that the positivist emperor was somewhat chilly, being naked as it was. But it transmogrified in to its own, self-serving, endless game

of navel gazing, as it was caught up in its own clever efforts to avoid pushback from existence, over which it sought to remain in control, doing so from wood panelled offices, with obsequious students at their feet, listening avidly and then tasting that day's sophistry, in which ever flavor it was offered up. In short, post-modernism, if approached as something welcome, was meant to be a moment (comparable to Protestantism, which was intended to be a 'protest') and substantialized, as when the anti-colonialists colonize the weak of mind with stories of a weak god. But as a cultural litmus test, as it were, if such professors have someone round to the house, say, a plumber, an electrician, or someone who lays brick for a living, and they ask what they do, and they start to tell them about a 'weak god', with almost certainty eye brows will be raised, being driven by contempt, and following Elvis, respect will have truly left the building. Working class people – the *proletariat* - have no time for such indulgent games.³⁹

Back to your question, yes, nihilism, as hinted at already, brings philosophy to a limit, a precipice, and here we are back to the newspaper clipping on my bedroom wall of the Hillsborough disaster, or my question in the Law lecture regarding murder, if murder be possible, given the aforementioned flatlining of reality, wherein univocal being has lapsed into a wholly equivocal being – the kingdom ruled by nominal aggregation: a pure nature, *natura pura*, which is now cleansed, purified of everything.

Question 2

Zhu Yiming:

Would you believe there is a pure nothing? Why cannot there be a nothing? To be more specific, according to your ideas, there is always a world promised firstly. Why cannot there not be a world, or why cannot the world be nothing? Why cannot we talk about nothing without the correlation between “there is” and “nothing”?

Conor Cunningham:

It is most important to realise that act – actuality – is always prior, hence God

39 Again, see Cunningham, “Nihilism and Theology: Who Stands at the Door?”

being *actus purus*. If that is the case, then all such talk of a pure nothing, negation, etc., always arrives in the middle, and is thereby intrinsically dependent and therefore parasitic, feeding of a prior gift. Tricky –to echo Tolkien’s Gollum- language games work or convince by way of misdirection, distracting from that upon which they rely. When a knife moves across a throat, slitting it, the bourgeois sentiments expressed in such sophistry regarding the pure nothing are phenomenologically evident. But not only in that register, even logically and linguistically if we attempt to articulate that which we witness, for again, we will be back to the *one thing necessary*, if we are to believe that a knife has been employed to slit a person’s throat.

Question 3

Zhu Yiming:

One thing, it’s still necessary to show clearly the difference between the limits of philosophy and the ending of philosophy. Some philosophers make it a central concern of their philosophy to reflect on the ending of philosophy. For example, Heidegger was quite keen on speaking about thinking (*Denken*) and poetry (*Dichtung*), yet Nietzsche was full of praise for music and dance. However, if you ask me, these cannot escape from such a logic, “if thought requires its own thought, then it can either be another thought or something other than thought. The former would initiate an infinite regress, for the supplementary thought would require its own thought, and so on, while the latter would ground thought in that which is not thought. But this means that all thinking would rest upon its own absence: thoughtlessness.”⁴⁰ So, when are we acutely aware of such an *aporia* involved in finitude, what else is there for philosophy to do?

Conor Cunningham:

Theology, otherwise known as First Philosophy, for such *aporia*, that is, the aporetic is built into its structure, as already suggested. Of course some will balk at the idea of theology, but when Late capitalists point out, when some

40 Conor Cunningham. *Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of nothing and the difference of theology*. Routledge: London and New York, 2002. Preface: xii.

past famous figure is mentioned, and who believed in God, they will say well, everyone believed in God back then, so we need not concern ourselves with that cultural/historical idiosyncrasy. Apart from the stunning chronological arrogance or chauvinism, with its Whiggish airs and graces, the flip side is just as valid, if not more than. Namely, *all the sheep may have gone to church back in the Middle Ages, say, but now not all the sheep don't; go to church*, and instead watch daytime TV, or play Xbox, those whom Nietzsche called – *the much too many*, or *the herd*.

Philosophy is *finished* only when it tries to be autarchical, fully autonomous, rather than subalternate, again to use Aristotle's term. To repeat, subalternation simply means the implicit reliance of one discipline or discourse on another, such as an optician relaying on geometry, but never having to discuss geometry explicitly; or science's dependence on mathematics, as another example. If it is reflexively subalternate, then such *aporia* bring into focus *limits*, but if philosophy is self-deluded enough to posture as autonomous, promoting some sort of isolationism, then it will indeed *end*, doing so in disaster. Both the Continental and analytic traditions have teetered on the edges of such demise – one getting lost in the haze of its own obfuscation, and the other becoming an ever-more refined form of Sudoku (*how many predicates can dance on the head of a pin*), but as mentioned, they have pulled back from it. Of course the temptation for near total self-indulgence is ever-present. The same goes for theologians, too, which goes without saying, for it stands in a relation of variegated, bi-directional dependence: towards God or transcendence and, concomitantly, towards sister disciplines.

4. An Alternative Way of Understanding Heidegger

In his history of Nihilism, Heidegger explored its range and depth. Meanwhile, nihilism is a complex phenomenon around which a few of the most important questions of Heidegger's philosophy orbit. In other words, Heidegger builds a bridge between the past and the future. In his books, Conor provides a different way in which Heidegger can be understood. Phenomenologically speaking, he

also offers a possibility to surpass phenomenology.

Question 1

Zhu Yiming:

We see that, as you once said, “The showing, which every phenomenon is, is a showing that withdraws as it shows, because Being is the arrival of a show, one which involves withdrawal. This means that every phenomenon presents itself in a manner which exceeds understanding, and this is the excess of phenomena as such: this excess manifests itself as withdrawal.”⁴¹ Do you think that phenomenology tries to achieve ontological stability, remaining in a movement between manifestation and withdrawal? And how can phenomenology also sink into univocity? Let’s take a broader vision, when regarding this special ontological stability as a base, which would lead to naturalism cosmology: In your view, could we get rid of nihilism?

Conor Cunningham:

First, I think phenomenology is very important, as it is an especially fruitful approach in many ways, but as is always the case, left too long on its own and a somewhat pharisaical proceduralism sets in, as it becomes ossified, and begins to present itself as a panacea. Its importance lies in bringing, or drawing, us back again and again, non-identically, to the cusp, the very font of reception. Yet such reception - and here’s the problematic moment - issues mandates for us to go forth and manifest such reception in a plethora of guises, modes and registers, from which there is no doubt a feedback loop to phenomenology, but not on its own, in isolation.

Phenomenology does explicitly admit it is subalternate, in terms of givenness (*Gegebenheit*), but this, at times, is too one directional. Phenomenology usefully weaves the apophatic and cataphatic together, which is absolutely necessary, but times, I feel, buried deep in its psyche, so to speak, it hides the very logic it rejects; the logic of its opponents, for it takes itself for granted, and has

41 Conor Cunningham. *Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of nothing and the difference of theology*. Routledge: London and New York, 2002. p. 136.

an *unquestioning, unreconstructed notion of objectivity*, on the one Husserlian side, yet on the other, can go too far down the purely poetic side, which can easily lapse into indulgent word play that makes possible a space for collaboration, accommodating all sorts of ideologies, including Nazism, as we saw with Heidegger, or later, postmodern piffle and pontification with an accompanying fiddle whilst Rome burns.

Question 2

Zhu Yiming:

Now back to Heidegger himself. Generally, we could describe Heidegger's thoughts as a "Negative Theology". In your book, you suggest that it should also be seen as a "*meontotheology*", but you have a clear vision for this and say: "that which is, cannot simply give way to another, for it is there in the first place as a result of eternal intention." (p. 263). I believe here you provide a way forward on which we might be able to surpass Heidegger. Could you provide more explanations? Since that book was published, have you ever changed these ideas?

Conor Cunningham:

My ideas have not changed, but they have developed and what has altered is their extent or reach, as I now more fully realise their application and relevance in a plethora of other disciplines, for example the natural sciences, neurology, and so on. I characterized Heidegger as an advocate of *meontoheology* because, simply, he prioritized *das Nicht*, which is to substantialize a process, namely, the *epoché*, or bracketing. He, like Protestantism, rendered a verb a noun, and that was the move that afforded the hospitality his work offered to Nazism. Simultaneously, he endeavoured to capture the *one thing necessary*, rendering it fully immanent, and thereby something to be mastered and possessed. His work was broadly, a secular counterfeit theology, something which would come into liberal fashion in the 1970s, with all manner of shallow plays, and writings (*Honest to God* springs to mind, and of course the work of Don Cupitt. Cupitt was in truth an unreconstructed Feuerbachian who, in terms of imagination and influence – went on a day trip from England to Cherbourg in France, and on his way back to

the port to catch the ferry, popped into a second-hand book shop and purchased a copy of Derrida's *Of Grammatology*.

The point about eternal intention that you mention, is that Creation, and all creatures, all phenomena bear the shadow of divine intention, and thereby intrinsic worth. Creation is an icon, and accordingly receives a gift twice over: *First* in being at all, and second in recapitulation, creation is 'summed up' (*ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι / anakephalaiousasthai*), as with time and history, it is taken up and non-identically repeated by God, in terms of eternity. As St Gregory of Nyssa says, 'there is produced, by virtue of a superior wisdom, a mixture (*suanakrasis*) of the comprehensible with perceptible creation, so that nothing in creation is rejected.'⁴²

5. Between Philosophy and Theology

Conor Cunningham has roots in the movement of radical orthodoxy. Radical orthodoxy is a Christian theological and philosophical school. When this movement was founded by John Milbank, it showed a great emphasis on the question of "Nothing" and "Nihilism". In his book Genealogy of Nihilism, Conor goes further and talks about the possibility of the "possibility of nihilism" (Milbank). He writes, "Indeed, nihilism is the absence of all choice. But this absence comes in the form of a particular 'plenitude'. For nihilism to be 'possible', it must not be a choice, but must be, in a sense, every choice, in that every choice must be available to it."⁴³ That is to say, nihilism promises something of positive value. But the positive one is only ever given real considerations and thought in theological discourse. So, in this part, we will pay more attention to the theological perspective.

⁴² Gregory of Nyssa, *Oratio catechetica* 6.2; emphasis mine (C. Cunningham).

⁴³ Conor Cunningham. *Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of nothing and the difference of theology*. Routledge: London and New York, 2002. p. 170.

Question 1

Zhu Yiming:

What is “radical orthodoxy”? What does “radical” really mean? Could radical orthodoxy be perfectly suited to consider the implications of “Nihilism”? Actually, I see that, when John Milbank founded this movement, it was accompanied by enormous interest in “Nothing” and “Nihilism.” Is this observation correct? And then, concerning the issue of Nihilism, what is the main difference between general ideas from radical orthodoxy and yours?

Conor Cunningham:

‘Radical’ just means root, to get to the root of things and nihilism helps us get to the root. What’s radical for RO is simply the Creeds – read them, speak them, they are unfathomable, and make punks, rockers, supposed cultural iconoclasts and the postmoderns all look like grannies at a knitting competition, eating cucumber sandwiches made with stale, somewhat grey bread. What is important for now, is the realization that Western culture must break the *omertà* of nihilistic materialist ideology, our very lives depending on it. These are the stakes, as Jacobi puts it in his *Open Letter to Fichte*, which I already mentioned: *God or nothingness*, and not even that. Any ‘wager on the meaning of meaning,’ George Steiner writes, must also be ‘a wager on transcendence.’⁴⁴ It is at such a juncture that conversation begins, all else is gossip. This is our Kierkegaardian leap of faith or F H Jacobi’s *salto mortale*, which, as with Kierkegaard, is a somersault, wherein we leap, not somewhere else (say, from reason here, to faith over there, crossing Gotthold Lessing’s protestant ‘broad ugly ditch’ - *der garstige breite Graben*), but into the air like a ballerina, landing eventually from where we rose, but now, after this moment (*Augenblick*), all is new, all is real—the person is real: *Ecce homo*. Here, Franz Kafka is surely correct ‘There is no path, but there is a goal’, or even more precisely: *Gluben ist sein*, as he puts it. Accordingly, he argues that ‘The Expulsion from Paradise is eternal in its principle aspect: this makes it irrevocable, and our living in this world inevitable, but the eternal nature of the process has the effect that not only could we remain forever in Par-

44 *Real Presences*, p. 213)

adise, but that we are currently there, whether we know it or not.’

RO seeks to recapture the sheer vertigo, fragility yet girth of creation in all its hues: The miracle of the quotidian, the sacrament in ordinary, to echo Hopkins again. RO seeks to wake us from the dogmatic slumbers of bourgeois other-worldly sedation. For our professors and their weak god, the sedative will be tenure, and modes of small-souled fame, what Aristotle called ‘small-souledness’ (*mikropsuchia*: *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1125a21-32), with its accompanying ‘small thoughts’ (*mikra phronein*). Such tenure becomes their telos, rather than a means for daily bread and opportunities to teach and learn. No wonder both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche used ‘professor’ as a scathing term of contempt.

As for differences between me and RO, they are not very interesting, and they would only ever be irrelevant nuance and emphasis. More important is the generative unity born out of creedal orthodoxy, for there, we have hardly begun.

Question 2

Zhu Yiming:

How does radical orthodoxy view the relation between philosophy and theology? It seems that, in radical orthodoxy, especially some declarations from John Milbank, philosophy is nihilism exactly, isn’t it? Of course, we have talked about it, but here, I want to ask in a theological angle: now that Nihilism is the consummate philosophy, where would be the position for philosophy? Should we just give up philosophy?

Conor Cunningham:

The main worry would be a strict dualism between philosophy and theology, for that would tempt both to become a caricature of their selves, and again to reside in a form of almost hermetic isolationism (parochial and colloquial). But in Blondelian fashion, philosophy will fall into nihilism when it denies theology, whether the cocks have crowed or not, whilst theology can easily lapse into some sort of Barthianism (followers of Karl Barth) when it is too neurotically self-enclosed, or a vacuous liberal morass if it is too insecure and therefore too accommodating or obsequious (neurosis from a different angle). In truth, Barthi-

anism is a form of liberalism, but in thin disguise, whilst liberalism advocates a form of fundamentalism, however implicit, that of secular logic. Both must be avoided, and that's what John Milbank has always tried to achieve, very successfully, it should be said.

Question 3

Zhu Yiming:

What is the radical orthodoxy's view of the body (*Leib*)? As far as you are concerned, how should we understand the relation between body and world? I would like to venture an idea that, even if emphasizing the correlation between body and world, as long as there is still a dualism, the body will finally become a body without body, that is to say, it ultimately falls into a bad monism. What do you think of this idea? What can we learn from the different views of theology about the body?

Conor Cunningham:

I always get a little weary when asked about bodies, as such questions usually issue form some sort of trendy rebellion against what is taken to be its opposite, say, soul or spirit. And nothing could be more ridiculous, inane even. In briefest terms, *no soul, no body: nobody*. Yet, conversely the body is there to help the soul, as Aquinas makes clear. It's a matter of duality, to borrow from physics, and never dualism. Think of the Council of Chalcedon, *Christ is fully divine and fully human in one person (esse)*. To ask about the body, as if it could be standalone term, is to miss the boat. It is wrongheaded. Interestingly Aquinas compares the soul not with some wispy flash of light, but more often than not with prime matter, for both have a *capax omnia*, a capacity for everything, this already eschews the typical questions about matter, body, and so on, especially in light of Creation and Incarnation, not to mention sacraments, bodily resurrection, or more generally eros.

Generally our imaginations are impoverished, having been so heavily programmed and conditioned by prevailing ideologies. Regarding impoverished imaginations, the angels offer a telling metaphysical and theological lesson, re-

garding bodies, and our imaginations generally, in terms of theology's intrinsically paradoxical nature, that often goes unnoticed. When the women discover the empty tomb, the missing body of Christ, they are told: 'Do not be amazed (*ἐκθαμβεῖσθε*). You seek Jesus of Nazareth, who was crucified. He has risen, he is not here.' (Mark 16:6). Similarly, recall the passage from Acts (1:11), wherein Christ is 'lifted into Heaven'. Two angels then turn up and chastise the onlookers: 'Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into heaven?' The impoverished imagination suffers a distorted wonderment. What would it entail, after all, to look up to 'see' the ascension? How high would Jesus be? Likewise, the command of not to be amazed, and the parochial references, inoculates against the idea of cheap miracle. Echoing this sensibility, when Christ encountered the women at the tomb, the casualness is telling: '*chairete*', 'good morning', *the lack of drama is dramatic*, as it were. There is here, revolution, yet fittingness. This resurrected person is, after all, God incarnate, for whom creation is, yet is the same person that cried at the tomb of Lazarus. Here we have the marriage of ascent (Aristotle) and descent (Plato). Yet there is no flattening, the removal of tension or specificity. The angels speak using geographical terms. It is not the Christ, but Jesus of Nazareth, likewise, in Acts, it is men of Galilee, just as further in the same verse of Mark, the angels tell the women to tell the disciples to go to Galilee. Most telling is that the resurrected

Jesus appears as a man not as some figure all in white and glowing, as with the transfiguration. The angels at the tomb are dazzling, but not Jesus, even if he no doubt does some peculiar things: On the one hand eating broiled fish, just as he *rose with his scars, validating history*, and on the other, passing through walls. This is our epoché, as it sets our natural understandings adrift, and precludes domestication, doing so because this is the marriage of transcendence and immanence, soul and body, time and eternity. Now, in light of this, questions about body seem somewhat tame.

6. Where Would be the Position for Darwinism?

Apart from Genealogy of Nihilism, one of Conor Cunningham's other very significant books (in my opinion) is: Darwin's Pious Idea: Why the Ultra-Darwinists and Creationists Both Get It Wrong. In fact, in this book, Conor also pushes on his research "Nihilism and Theology". However, this book hasn't attracted Chinese readers' serious attention.

Question 1

Zhu Yiming:

Is there any continuity between your first monograph *Genealogy of Nihilism* and the second one *Darwin's Pious Idea*? Will the Ultra-Darwinists and Creationists fall into Nihilism?

Conor Cunningham:

Yes, there is real continuity. In fact, scattered throughout the nihilism book, especially in the preface, and then towards the end, figures such as Dawkins and Dennett begin to make an appearance, as do questions about molecular reductionism. Ultra-Darwinism is a conspicuous example of modern nihilism. For example, the expansion of Darwinian evolution to that of a *universal theory* enacts a project of radical elimination wherein mind, ethics, normativity, beauty and so on are totally lost. In their stead is the aforementioned flatlining of existence, bolstered only by conjurations fashioned from mere aggregation. Similarly in the Darwin book, there are explicit moves to begin taking about the soul, which is taken up in the work I'm doing now, alongside a radical critique of our general understanding of science; a critique which is simultaneously negative and positive. Put differently, I deconstruct and then reconstruct science moving it from being a largely *degenerate research program* (to echo Imré Lakatos) to being a regenerative one that is now in better communion with its sibling disciplines.

In so doing, all talk of soul, anthropology, and so on, receive a much better hearing, as I've neutralized what is taken by some to be the Master Discourse, namely, particle physics, turning it instead into a *proto-metaphysics*, on the one hand, and a *proper art*, on the other. Regarding it now deserving the appellation

‘art’ is something that has been achieved, unbeknownst to itself, no doubt, but achieved nonetheless; doing so in fits and starts over the last 120 years or so. In short, *science has finally bumped into Plato up ahead (something Catherine Pickstock has argued for, doing so for many years, right back to when I was a student at Cambridge University, and very much against the tides of fashion)*. I intend to bring this to the fore and distil the enormous consequences that arise from it. Many childish things will have to be put away, with which many people have made duplicitous, counterfeit livings.

7. Conclusion

Now the interview with Professor Conor Cunningham is drawing to an end. I would like to thank Conor Cunningham for his inspiring answers. He offers so many profound philosophical and theological insights, which are still difficult to fully comprehend. In this final part, we are asking for some support for our understanding from Prof. Cunningham himself. Also, there are some cultural barriers between the Professor and Chinese readers, and we must realize that dialogues between western and eastern cultures are essential for the future research on Nihilism. This interview aims to promote such dialogue and exchange.

Question 1

Zhu Yiming:

You possess a wide knowledge of different thinkers, ranging from philosophy to theology. Sometimes, our own limited academic background makes it difficult to follow your train of thought. Could you provide some effective methods to get into your book?

Conor Cunningham:

As mentioned, the nihilism book is underwritten by the simple realization that there is, an invariant logic that continually manifests itself in the Western corpus, and this logic entails nihilism. I use the example of the *Gestalt* image of the duck/rabbit, in terms of what is called aspect perception. When we look at the image, we either see a duck (one aspect) or a rabbit (second aspect), but *we*




FIG. 20.—Do you see a duck or a rabbit, or either? (From Harper's Weekly, originally in *Fliegende Blätter*.)

can never see both at once. More importantly, whilst we perceive the duck or the rabbit, the two aspects, *we can never see the 'One' underlying the two*, upon which the aspects appear, even though we are staring right at it, there in front of our eyes, empirically: *the One is forever hidden.*

Philosophically the two aspects - duck or rabbit are taken as representing a dualism, say, mind and matter, whilst the hidden One is the implicit or even insidious monism that prevails. For example, Spinoza has God (duck) or Nature (rabbit): *Deus sive Natura*. Yet, we know that both irreducible aspects reside within one hidden Substance. Similarly, Kant has the phenomenal (duck) and the noumenal (rabbit), and again underlying this dualism is a hidden 'One' upon which they are unwittingly made manifest. For Kant this One is the transcendental 'x', as he calls it in the *Opus Postumum*, his last work. Finally, Hegel has the finite (duck) and the infinite (rabbit), and the One *Geist*.

The above logic then is applied to a host of philosophers, and philosophies, which are found wanting, amounting to expressions of this nihilistic logic that

is often just a counterfeit (Trinitarian) theology. The second point is to grasp the ‘positive’ nature of nihilism, it will, in short, not survive if it is just lack. Instead, it must be able to generate *ersatz* or false versions of what the absence of nihilism might provide: ethics, beauty, truth, meaning, and so on: By providing all these ‘goods’ it is much harder to outflank nihilism. Lastly, nihilism can be read as a *propaedeutic* to theology or of a more transcendent philosophy, such as Blondel’s or in some respects, reservations notwithstanding, Michel Henry’s. Being so because nihilism brings us to the crossroads of decision: *God or nothingness?*

Question 2

Zhu Yiming:

China and the UK still differ greatly in their culture. Do you believe that nihilism is in essence of Western origin? Generally speaking, both Greek and Hebrew traditions constitute the very core of Western culture. But how is it that nihilism might be inevitable? There are also some profound thoughts of Nihilism stemming from traditional Chinese philosophy. How do you think about these debates on “Nothing” and “Nihilism” that were taking place in China? I am referring to Taoism, Buddhism, and so on.

Conor Cunningham:

Nihilism is Western, in broad strokes, for as Kierkegaard, and then Nietzsche borrowing from him, rightly diagnosed that Europe, through presumptuous decadence, had fallen into nihilism. And the god of Europe was the ancestor of today’s weak god: the bourgeois conjuration advocated by Caputo *et al*, as already said. Nihilism and talk of nothingness is foreign to Europe’s Hebraic/Hellenic origins, which always cross-pollinated, endogenously, and there is no sense of speaking as if they were two wholly different entities, that can be unwound and separated. Here it is wise to ignore the ideological erroneous fantasies of Adolf von Harnack, who contrived the notion of the Hellenic corruption of the purely Hebraic, doing so to enable the generation of an artificial mandate that permitted criticism of the church for having taken on foreign beliefs. Such xenophobic

fantasies are for the birds, as Shakespeare might say, and are part ingredient of Nietzsche's very diagnosis. Harnack's god is related to the weak god of Caputo, the grandfather of which is the dead god of Nietzsche.

By contrast, Chinese culture is different, and therein talk of nothingness is more indigenous, and therefore not contrived and self-serving, a symptom of decadence, but rather part and parcel of an organic manner of speaking, ignoring for the moment, whatever other criticisms could be made legitimately of such talk.

Question 3

Zhu Yiming:

Following the directions you've pointed us toward; I've heard that you are writing a three-volume book. So, before we end this interview, could you provide us with some details about it? Also, is there anything special you want to say to Chinese readers, especially those young students who are preparing to study philosophy and theology? What are your expectations for the future research on nihilism?

Conor Cunningham:

Well, I've mentioned the trilogy already, so here's a short abstract for the first volume, for your readers:

"Naturalness, a central dogma of particle physics, is failing. Shockwaves are spreading throughout science, as the prevailing paradigm—from the Higgs boson to the cosmological constant—collapses. Naturalness, it turns out, is not good science, but bad philosophy: fruit of a reductionist programme spectacularly undermined by the latest scientific data. My project explains why naturalness does not work and shows how its failure buries the myth that only particle physics delivers real knowledge. Across three volumes—interweaving physics, philosophy and theology—I develop a new paradigm of science and nature with the potential to inspire imaginative research in a post-naturalness landscape. This paradigm also dissolves many hoary dualisms, which it exposes as wrongheaded and unmotivated, thus clearing the way for the radical reformulation of many seemingly intractable debates—such as that between emergence and reduction. In this way, I seek not only to midwife the discovery of new theoretical vistas for

physics, but also to re-open lines of communication among the sciences. To debunk naturalness, to undermine the specious hegemony of particle physics naturalness supports, is to invite all the sciences to renounce internecine turf wars and to re-discover themselves and one another as co-participants in a single community of inquiry.”

As for research, my advice is: read as widely as possible, and then gradually narrow it down to a few horses, as it were, and then whichever one, fuelled by desire, eventually takes the lead, put your saddle on that one, and engage with it exhaustively. In general, when doing research, be courageous; take risks, inhabiting places of initial discomfort, because creativity comes from that liminal realm. But at all times be rigorous. Treat fashion like desert (sweet), only to be consumed after the savoury. Ensure to engage fully with the genius of the past (tradition), which will, with patience, appear to be much younger or vital than the new.

I wish young researchers well for all their efforts and pursuits, and when things seem tough, recall the words of Samuel Beckett (the other poster on my bedroom wall): *‘I can’t go on, you must go on, I’ll go on’*.

Conor Cunningham

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