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From "Ἑρμῆς" to "Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue*" (经学诠释学): A Genealogical Construction of *Quan* (诠) with Λόγος and *Auslegen* Across Multiple Interlingual Boundaries[1]

Abstract: The German term "*Hermeneutik*" and the English term "hermeneutics" have undergone various translations in Chinese due to the diverse cross-cultural intertextual contexts. No single translation can become a dominant "center" that overrides or marginalizes the others. One such translation, "*chanshi xue*" (阐释学), is commonly used in Chinese literary criticism and literary hermeneutics but should not be forcibly interpreted as the dominant term by imposing a rigid conceptual hierarchy on related Chinese concepts. Even in the Western cultural context, clarifying the etymology of "*Hermeneutik* / hermeneutics" and its relation with "Ἑρμῆς" (Hermes) remains a complex task. However, when examining Chinese and Western hermeneutical concepts, the meaning dispersion of Chinese characters and Indo-European words allows the possibility of meaning connection and genealogical construction across multiple interlingual boundaries. It is precisely through the mutual reference and reflexive reference that the successive explaining chain—"*quan* (诠), [means] *ju* (具)" and "*ju* (具), [means] *gongzhi* (共置)"—can become a functional and non-substantial pivot for mutually interpreting "*quan*" (诠), "λόγος," and "*auslegen*" (with the aid of Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation). Within this reciprocating framework, "Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue*" (经学诠释学), which combines *Jing Xue* (经学) with hermeneutics, will be a study of "collection of Ancients

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and Moderns" and "selection of Chinese and Western." It not only provides an alternative path for the modern transformation of traditional *Jing Xue* but also establishes a productive discursive *tópos* for dialogue between Chinese classical and Western scholarship.

Zusammenfassung: Der deutsche Ausdruck „Hermeneutik" und der englische Ausdruck „hermeneutics" sind im Chinesischen aufgrund der vielfältigen interkulturellen Intertextualitäten in unterschiedlichen Weisen übersetzt worden. Keine dieser Übersetzungen kann zu einem dominierenden „Zentrum" werden, das andere Varianten überlagert oder marginalisiert. Eine solche Übersetzung, „chanshi xue" (阐 释 学), wird in der chinesischen Literaturkritik und der literarischen Hermeneutik häufig verwendet, sollte jedoch nicht durch die Errichtung einer starren begrifflichen Hierarchie gegenüber anderen chinesischen Bezeichnungen als dominanter Terminus behauptet werden. Selbst im westlichen kulturellen Kontext bleibt die Klärung der Etymologie von „Hermeneutik/hermeneutics" und ihrer Beziehung zu „Ἑρμῆς" (Hermes) eine komplexe Aufgabe. Bei der Untersuchung chinesischer und westlicher hermeneutischer Begriffe eröffnet jedoch die Bedeutungsstreuung sowohl der chinesischen Schriftzeichen als auch der indogermanischen Wörter die Möglichkeit von Bedeutungsverknüpfungen und genealogischen Konstruktionen über mehrere interlinguale Grenzen hinweg. Gerade durch diese wechselseitigen und reflexiven Bezugnahmen kann die sukzessive Erklärungskette – „quan (诠) bedeutet ju (具)" und „ju (具) bedeutet gongzhi (共 置)" – zu einem funktionalen, nicht-substanziellen Drehpunkt werden, der eine gegenseitige Auslegung von „quan" (诠), „λόγος" und „auslegen" (unter Rückgriff auf Heideggers phänomenologische Interpretation) ermöglicht. In diesem zirkulären Bezugsrahmen kann die „Hermeneutik der Jing Xue" (经 学 诠释学), welche die Jing Xue (经学) mit der Hermeneutik verbindet, zu einer Forschung über eine „Sammlung der Alten und Modernen" sowie über eine „Auswahl des Chinesischen und des Westlichen" werden. Sie eröffnet nicht nur

einen alternativen Weg für die moderne Transformation der traditionellen *Jing Xue*, sondern etabliert zugleich einen produktiven diskursiven tópos für den Dialog zwischen der chinesischen klassischen und der westlichen Gelehrsamkeit.

摘要：由于跨文化互文的不同处境，"Hermeneutik"这一德文术语在进入中文语境时必然延异为多种译名，其中任何一种都没有占据"中心"以统摄其他译名的"权力"。"阐释学"这一为文艺理论界及文学阐释学所青睐的中文译名，亦不应被强制阐释并形塑于概念等级之巅。其实，在西文语境中"Hermeneutik"的词源及其与"赫尔墨斯"的关系亦是复杂难辨，其中的诠释学建构更需在语际间的翻译转码中给予解构性透视。然而，在中西诠释学概念的互视中，字义或词义于自身语言网络中的散布状态，却为其在本不可通约的多重语际间创造了意义勾连与谱系建构的可能。因此，"诠，具也""具，共置也"这一递训之链，必须在语际间的相互指涉与反身指涉中，方可成为"诠"与"λόγος"和"auslegen"融通互释的功能性而非实体性的枢纽。进而，中国古代经学与西方现代诠释学的合会共置，也使得"经学诠释学"成为"言具古今、择鉴中西"之学，其不仅为传统经学之现代学术转型开辟了可供择选的路径，也为中国古典学术与西方学术营构了生产性的话语空间。

Key words: *quan*（诠）; λόγος; *auslegen*; Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue*

In the course of cross-cultural transmission, the German term "*Hermeneutik*" and the English term "hermeneutics" have been translated into various Chinese equivalents across different contexts of reception. These translated terms mainly include *quanshi xue*（诠释学）,*chanshi xue*（阐释学）,*jieshi xue*（解释学）, and *shiyi xue*（释义学）. As target language concepts, however, none of these translations has the right to claim the position of origin (*Ursprung*), center, or ultimate. As for the Chinese concepts, such as *quan*（诠）, *chan*（阐）,*jie*（解）, *shi*（释）, and others, there is even less justification for configuring a closed hierarchy that enforces the dominance of one over the others. It is worth noting that even within its European linguistic genealogy, the

etymology or origin of "*Hermeneutik*/hermeneutics" remains ambiguous. As a result, we can only discern vague traces of its source (*Herkunft*) or emergence (*Entstehung*) in surviving textual materials.[2]

1. The Obscure Etymology of Hermeneutics

For many Chinese scholars, the relation between "hermeneutics" and "Ἑρμῆς" (Hermes) is often taken to be self-evident, or is considered sufficiently proven simply by citing a well-known passage from Hans-Georg Gadamer. It begins as follows:

> Hermeneutics is the art [*Kunst*] of ἑρμηνεύειν, i.e., of proclamation, oral interpretation, explanation and interpretation. "Hermes" was the name of the messenger of the gods, who conveyed the messages of the gods to mortals. His proclamation is evidently not a mere communication but an explanation of divine commands, and indeed, it is in such a way that he translates them into mortal language and makes them intelligible. The achievement of hermeneutics is always to transfer an interrelation of sense from another "world" into one's own.[3]

This passage is from Gadamer's entry on *Hermeneutik* in the *Historical Dictionary of Philosophy* (*Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, 1974). The earliest Chinese version of this entry, titled "Jieshi Xue" (解释学), was published in *Zhe Xue Yi Cong* (哲学译丛 , *Translations in Philosophy*), No. 3, 1986. The translator is Hong Handing (洪汉鼎), a specialist in Western hermeneutics and prominent scholar of Hans-Georg Gadamer's thought. As a result of his translation, the idea that Hermes is the etymological root of hermeneutics has become widely accepted—if not taken for granted—within Chinese academic discourse.

2　For the German concepts "*Ursprung*," " *Herkunft*," and "*Entstehung*," see Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire," in Suzanne Bachelard, et al, *Hommage à Jean Hyppolite*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971, pp.145-172.

3　Hans-Georg Gadamer, „Hermeneutik," in Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer und Gottfried Gabriel, Hrsg., *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Bd.3, Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 1974, S.1062.

However, Gadamer was well aware of the controversy over the etymology of hermeneutics in Western academia, although he found it unintelligible that some scholars denied the etymological relation between Hermes and hermeneutics. In his article "Logic or Rhetoric?—On the Early History of Hermeneutics Again" („Logik oder Rhetorik?—Nochmals zur Frühgeschichte der Hermeneutik"), Gadamer argues that even if the derivation of hermeneutics from Hermes has been revealed as a "fiction" by modern linguistics, this does not negatively affect the fact that Augustin and the entire "tradition" understood this term.[4] He explains that "the testimony of tradition weighs heavily—not as a linguistic argument, of course, but as a valid indication of how far and how universally the hermeneutical phenomena must be seen and have been seen: as 'a nuncio to all thoughts [*Nuntius für alles Gedachte*].'"[5] Similarly, in his famous book *Truth and Method* (*Wahrheit und Methode*), Gadamer emphasizes that "tradition" is the crucial "prejudice" (*Vorurteil*) that institutes the condition of understanding and is "valid without justification."[6]

According to Gadamer's view of "tradition," "Hermes" must be a metaphor for the universal mediating nature of hermeneutics. Moreover, for the "spiritual sciences" (*Geisteswissenschaften*), the etymological reference to "Hermes"—we understood as oriented toward knowledge and empirical verification—can only belong to "a subordinate level" (*eine untergeordnete Schicht*).[7] Still, it is undeniable that Gadamer's direct linkage of hermeneutics and Hermes in

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4　Hans-Georg Gadamer, „Logik oder Rhetorik? — Nochmals zur Frühgeschichte der Hermeneutik", in *Hermeneutik II: Wahrheit und Methode*, *Hans-Georg Gadamer Gesammelte Werke*, Bd.2, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1993, SS.294-295.

5　Hans-Georg Gadamer, „Logik oder Rhetorik? — Nochmals zur Frühgeschichte der Hermeneutik", in *Hermeneutik II: Wahrheit und Methode*, *Hans-Georg Gadamer Gesammelte Werke*, Bd.2, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1993, S.295.

6　Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hermeneutik I: Wahrheit und Methode*, *Hans-Georg Gadamer Gesammelte Werke*, Bd.1, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1990, S.285.

7　Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hermeneutik I: Wahrheit und Methode*, *Hans-Georg Gadamer Gesammelte Werke*, Bd.1, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1990, S.288.

his entry not only leads to a leap in the meaning connection but also introduces interpretive ambiguity for many Chinese readers regarding the etymological relationship between the two terms.

Differently from his student Gadamer, Martin Heidegger categorically states in his lecture notes *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity* (*Ontologie [Hermeneutik der Faktizität]*), often considered a precursor to *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*): "The word ἑρμηνευτική [of or for interpreting] (ἐπιστήμη [science], τέχνη [art]) is a form from ἑρμηνεύειν [to interpret], ἑρμηνεία [interpretation], ἑρμηνεύς [interpreter]. Its etymology is obscure."[8] In the original German footnote, Heidegger references the Belgian linguist Émile Boisacq's *Etymological Dictionary of Greek* (*Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*), which indicates that the etymology of "ἑρμηνεύς" is obscure.[9] Even in the two etymological dictionaries of Greek—one edited by Swedish linguist Hjalmar Frisk, the other by French linguist Pierre Chantraine—published during Heidegger's later years, the definite etymology of "ἑρμηνεύς" remains undetermined. They merely confirm that "ἑρμηνεύω" (to interpret) is a verb derivative from the noun "ἑρμηνεύς."[10]

In the latter dictionary of the above two, the editor Pierre Chantraine refers to E. Bosshardt's dissertation *Nouns Ending in -εύς* (*Nomina auf -εύς*). He notes that Bosshardt "has been tempted by the resemblance to ἑρμηνεύς, etc., and thinks that Hermes would be the 'intermediary between gods and men, the interpreter' (?)."[11] In fact, well before Bosshardt, the German classical philologist August Boeckh stated in *Encyclopedia and Methodology of Philology* (*Encyklopädie und*

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8   Martin Heidegger, *Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)*, *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe*, Bd.63, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988, S.9.

9   Émile Boisacq, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*, Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1916, p.282.

10   Hjalmar Frisk, Hrsg., *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, Bd.1, Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1960, S.563; Pierre Chantraine, dir., *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque: Histoire des mots*, Tome II, Paris: Éditions Klincksieck, 1970, p.373.

11   Pierre Chantraine, dir., *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque: Histoire des mots*, Tome II, Paris: Éditions Klincksieck, 1970, p.374.

Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften): "The name of hermeneutics comes from ἑρμηνεία. This word is evidently connected with the name of the god Ἑρμῆς (Ἑρμέας); but cannot be deduced from this, but both have the same root."[12]

Despite the etymological obscurity, Heidegger is not immune to the allure of this resemblance. He acknowledges a connection between "ἑρμηνευτική" and the messenger of the gods "Hermes," and further suggests: "Some evidence can delimit the original meaning [*die ursprüngliche Bedeutung*] of this word and at the same time make the way of its meaning change understandable."[13] In the case of the obscure origin (*Ursprung*) of "ἑρμηνευτική" and its cognate words, however, it is not so much to delimit its original meaning as only to find a source (*Herkunft*) for it in the history of Western thoughts and culture. Moreover, this source is not as elevated as one might assume, because Heidegger first anchors it in the *Ion* (534e; 535a), in which Plato says in the words of Socrates: "οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἑρμηνῆς εἰσιν τῶν θεῶν (the poets are but the 'spokespersons' [*Sprecher*] of the gods). Thus the following applies to the rhapsodes who for their part recite the poets: οὐκοῦν ἑρμηνέων ἑρμηνῆς γίγνεσθε; do you not accordingly become the spokespersons of the spokespersons [*die Sprecher der Sprecher*]?"[14]

In this context, I translate "ἑρμηνῆς" and "ἑρμηνέων" as "spokespersons" rather than "interpreters," in light of Plato's ambiguous stance in the *Ion* and his looming reversal of "tradition." In the "Introduction" to her book *Plato on Poetry*, Penelope Murray argues:

By using the language of divine possession he [Plato] maintains a link with the traditional concept of poetic inspiration, but turns that concept upside down. In the

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12 August Boeckh, *Encyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften*, Leipzig: Teubner, 1877, SS.79-80.

13 Martin Heidegger, *Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)*, *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe*, Bd.63, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988, S.9.

14 Martin Heidegger, *Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)*, *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe*, Bd.63, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988, S.9.

early Greek poets, the divine origin of poetry is used to guarantee its truth and quality, and there is still an implication of that sort in S. [Socrates]'s words here, especially at 534d. Despite its eulogistic tone, however, the central speech of the Ion undermines the authority traditionally accorded to poets by depriving them of *techne*.[15]

Therefore, according to the *original meaning* delimited in the *Ion*, both poets and rhapsodes are portrayed merely as spokespersons, possessing no *techne* (art) of their own.

Such a spokesperson, without any *techne*, is naturally unfit to assume the weighty role of "the messenger of the message" (*der Botengänger der Botschaft*).[16] This expression, "the messenger of the message," is in the dialogue between Heidegger and Japanese scholar Tezuka Tomio. It is in this very dialogue that Heidegger admits to being familiar with "hermeneutics" through theological study. He further clarifies his use of this term and quotes the same passage in the *Ion* mentioned above:

The expression "hermeneutic" derives from the Greek verb ἑρμηνεύειν. That verb is related to the noun ἑρμηνεύς, which one can bring together with the name of the god Ἑρμῆς by a play of thinking that is more binding [*verbindlicher*] than the rigor of science. Hermes is the messenger of the gods. He brings the message [*Botschaft*] of destiny; ἑρμηνεύειν is that exposition [*Darlegen*] which brings tidings [*Kunde*] because it can listen to a message. Such exposition becomes an interpretation [*Auslegen*] of what has already been said by the poets who, according to Socrates in Plato's dialogue *Ion* (534e) ἑρμηνῆς εἰσιν τῶν θεῶν, "are messengers of the gods" [*Botschafter sind der Götter*].[17]

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15   Penelope Murray, "Introduction", in Penelope Murray, ed., *Plato on Poetry*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.10.

16   Martin Heidegger, „Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache (1953/54): Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden", in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe*, Bd.12, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985, S.128.

17   Martin Heidegger, „Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache (1953/54): Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden", in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, *Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe*, Bd.12, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985, S.115.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger also explains what he means by "the rigor of science":

Because understanding, in accordance with its existential meaning, is Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being [*Seinkönnen*], the ontological presuppositions of historiological knowledge transcend in principle the idea of rigour held in the most exact sciences. Mathematics is not more rigorous than historiology, but only narrower, because the existential foundations relevant for it lie within a narrower range. [18]

For Heidegger, the reason why historiology can transcend the rigor of mathematics is that the former, as a "thing ready-to-hand" (*Zuhandene*), is more primordial than the latter, which appears as a "thing present-at-hand" (*Vorhandene*). [19] Gadamer also implicitly adopted his teacher's idea when he considered "tradition" as "a valid prejudice without justification" to transcend the exact proof of linguistics.

However, in an absolute sense, everything present-at-hand is also the thing ready-to-hand—as Heidegger puts it, the former is merely narrower than the latter in terms of "the existential foundations relevant for it." Hence, "the rigor of science" has its irreplaceable function, such as acknowledging the obscurity or diversity of origin and its incommensurable differences. Therefore, according to the standards of "the rigor of science," even the etymology and origin of "Hermes" remain undetermined. In *Hermeneutics: Method and Methodology*, Thomas M. Seebohm points out: "Hermes is the messenger of the gods, and thus he is the *hermeneus* of the gods. This etymology—like many others—rests on a mistake. The linguistic root for the name of the god is *herme,* the name for pyramids of stones belonging to an archaic cult." [20] In fact, in the *Dictionary of Greek*

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18   Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2013, p.195. [*GA*.2, SS.203-204.]

19   Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2013, pp.121-122. [*GA*.2, SS.117-118.]

20   Thomas M. Seebohm, *Hermeneutics: Method and Methodology*, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004, p.11.

Etymology (*Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*), Chantraine traces the name "Hermes" back to the "pillar" or the "pile of stones." It, however, does not resolve the etymological problem of "Hermes." Chantraine notes: "However, the existence of the pillar surmounted by the head of the god is much later than the name of the god. This analysis does not exclude an Aegean origin of the word, since ἕρμα, whatever its appearance is, is also devoid of etymology."[21]

More importantly, as a god, "Hermes" is not just "the messenger of the gods." He is also, at least, known as the "giver of good luck;" "god of all secret dealings, cunning, and stratagem;" "conductor of defunct spirits;" and "tutelary god of all arts, of traffic, markets, roads, and of heralds." Besides, "[h]is bust, mounted on a four-cornered pillar, was used to mark boundaries."[22] Even so, when connecting "hermeneutics" with "Hermes," Boeckh appears to relax the scientific rigor of philological or etymological analysis. He thus emphasizes disregarding the original significance (*Urbedeutung*) of "Hermes," who "probably belongs to the chthonic gods."[23] Likewise, Heidegger's more binding play cannot let us harken to the overtone of "ἑρμηνῆς εἰσιν τῶν θεῶν" in the *Ion* because his initial thinking has already pre-emptively downplayed the hybridity and polysemy of "Hermes" in terms of its origin and etymology. As a result, Heidegger is unable to shelter (*bergen*) its various signifieds *dispersive* in the form of stars (*étoilé*)[24] gathered under the single signifier "Hermes."

Moreover, when Heidegger further articulated the connection between their signifieds of "Hermes" and "ἑρμηνεύειν," his play of thinking, in fact, irretrievably fell into the play of signifiers. On the one hand, in ancient Greek itself, Heidegger could not help being tempted by the similarity of "Ἑρμῆς"

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21 Pierre Chantraine, dir., *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque: Histoire des mots*, Tome II, Paris: Éditions Klincksieck, 1970, p.374.

22 Cf. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, comps., *An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, p.315.

23 August Boeckh, *Encyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften*, Leipzig: Teubner, 1877, S.80.

24 For the French word "*étoilé*" borrowed from Roland Barthes, see his book *S/Z*, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1970, p.20.

and "ἑρμηνεύειν" to resort to the methods of "explaining a character/word solely by its written form" (望 文 生 训 , *wang wen sheng xun*) and "deriving meaning from sound" (因 声 求 义 , *yin sheng qiu yi*); on the other hand, in the interlingual transcoding between ancient Greek and modern German, only if Heidegger translated "ἑρμηνῆς" as "*Botschafter*" (messengers), he could *naturally* metamorphose the poet into the messenger of gods in order to more *bindingly* link poet, messenger, interpreter, and Hermes together. However, in the previously cited *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, "ἑρμηνῆς" from the same passage in the *Ion* is translated by Heidegger as "*Sprecher*" (spokespersons) rather than "*Botschafter*" (messengers). Besides "spokesperson," "*Sprecher*" in German also carries a broad semantic range, including speaker, newsreader, narrator, interpreter. Therefore, Heidegger's play of thinking cannot ultimately establish semantic identity because there is no way for *Dasein,* being in the world of signs, to exhaust the intertextual abyss, not to mention that this intertextuality still operates in the overlapping space of interlingual transcoding between ancient Greek and modern German.

2. The Controversial Chinese Translations of Hermeneutics

As mentioned above, *within* the Hellenic cultural and linguistic context, Plato reversed the traditional meanings of the term "ἑρμηνεύς" in his dialogue between "Socrates" and "Ion." Similarly*, between* ancient Greek and modern German, the two cognate languages, Heidegger achieved a reversal of Plato's reversal by quotation, translation, and interpretation. Specifically, *Dasein,* akin to Hermes or a poet, is cast as "the messenger of the message." This raises an important question: what message is conveyed and interpreted by *Dasein*? For Heidegger, the message is none other than the "good news" (*Frohe Botschaft*) of *Sein*. Thus, while Heidegger's reversal of Plato's reversal adopts a stance oriented towards Pre-Socratic thoughts, it also subtly interweaves with Christian theology and the Hebrew culture from which it originated.

Furthermore, *among* the Chinese, German, and Greek, it seems to be also a kind of reversal of Heidegger's reversal that we translate the Greek word "ἑρμηνῆς" in his quotation of the *Ion* as "*daiyan ren*" (代言人 , spokespersons) in Chinese. According to Heidegger's *intended* meaning, "ἑρμηνῆς" should be translated as "interpreters," but such a rendering contradicts the specific context and rhetorical expression of the *Ion*. Translation never effortlessly transforms every concept, especially in the multilingual relationship that spans both "Ancients and Moderns" and "Chinese and Western." This is equally evident in the diverse Chinese translations of the term "hermeneutics."

The first introduction of the German term *Hermeneutik* into mainland Chinese academia may date back to the 1960s. It occurred with the publication of a Chinese version of Oskar Becker's book review in *Zhe Xue Yi Cong*, No. 9, 1963. The German title of this review is "Die Fragwürdigkeit der Transzendierung der ästhetischen Dimension der Kunst" (The Questionability of the Transcendence of Aesthetic Dimension of Art),[25] which discusses the first part of Gadamer's *Truth and Method*, i.e., the question of truth as it emerges in the experience of art. The Chinese version is an abridged translation by Shui Yangmu (水羊木), published just one year after the original version (1962) and three years after the first edition of *Truth and Method* (1960).[26]

However, if we attribute the first Chinese translation of *Hermeneutik* to "*quanshi xue*" (诠释学) and credit the first use of this Chinese term to this review, then its "emergence" in the Chinese context would appear somewhat coincidental. After all, Becker's review primarily discusses the transcendence of the aesthetic dimension of art, with little relevance to Western hermeneutics as a discipline. But,

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25   Oskar Becker, „Die Fragwürdigkeit der Transzendierung der ästhetischen Dimension der Kunst" (*H.-G. Gadamer: Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik.* Tübingen 1960. J. C. B. Mohr. XI, 486 S. Im Hinblick auf den I. Teil: *Freilegung der Wahrheitsfrage an der Erfahrung der Kunst.*), *Philosophische Rundschau*, Jahrgang 10 (1962) / Heft 3-4, SS.225-238.

26   Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik,* Tübingen: Mohr, 1960.

in Hong Handing's view, the Chinese translation "*quanshi xue*"（诠释学）is the most appropriate term for the discipline of hermeneutics. In the "Postscript" to his Chinese translation of *Truth and Method*, Hong Handing explains:

> The reason why modern and contemporary hermeneuticians adopted the ancient Greek word *Hermeneutik* as the name of this discipline is, I think, primarily to convey as much as possible the ancient ethos—especially the intellectual dispositions and thinking modes of the ancients. In ancient Chinese culture, a term that closely aligns with this concept is "*quanshi*"［诠释］. As early as the Tang dynasty, "*quanshi*"［诠释］was used to describe a form of learning focused on "detailed explanation and reasonable interpretation." …… Hence, I prefer the Chinese term "*quanshi xue*"［诠释学］, which is more elegant and profound than the other translations mentioned above.[27]

Additionally, Hong Handing also provides another reason for his adoption of "*quanshi xue*"（诠释学）. He argues: "Precisely considering that '*jieshi*'［解释］implies the explanatory mode of natural sciences, I think that my choice of '*quanshi xue*'［诠释学］to translate *Hermeneutik* can more effectively highlight the opposition between the explanatory method of natural sciences and the interpretative method of human sciences, i.e., scientific theory vs. hermeneutics."[28] This opposition should mainly derive from Wilhelm Dilthey, who points in his book *Ideas on Descriptive and Analytical Psychology* (*Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie*) that "we explain [*erklären*] nature, while we understand [*verstehen*] spiritual life."[29]

A fascinating phenomenon in cross-cultural translation is that native Chinese scholars engaged in the study of Western thought often consciously or

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27　洪汉鼎著：《译后记》，见于［德］伽达默尔著、洪汉鼎译：《真理与方法》，上海：上海译文出版社 1999 年版，第 959 页。

28　洪汉鼎著：《译后记》，见于［德］伽达默尔著、洪汉鼎译：《真理与方法》，上海：上海译文出版社 1999 年版，第 961 页。

29　Wilhelm Dilthey, *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie*, in *Wilhelm Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd.5, Stuttgart: Teubner, 1964, S.144.

unconsciously redefine Chinese concepts based on the distinctions present in the source language. In fact, the Chinese concepts "*jieshi*" (解 释) and "*lijie*" (理 解) do not fully encompass Dilthey's distinction between "explain" and "understand." As a result, the term "*jieshi xue*" (解 释 学) is not unacceptable in the Chinese context, nor would it generate the same confusion as it might in German. Furthermore, even in his entry on *Hermeneutik* quoted above, Gadamer himself doesn't draw a strict opposition between "explain" and "understand." Instead, he states that Hermes's "proclamation" is "the explanation [*Erklären*] of divine commands."

In the late 1990s, Peking University scholar Tang Yijie (汤 一 介) successively published five articles on establishing Chinese hermeneutics. In his second article, "Zai Lun Chuangjian Zhongguo Jieshi Xue Wenti" (再论创建中国解释学问题 , On the Establishment of Chinese Hermeneutics Again), Tang Yijie refers to the two Chinese translation terms, "*jieshi xue*" (解释学) and "*quanshi xue*" (诠释学). He notes: "He [Cheng Chung-Ying, 成中英] also suggests me to translate 'Hermeneutics' into '*quanshi xue*' [诠 释 学]. That is a good idea. But, because all I use in my previous articles is '*jieshi xue*' [解释学] and many contemporary scholars still use '*jieshi xue*' [解释学], I decide to use it the way I used to."[30] In some of his later articles, however, Tang Yijie began to use the term "*quanshi xue*" (诠 释 学).[31] This suggests that, even for the same scholar, a translation term is by no means irreplaceable.

The emergence of the Chinese translation term "*jieshi xue*" (解 释 学) may be from the article "He Wei 'Jieshi Xue'?" (何谓"解释学"? , What is Hermeneutics?) by Wilhelm Raimund Beyer, translated by Yan Hongyuan (燕 宏远) and published in *Zhe Xue Yi Cong*, No. 5, 1979. This article is also an entry on *Hermeneutik*, written for the *Philosophical Dictionary* (*Philosophisches*

30　汤一介著：《再论创建中国解释学问题》，《中国社会科学》2000 年第 1 期，第 83 页。

31　参见汤一介著：《儒学与经典诠释》，《北京大学学报》（哲学社会科学版）2010 年第 4 期，第 5-12 页。

Wörterbuch, 1964) edited by Georg Klaus and Manfred Buhr.[32] After that, *Zhe Xue Yi Cong*, No. 3, 1986, published a special issue on German philosophical hermeneutics. In the "Editor's Note," the editor emphasizes: "It is not feasible to impose the translation of terminology in all contributions of this issue to unity. Even the name of this discipline itself ('*jieshi xue*' [解释学], '*quanshi xue*' [诠释学], '*shiyi xue*' [释义学]) has not been standardized. Given the differences in linguistic, intellectual, and cultural contexts between Chinese and Western traditions, we should exercise caution when attempting to establish word-for-word correspondences in translation. It would be beneficial to continue researching and deliberating on this for some time."[33] It is particularly noteworthy here that the editor does not mention the translation term "*chanshi xue*"（阐释学）in the context of philosophical hermeneutics.

The use of "*chanshi xue*"（阐释学）as a translation term predates the special issue on German philosophical hermeneutics. In 1983, Zhang Longxi（张隆溪）used this term in his article "Shi Wu Da Gu"（诗无达诂, Non-Thoroughgoing Exegesis of Poetry).[34] In the "Preface to the Chinese Version" of his book *The Tao and the Logos*, Zhang Longxi explains why he adopts *chanshi xue*（阐释学）as the Chinese translation of hermeneutics:

The term *chanshi xue* [阐释学] is the Chinese translation of the German term *Hermeneutik* or the English term hermeneutics. Besides, the Chinese translations also include "*jieshi xue*" [解释学], "*quanshi xue*" [诠释学], "*jiejing xue*" [解经学], and so on. While the sense of *jieshi xue* [解释学] is definite, I consider it too general to be a terminology. Since there is a definite difference between this term and the common word "explanation" in the source language, the Chinese translation should also differentiate between them. It appears that *quanshi xue* [诠释学] is too

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32   Wilhelm Raimund Beyer, „Hermeneutik", in Georg Klaus und Manfred Buhr, hrsg., *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*, Bd.1, Leipzig: VEB Bibliographisches Institut, 1964, SS.473-475.

33   《〈德国哲学解释学专辑〉编辑说明》，《哲学译丛》1986 年第 3 期，第 1 页。

34   参见张隆溪著：《诗无达诂》，《文艺研究》1983 年第 4 期，第 13-17 页。

focused on the gloss of Chinese characters [文字训诂 , *wen zi xun gu*] to convey the broader meanings of the term in Western languages. The sense of *jiejing xue* [解经学] is too narrow. Although hermeneutics originated from the interpretation of Christian scriptures and classical works, it should not be limited to this type of interpretation. All demonstrate that *chanshi xue* [阐 释 学] is the most suitable translation term because it can encompass the various meanings of other terms and distinguish itself from common words such as *jieshi* [解释] and *quanshi* [诠释].[35]

However, Zhang Longxi's defense of the translation term *chanshi xue* (阐 释 学) remains unpersuasive. If *jieshi* (解 释) in *jieshi xue* (解 释 学) should not be understood in its everyday sense, the same principle should be able to apply to *chanshi* (阐释) in *chanshi xue* (阐释学). Moreover, it is particularly inappropriate and misleading to consider *chanshi* (阐 释) as a form of interpretation of literary texts after the ontological turn of Western hermeneutics. It is equally groundless that Zhang Longxi restricts the meaning of *quanshi* (诠 释) only to the gloss of Chinese characters. Neither etymological sources nor the titles of canonical exegesis works support the claim that *quan* (诠) solely denotes the gloss of Chinese characters.

In addition, the statement that *chanshi xue* (阐 释 学) "can encompass the various meanings of other terms" is untenable. Given that *jieshi* (解 释) has a broader semantic range, one may ask why *jieshi xue* (解 释 学) could not, in turn, encompass the meanings of *chanshi* (阐释) and *quanshi* (诠释). Zhang Longxi's insistence on the term *chanshi xue* (阐释学) stems from Qian Zhongshu's (钱钟书) translation and use. In his book *Guan Zhui Bian* (管锥编 , *Limited Views*), Qian Zhongshu refers to the question "*chanshi zhi xunhuan*" (阐释之循环 , *der hermeneutische Zirkel*)[36] when discussing *pu xue* (朴 学 , textual criticism)

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35 张隆溪著：《中译本序》，见于张隆溪著、冯川译：《道与逻各斯》，成都：四川人民出版社 1998 年版，第 3 页。

36 参见钱钟书著：《管锥编》（第一册），北京：中华书局 1979 年版，第 171 页；《管锥编》（第五册），北京：中华书局 1994 年版，第 146 页。

during the Qian-Jia period.[37] Qian Zhongshu's translation and use case, however, do not constitute a compelling rationale for privileging *chanshi xue*（阐释学） over other translation terms. Moreover, despite its broad scope, *Guan Zhui Bian* remains within the realm of literary interpretation and criticism.

Recently, Zhang Jiang（张江）has been discussing the meanings of "*chan*"（阐）, "*quan*"（诠）, "*li*"（理）, "*xing*"（性）, "*jie*"（解）, "*shi*"（释）, "*yan*"（衍）, "*sheng*"（生）, and other Chinese characters under his framework of the "publicness of interpretation"（*chanshi de gonggong xing*, 阐释的公共性）. However, it is striking that while emphasizing the importance of publicness and openness, he makes such a dogmatic statement: "It is necessary and sufficient to choose and designate '*chanshi xue*'［阐释学］—neither '*quanshi xue*'［诠释学］ nor '*jieshi xue*'［解释学］—as the general term of contemporary Chinese hermeneutics."[38] To get to his so-called necessity and sufficiency, Zhang Jiang constructs a closed conceptual hierarchy among Chinese terms and concludes:

In brief, *shi*［释, to explain］originates from *jie*［解, to dissect］and becomes its own by dividing; *quan*［诠, to interpret］begins with *jie*［解］and justifies itself by *gu*［诂, to gloss］; *quan*［诠］must generate *chan*［阐, to explicate］and thus manifest meanings. *Jie*［解］is dividing, *quan*［诠］is justifying, *chan*［阐］ is developing. The whole process and ultimate goal of *chan*［阐］are from *jie*［解］ to *quan*［诠］and from *quan*［诠］to *chan*［阐］. *Chan*［阐］originates from *jie* ［解］and *quan*［诠］, as well as completes them. "*Chanshi*"［阐释］should be the basic concept of contemporary hermeneutics.[39]

To highlight the central position of the term *chanshi* (阐释), Zhang Jiang actually employs a discursive strategy similar to that of Zhang Longxi. Specifically, he downplays the term *quanshi* (诠释) by reducing it to a mere glossing of Chinese

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37　参见张隆溪著：《中译本序》，见于张隆溪著、冯川译：《道与逻各斯》，成都：四川人民出版社 1998 年版，第 3-4 页。

38　张江著：《"解""释"辨》，《社会科学战线》2019 年第 1 期，第 1 页。

39　张江著：《"解""释"辨》，《社会科学战线》2019 年第 1 期，第 12 页。

characters. It drives him to drift further and further down the path of criticism and interpretation of literary texts, ultimately collapsing the rich and multifaceted dimensions of Western hermeneutics into the adventures of a soul with "forced interpretation" (*qiangzhi chanshi*, 强制阐释 —Zhang Jiang's term) in masterpieces.

By contrast, Zhang Rulun（张 汝 伦）, a specialist in Western philosophy, approached hermeneutics directly from the perspective of ontology rather than literary interpretation as early as the 1980s. In his article, "Lijie: Lishi Xing Yu Yuyan Xing—Zhe Xue Shiyi Xue Jianshu"（理解：历史性与语言性 —— 哲学释义学简述, Understanding: Historicity and Linguality—A Brief Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics), Zhang Rulun argues: "From the Heidegger's view, understanding is not a research method or technique, nor a behavior way of subject, but originally the existential way of human being in the world. Therefore, hermeneutics should not be viewed as a methodology in itself; rather, it seeks to delve into methodologies to reveal their foundations."[40] Consequently, philosophical hermeneutics is by no means a method or technique employed solely in textual interpretation; rather, it designates understanding and interpretation as a fundamental mode of existence.

In this regard, Zhang Rulun asserts that "*shiyi xue*"（释义学）is the most suitable translation for "hermeneutics." In the preface's note of his book *Yiyi De Tanjiu—Dangdai Xifang Shiyi Xue*（意义的探究——当代西方释义学, *The Studies of Meaning: Contemporary Western Hermeneutics*), Zhang Rulun elaborates on his choice of *shiyi xue*（释义学）: "Precisely because hermeneutics is the study of understanding and interpretation of meanings, I believe that *shiyi xue* [释义学] better captures the essence of hermeneutics than alternatives such as *jieshi xue* [解释学], *chanshi xue* [阐释学], or *quanshi xue* [诠释学]."[41]

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40 张汝伦著：《理解：历史性与语言性——哲学释义学简述》，《复旦学报》（社会科学版）1984 年第 6 期，第 37 页。

41 张汝伦著：《引言》，见于张汝伦著：《意义的探究——当代西方释义学》，沈阳：辽宁人民出版社 1986 年版，第 2 页。

Admittedly, the translation term "*shiyi xue*" (释义学) highlights the concept of "meaning," because the word "*shiyi*" combines "*shi*" (释, to explain) and "*yi*" (义, meaning). However, other translation terms, such as "*quanshi xue*" (诠释学), "*jieshi xue*" (解释学), and "*chanshi xue*" (阐释学), while not including the character for "meaning" (*yi*, 义), still focus on the study of understanding and interpretation of meanings. Notably, Zhang Rulun also used the term "*jieshi xue*" (解释学) in his article titled "Jieshi Xue Zai Ershi Shiji" (解释学在二十世纪, Hermeneutics in the 20th Century).[42]

In fact, the translation term "*shiyi xue*" (释义学) was not coined by Zhang Rulun. Its earliest emergence can be dated back to a Chinese translation of a Japanese article titled "Gei Cunzai Gainian Zhuru Xin De Yiyi (Ping Aotuo Beigela Bian *Shiyi Xue De Genben Wenti*)" (给存在概念注入新的意义 [评奥托·倍格拉编《释义学的根本问题》], The New Meanings Given to the Concept of Being [A Review of *Hermeneutic Philosophy* Edited by Otto Pöggeler]). This article, written by Takeuchi Yoshitomo, was published in the *Asahi Weekly* on April 14, 1978. Its abridged Chinese version was translated by Guo Yueyue (郭越悦) and appeared in *Guowai Shehui Kexue Zhuzuo Tiyao* (国外社会科学著作提要, *Outline of Foreign Social Science Works*), No. 2, 1980. It remains unclear why the Japanese translator rendered Otto Pöggeler's German title, "Hermeneutische Philosophie" (Hermeneutic Philosophy), as "解釈学の根本問題" (The Fundamental Problem of Hermeneutics). Similarly, the reason Guo Yueyue translated the Japanese term "解釈学" as "释义学" (*shiyi xue*) instead of the more literal translation "解释学" (*jieshi xue*) has not yet been explained.

All in all, the "sources" and "emergences" of the four Chinese translation terms discussed above reveal that some of them are not only "forcedly original" *within* the single context of the target language but also full of coincidence, dislocation, mixing, and overlap, making them difficult to be clarified *among* the

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42　张汝伦著：《解释学在二十世纪》，《国外社会科学》1996 年第 5 期，第 20-26 页。

cross-cultural and interlingual settings. Then, let us, against this background, return to a relatively closed but still complex context of ancient Chinese. Here we may investigate the intricate genealogy of the character "*quan*" (诠 , to interpret).

3. The Meaning *Dispersion* of "*Quan*" (诠)

Within the Semiotic Network of Chinese Characters[43]

In *Ji Yun* (集 韵 , *Collected Rhymes*), the character "*quan*" (诠) is defined with three meanings: "*Shuowen Jiezi* [说 文 解 字 , *Explaining Graphs and Analyzing Characters*] explains it as *ju* [具 , to lay out]; another explanation is *ze yan* [择言 , to select words]; yet another one is *jie yu* [解 喻 , to explicate and instruct]."[44] The complete explanation in *Shuowen Jiezi* is that "*quan* [诠], [means] *ju* [具], [is] from *yan* [言 , speech], with the sound of *quan* [全 , whole/entire]."[45] This demonstrates that the "*quan*" (诠) is a phono-semantic compound character (*xing sheng zi*, 形声字), consisting of a semantic radical *yan* (言) and a phonetic component *quan* (全). *Shuowen Jiezi* also states: "*Ju* [具], [means] *gongzhi* [共 置 , to accommodate/to collect], [is] from *gong* [廾 , which looks like two hands holding something up], and from simplified *bei* [贝 / 貝 , seashell]. In ancient times, seashells were a kind of currency."[46] Thus, "*ju*" (具) is an associative compound character (*hui yi zi*, 会意字), signifying the act of presenting a valuable object—such as a seashell—with both hands.

In his book *Shuowen Xin Zheng* (说 文 新 证 , *The New Evidences of Shuowen*), however, Ji Xusheng (季旭昇) believes that the character *ju* (具) is intractable in its origin of configuration. He explains that, in the archaic forms of *ju* (具), there are either from *bei* (贝 / 貝), such as 🐚, 🐚, 🐚, or from *ding* (鼎 , three-

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43 For the French concept "*dispersion*," see Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire," in Suzanne Bachelard, et al, *Hommage à Jean Hyppolite*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971, p.152.

44 ［宋］丁度等编：《集韵》（上册），上海：上海古籍出版社 1985 年影印上海图书馆藏述古堂影宋钞本，第 169 页。

45 ［汉］许慎撰：《说文解字》，北京：中华书局 1978 年影印清同治十二年陈昌治刻本，第 53 页。

46 ［汉］许慎撰：《说文解字》，北京：中华书局 1978 年影印清同治十二年陈昌治刻本，第 59 页。

legged bronze caldron), such as 鼎, 鼎, 鼎.[47] Guo Moruo (郭 沫 若) contends that the component *ding* (鼎) in *ju* (具) is a wrong variation of *bei* (贝 / 貝). However, Ji Xusheng disagrees with Guo's assessment, noting that both forms of *ju* (具) appeared almost simultaneously.[48] More importantly, he asserts that it is only from the component *ding* (鼎) that *ju* (具) can convey the meaning of "accommodate" (*gongzhi*, 共置), i.e., "to accommodate guests with three-legged bronze cauldrons full of food."[49] Ji Xusheng's opinion aligns with Duan Yucai's (段玉裁) explanation in his *Shuowen Jiezi Zhu* (说文解字注 , *The Annotations on Shuowen Jiezi*), where he states: "*Gong* [共 , to collect] and *gong* [供 , to supply] are the archaic and contemporary forms of the same character. *Gong* [共] should be read as *gong* [供] with the radical *ren* [人 , human]."[50]

Notably, Xu Shen (许 慎), the author of *Shuowen Jiezi*, and Duan Yucai explain the character *gong* (共) based on its form of small seal script "𦥑". *Shuowen Jiezi* states: "*Gong* [共], [means] *tong* [同 , to gather], [is] from *nian* [廿 , twenty] and *gong* [廾]."[51] Duan's annotation is that "*nian* [廿], [means] the assemblage of twenty; *tong* [同] can be understood as twenty people all holding their hands up."[52] Similar to *ju* (具), the character *gong* (共) also has two archaic forms. The first form includes 𦥑,[53] 𦥑, 𦥑,[54] and so on. The small seal script of the *gong* (共) likely originated from this form. Guo Moruo points out: "Rong Geng [容 庚] says that 'holding a utensil up with two hands, it resembles the posture of making offerings.' What kind of utensil is held? It is also vaguely indicated

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47　参见季旭昇撰：《说文新证》（上册），台北：艺文印书馆 2004 年版，第 162-163 页。

48　季旭昇撰：《说文新证》（上册），台北：艺文印书馆 2004 年版，第 163 页。

49　季旭昇撰：《说文新证》（上册），台北：艺文印书馆 2004 年版，第 163 页。

50　［汉］许慎撰、［清］段玉裁注：《说文解字注》，上海：上海古籍出版社 1981 年影印经韵楼藏版，第 104 页。

51　［汉］许慎撰：《说文解字》，北京：中华书局 1978 年影印清同治十二年陈昌治刻本，第 59 页。

52　［汉］许慎撰、［清］段玉裁注：《说文解字注》，上海：上海古籍出版社 1981 年影印经韵楼藏版，第 105 页。

53　中国科学院考古研究所编辑：《甲骨文编》，北京：中华书局 1965 年版，第 104 页。

54　容庚编著，张振林、马国权摹补：《金文编》，北京：中华书局 1985 年版，第 164 页。

without specific reference."[55] According to Guo's explanation, *nian* (廿) in *gong* (共) is not "twenty" but "an image of utensil." Hence, from their configurations, the original meanings of *gong* (共) and *ju* (具) are very similar: the former is to hold a utensil up with two hands; the latter is to hold a three-legged bronze caldron or seashell up with two hands. *Er Ya* (尔雅) also states that "*gong* [供], *zhi* [峙], *gong* [共], [mean] *ju* [具]."[56]

The second archaic form of the character *gong* (共) mainly includes 𝆃 and 𝆃 .[57] This form looks like holding two similar things up with two hands, but there is still no specific reference to what kind of things they are. Compared with the first form, the meaning conveyed by the second one is closer to the character *tong* (同), used as a mutual explanation with *gong* (共) in *Shuowen Jiezi*, which also states that "*tong* [同] , [means] *he hui* [合会 , to collect and assemble]."[58] So, it would make sense that Duan Yucai explains the character *nian* (廿) in *gong* (共) as "the assemblage of twenty" because it is difficult to recognize the meaning of "collecting and assembling" if considering *nian* (廿) an image of utensil.

Therefore, the term *gongzhi* (共 置) should not be understood merely as "accommodating guests" (*gongzhi*, 供置), which originates from the first form of *gong* (共). According to the second form, however, *gongzhi* (共 置) can also signify "collecting" or "placing together." These two meanings need not be explained through an evolutionary sequence in which one develops from the other, because they can be considered symbiotic. Accommodating guests involves preparing and collecting food and utensils, and this preparation and collecting is also to accommodate guests. Perhaps it is precisely through this specific way of collecting food and utensils for hosting that *gong* (共) acquires its broader or more abstract sense of "collection."

55　郭沫若著：《金文丛考》，北京：人民出版社 1954 年版，第 231 页。

56　［晋］郭璞注、［宋］邢昺疏：《尔雅注疏》，见于《十三经注疏》（下册），北京：中华书局 1980 年影印世界书局阮元校刻本，第 2576 页中栏。

57　容庚编著，张振林、马国权摹补：《金文编》，北京：中华书局 1985 年版，第 165 页。

58　［汉］许慎撰：《说文解字》，北京：中华书局 1978 年影印清同治十二年陈昌治刻本，第 156 页。

In the same way, because of the symbiotic relationship, there is also no need to argue that the component *ding* (鼎) in *ju* (具) is a mistaken variation of *bei* (贝 / 貝) or vice versa. Whether *ding* (鼎) or *bei* (贝 / 貝), they are only the most representative components of *ju* (具) in the simultaneous network of archaic Chinese characters, which can be both coexistent and interchangeable. In the Saussurean sense, anything held up with hands can displace *ding* (鼎) or *bei* (贝 / 貝) in *ju* (具). It is even possible to imagine interchangeablity between the things held up in *ju* (具) and *gong* (共) for as two signifiers, both of them are only "the differences *without positive terms*" (des différences *sans termes positifs*).[59] As to the specific signified of *ju* (具) or *gong* (共), it is also a kind of *convention* based on mutual explanation in Saussurean framework.

The differences in the origin of the configuration of *ju* (具) or *gong* (共) are not unique cases. It is worth noting that the archaic forms of any Chinese character are never singular but rather exist as a multiplicity. The idea of a single, ideal configuration is merely *a posteriori* abstraction. When we seek the "original meaning" of Chinese characters, are we attempting to recover a pre-determined "identity," or are we acknowledging the proliferation of uncontrollable "differences"? Should we instead embrace the *dispersion* of "original meanings" that can be interchangeable and coexistent within these differences?

Additionally, the generation of meaning for Chinese characters encompasses not only the coexistence of differences in space but also temporal evolution and semantic proliferation—two dimensions that are always intertwined. Wang Yun's (王筠) *Shuowen Jiezi Shi Li* (说文释例 , *Explanatory Examples for Shuowen Jiezi*) explains: "The entry for *ju* [具] states *gongzhi* [共置] and the entry for *ju* [俱] states *xie* [偕 , together] .... It can be known that the things accommodated must not be of a single kind. Therefore, by extension, the meaning of *jie* [皆 , all] can be derived."[60] However, as noted above, the second archaic form of *gong* (共)

59   Ferdinand de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale*, Paris: Éditions Payot & Rivages, 1995, p.166.

60   ［清］王筠撰：《说文释例》，北京：中华书局 1987 年影印道光三十年刻本，第 184 页。

originally means "to collect." So, there is no need for a roundabout derivation by "the things accommodated."

Since the meaning of *jie* (皆, all) can be derived from *ju* (具), Wang Yun further points out that the character *quan* (全) in *quan* (诠) functions not only as a phonetic component but also as a semantic one in his *Shuowen Jiezi Ju Dou* (说文句读, *Preliminary Annotations on Shuowen Jiezi*).[61] However, the *Song Ben Yu Pian* (宋本玉篇) also mentions: "*quan* [全], … [means] *ju* [具] or *wan* [完, whole/complete]."[62] And because *yan* (言) is the semantic radical of *quan* (诠), *ju* (具) can be further explained as *ju shuo* (具说, to interpret in detail). So, in his book *Shuowen Jiezi Yi Zheng* (说文解字义证, *Exegetical Proofs on Shuowen Jiezi*), Gui Fu (桂馥) states that "*quan* [诠], [means] *ju* [具], i.e., to fully interpret the principles of matters [*ju shuo shi li*, 具说事理]" by an indirect quotation of *Zi Lin* (字林, *Forest of Chinese Characters*).[63] This interpretation likely serves as the source of Hong Handing's explanation of *quanshi* (诠释), a learning focused on "detailed explanation and reasonable interpretation."

According to *Ji Yun*, the second meaning of *quan* (诠) is *ze yan* (择言, to select words). Quoting from *Tongsu Wen* (通俗文, *Popular Characters*), Qian Dian (钱坫) also explains in his *Shuowen Jiezi Jiao Quan* (说文解字斠诠, *The Collative Annotations on Shuowen Jiezi*): "To select words is to interpret [*ze yan yue quan*, 择言曰诠]."[64] The entry for *zhuan* (顨) in *Shuowen Jiezi* explains it as *xuan ju* (选 / 選具),[65] which means "to select and collect" (*xuanze er gongzhi*, 选 / 選择而共置), as Duan Yucai annotates. He further notes: "*Zhuan* [顨], [means] *ju* [具]; *xun* [巽], [means] *ju* [具]…. *Yu Pian* [玉篇] states that the archaic form of *zhuan* [顨] is *xuan* [选 / 選]…. The parallel of *ye* [頁] and

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61　［清］王筠撰集：《说文句读》卷 5，北京：北京市中国书店 1983 年影印 1882 年尊经书局刊本，第 11 页 b。

62　［南朝梁］顾野王撰、［唐］孙强增字、［宋］陈彭年等重修：《宋本玉篇》，北京：中国书店 1983 年影印张氏泽存堂本，第 296 页。

63　［清］桂馥撰：《说文解字义证》，上海：上海古籍出版社 1987 年影印清连筠簃丛书本，第 198 页。

64　［清］钱坫撰：《说文解字斠诠》卷 3，清嘉庆十二年钱氏吉金乐石斋刻本，第 10 页 b。

65　［汉］许慎撰：《说文解字》，北京：中华书局 1978 年影印清同治十二年陈昌治刻本，第 184 页。

ye [頁] is the meaning of *ju* [具]."[66] Besides, *xun* (巽) also means *ju* (具).[67] It establishes a chain of mutual explanation among *zhuan* (顨), *xun* (巺), *xun* (巽), and *ju* (具). The configuration of the first three characters resembles the second archaic form of *gong* (共), symbolizing the holding up of two similar things. Therefore, *xun* (巽) in the character *xuan* (选 / 選) is both a semantic and phonetic component. *Shuowen Jiezi* states: "*Xuan* [选 / 選], [means] *qian* [遣 , to release], from *chuo* [辵] and *xun* [巽].… *Xun* [巽] is also the phonetic component. Another explanation of *xuan* [选 / 選] is *ze* [择 , to select]."[68] Thus, the character *ju* (具) connotes both "collecting" and "selecting," as any act of collection inherently involves selection, and vice versa. Based on the meanings of *ju* (具) and the semantic radical *yan* (言), *quan* (诠) can be understood as "selecting words and collecting them" (*ze yan er gongzhi*, 择言而共置).

In *Jing Yi Kao* (经义考 , *Textual Research on the Confucian Canons*), Zhu Yizun (朱彝尊) cites the words of Deng Bogao (邓伯羔), author of *Gu Yi Quan* (古易诠 , *The Interpretations of Yi by Ancient Scholars*) and *Jin Yi Quan* (今易诠 , *The Interpretations of Yi by Contemporary Scholars*). Deng states: "*Quan* [诠], [means] *ju* [具] and *ze yan* [择言]. They [my works] not only record and collect interpretations from ancient and contemporary scholars but also select and discriminate from good and flawed insights. I humbly dedicate myself to interpreting the Confucian Canons through my efforts in transmitting."[69] Zhu Yizun admires Deng Bogao for his ability to "select the good to preserve and collect the differences to unify" (*ze shan er zhi*, *he yi er tong*, 择善而执，合异而同).[70] In this sense, Zhu's admiration can convey the third meaning of *quan* (诠), namely, "to explicate and instruct" (*jie yu*, 解喻). *Yiqie Jing Yin Yi* (一切经音

66　［汉］许慎撰、［清］段玉裁注：《说文解字注》，上海：上海古籍出版社 1981 年影印经韵楼藏版，第 422 页。

67　［汉］许慎撰：《说文解字》，北京：中华书局 1978 年影印清同治十二年陈昌治刻本，第 99 页。

68　［汉］许慎撰：《说文解字》，北京：中华书局 1978 年影印清同治十二年陈昌治刻本，第 40 页。

69　［清］朱彝尊撰：《经义考》卷 58，光绪二十三年浙江书局刊本，第 5 页 b。

70　［清］朱彝尊撰：《经义考》卷 58，光绪二十三年浙江书局刊本，第 5 页 b。

义 , *Phonetic and Semantic Annotations on All Sutras*) also states: "*Quan* [诠] means to *xian le yi* [显了义 , manifest meanings]."[71]

It is precisely through the integration of these three meanings of *quan* (诠) that the *Huainan Zi* (淮南子) provides the explanation:

"Sayings Interpreted" [*quan yan*, 诠 言] provides the means by which to collect through analogy the significances of human affairs and explicate through instruction the substance of order and disorder. It selects and ranks the hidden meanings of subtle sayings, interpreting them with texts that reflect ultimate principles. Thus it patches up and mends deficiencies due to errors and oversights. [诠言者，所以譬类人事之指，解喻治乱之体也；差择微言之眇，诠以至理之文，而补缝过失之阙者也。][72]

Gao You (高 诱) introduces the fourth meaning of *quan* (诠) in his annotations on *Huainan Zi*. He states: "*Quan* [诠], [means] *jiu* [就 , to approach]. It refers to articulating the representations of all things by approach to their significances, as well as what the matters mean and what the Way relies upon. Therefore, this is what is called sayings interpreted. [诠，就也。就万物之指以言其征。事之所谓，道之所依也，故曰诠言。]"[73] However, the original meaning of *jiu* (就) is *gao* (高 , high), according to *Shuowen Jiezi*.[74] Hence, Gao You's explanation of *quan* (诠) with *jiu* (就) should have taken into account its derivative meanings. *Guang Yun* (广 韵 , *Revised and Expanded Rhymes*) states that "*jiu* [就], [means] *cheng* [成 , to accomplish], *ying* [迎 , to meet], and *ji* [即 , to be near]."[75]

71　［唐］释元应撰，［清］庄炘、钱坫、孙星衍校：《一切经音义》，上海：商务印书馆 1936 年影印海山仙馆丛书本，第 1063 页。

72　［汉］刘安撰，［汉］高诱注、［清］庄逵吉校：《淮南子》，见于《二十二子》，上海：上海古籍出版社 1986 年缩印浙江书局汇刻本，第 1307 页上栏。

The translation is referenced from an English version, with slight modifications. See Liu An (King of Huainan), *The Huainanzi: A Guide to the Theory and Practice of Government in Early Han China*, trans. and eds., John S. Major, et al, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p.855.

73　［汉］刘安撰，［汉］高诱注、［清］庄逵吉校：《淮南子》，见于《二十二子》，上海：上海古籍出版社 1986 年缩印浙江书局汇刻本，第 1270 页下栏。

74　［汉］许慎撰：《说文解字》，北京：中华书局 1978 年影印清同治十二年陈昌治刻本，第 111 页。

75　［汉］许慎撰、［清］段玉裁注：《说文解字注》，上海：上海古籍出版社 1981 年影印经韵楼藏版，第 229 页。

Up to this point, we have carried out multi-dimensional interpretations of the dispersive meanings of *quan* (诠) within the semiotic network of Chinese characters. However, it is impossible to capture its entirety, as omissions and gaps inevitably mark the process. This limitation applies to any understanding and interpretation. Although the original intention of "selecting words and collecting them" is to achieve "accomplishment" (*cheng*, 成), "manifestation" (*xian*, 显), "wholeness" (*quan*, 全), and "completeness" (*wan*, 完), it will always leave space for supplementing and margin for patching.

4. The Meaning Connections of *Quan* (诠) with Λόγος and *Auslegen*

Across Multiple Interlingual Boundaries

We still need to expound further that representing dispersive meanings of *quan* (诠) is by no means to (re-)construct its origin, center, or ultimate position within the semiotic network of Chinese characters to dominate other Chinese hermeneutical concepts, such as *chan* (阐), *jie* (解), *shi* (释), and so on. The emphasis on *quan* (诠) arises not from any intrinsic linguistic superiority within the Chinese language itself, but from a reflexive examination shaped by its positioning across multiple interlingual boundaries. Therefore, the cross-cultural connections between the meanings of the Chinese character *quan* (诠) and the ancient Greek word λόγος, as well as the German word *auslegen*, should be regarded as tentative, transitory, and ultimately replaceable. Essentially, there is no commensurability among various languages. Yet, through the coincidental dispersions of meaning in each linguistic system, an implicit connection may momentarily emerge.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger discusses the uses of λόγος by Plato and Aristotle:

As Plato knew, this unity lies in the fact that the *λόγος* is always *λόγος τινός*. In the *λόγος* an entity is manifest, and with a view to this entity, the words are

put together [*zusammengesetzt*] in one verbal whole. Aristotle saw this more radically: every λόγος is both σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις, not just the one (call it 'affirmative judgment') or the other (call it 'negative judgment'). Rather, every assertion, whether it affirms or denies, whether it is true or false, is σύνθεσις *and* διαίρεσις equiprimordially.[76]

The verb form of the Greek noun "σύνθεσις" is "συντίθημι," which combines the preposition "σύν" (along with or together with) and the verb "τίθημι" (to set or put), and its original meaning is "to place or put together."[77] Heidegger's use of the German word "*zusammengesetzt*" in the cited text aims to emphasize this connotation of "λόγος." This meaning also coincides with the Chinese term *quan* (诠) in its successive explanations (*di xun*, 递训). Specifically, *quan* (诠) means *ju* (具), which in turn means *gongzhi* (共置 , to collect or place together).

Besides, the second meaning of *quan* (诠) in *Ji Yun* is "selecting (words)," which is also implicit in the meanings of διαίρεσις. The verb form of διαίρεσις is διαιρέω, which combines the adverb "δίς" (twice) and the verb "αἱρέω" (take) and thus means "to take apart."[78] In addition to its active voice meaning of "to take with the hand," the middle voice of "αἱρέω" conveys the meaning of "to choose."[79] Since "choosing" or "selecting" can be understood as both "taking apart" and "collecting," the Greek term "λόγος" can also be interpreted as "selecting words and collecting them" (*zeyan er gongzhi*, 择言而共置), drawing from the meanings of the Chinese character *quan* (诠). Furthermore, the middle

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76   Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2013, p.201. [*GA*.2, S.211.]

77   Cf. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, comps., *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, p.1727.

78   Cf. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, comps., *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, p.395.

79   Cf. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, comps., *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, pp.41-42.

voice meaning of "διαιρέω" is "to interpret."[80] This suggests that any act of interpreting entails a kind of separation or analysis, which aligns with the Chinese character *jie* (解) in *jie yu* (解喻) or *quan jie* (诠解). Through the Greek word διαιρέω, we can further understand the close relation between *quan* (诠) and *jie* (解) in Chinese hermeneutic thought.

Back to ancient Greek, various semantic directions of λόγος, such as "synthesis/collection," "analysis/selection," and "interpretation/elucidation," can all be traced back to its verbal form, "λέγειν." In his article "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)" („Logos [Heraklit, Fragment 50]"), Heidegger provides a phenomenological description or reduction of the original meanings of λόγος and λέγειν. He points out first: "Since antiquity the Λόγος of Heraclitus has been interpreted in various ways: as *Ratio*, as *Verbum*, as cosmic law, as the logical, as necessity in thought, as meaning and as reason."[81] From Heidegger's view, however, the "reason to be the standard for deeds and omissions" forgets its "essential origin [*Wesensherkunft*]." So, he urges us to "pay heed to the Λόγος and follow its initial unfolding."[82] Heidegger considers that although λέγειν is commonly understood as "to talk" (*reden*) or "to say" (*sagen*), its more original (*ursprünglicher*) meaning is "what our similarly sounding [*gleichlautendes*] *legen* means: to lay down and lay before [*nieder- und vorlegen*]."[83] He further explains: "In *legen* a 'bringing together' [*Zusammenbringen*] prevails, the Latin *legere* understood as *lesen*, in the sense of collecting and bringing together. λέγειν properly means the laying-down and laying-before which gathers itself and

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80   Cf. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, comps., *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, p.395.

81   Martin Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)," in Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, p.60. [*GA*.7, S.214.]

82   Martin Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)," in Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, p.60. [*GA*.7, S.214.]

83   Martin Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)," in Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, p.60. [*GA*.7, S.214.]

others [*das sich und anderes sammelnde Nieder- und Vorlegen*]."[84]

In Ancient Greek, λέγειν can convey various meanings such as "to lay," "to pick up," "to gather," "to choose," "to pick out," and "to recite."[85] The Latin verb *legere* is a transcription of λέγειν and shares many similar meanings. However, in its own language system, *legere* has further developed additional connotations such as "to remove," "to take away," "to wind up," and "to traverse."[86] Coincidentally, the English words "col-lect" and "se-lect" also derive from *legere*, whose perfect passive participle is *lectus*. As for the German verb "*lesen*," its most common meaning is "to read" or "to read aloud," but it can also mean "to pick" and "to gather," reflecting its etymological roots in *legere* and λέγειν.[87]

Heidegger further asks this question: "How does the proper sense [*der eigentliche Sinn*] of λέγειν, to lay, come to mean saying and talking?"[88] The way of "coming to mean," for him, is undoubtedly phenomenological; however, its interconnection occurs necessarily *through* the chain of successive explanations among signifiers, i.e., the play of *différance* or *supplément*. Much like the relationship between *Hermeneutik* and Ἑρμῆς, Heidegger interprets the ancient Greek λέγειν with the modern German *legen* precisely *through* an interlingual mutual explanation of similar sounds. While in modern German, he interprets (also through *différance* or *supplément*) *legen* as *liegen* and *lesen*, or more accurately, provides a phenomenological mutual explanation of the three German words:

To lay [*Legen*] means to bring to lie [*zum Liegen bringen*]. Thus, to lay is at the same time to place one thing beside another, to lay them together

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84   Martin Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)," in Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, p.60. [*GA*.7, S.214.]

85   Cf. Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, comps., *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, pp.1033-1034.

86   Cf. P. G. W. Glare, ed., *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p.1116.

87   Vgl. Friedrich Kluge und Elmar Seebold, *Etymologisches W*örterbuch der deutschen Sprache, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989, S.439.

88   Martin Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)," in Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, p.61. [*GA*.7, S.215.]

[*zusammenlegen*]. To lay is to gather (*lesen*). The lesen better known to us, namely, the reading of something written, remains but one sort of gathering, in the sense of bringing-together-into-lying-before [*zusammen-ins-vorliegen-bringen*], although it is indeed the predominant sort.[89] (Translator's original square bracket is converted to round bracket; the citer's additions remain in square brackets.)

Conveniently, Heidegger patches *lesen*, whose predominant sort is gathering, into the wholeness of relations (*Bewandtnisganzheit*) of picking grapes. He elaborates: "But gathering is more than mere amassing [*Anhäufen*]. To gathering belongs a collecting which brings under shelter [*das einholende Einbringen*]. Accommodation [*Unterbringen*] governs the sheltering; accommodation is in turn governed by safekeeping [*Verwahren*]."[90] After this, Heidegger phenomenologically relates *lesen* to *legen* and then to *liegen*: "However, *lesen* [to gather] thought in this way does not simply stand near *legen* [to lay]. Nor does the former simply accompany the latter. Rather, gathering is already included in laying. Every gathering is already a laying. Every laying is of itself gathering. Then what does 'to lay' mean? Laying brings to lie [*bringt zum Liegen*], in that it lets things lie together before us."[91]

Subsequently, Heidegger returns to λέγειν and argues: "However, λέγειν, to lay, by its letting-lie-together-before [*beisammen-vor-liegen-Lassen*] means just this, that whatever lies before us involves us and therefore concerns us."[92] At the same time, laying, as λέγειν, can "let what of itself lies together here before us…into its protection [*Hut*]," i.e., "[w]hat lies together before us is stored, laid

89   Martin Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)," in Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, p.61. [*GA*.7, S.215.]

90   Martin Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)," in Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, p.61. [*GA*.7, S.215.]

91   Martin Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)," in Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, p.62. [*GA*.7, S.216.]

92   Martin Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)," in Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, p.62. [*GA*.7, S.216.]

away, secured and deposited [*ein-*, *in sie weg-*, *in sie hin-gelegt*, *in sie hinter-legt*] in unconcealment [*Unverborgenheit*], and that means sheltered (*geborgen*) in unconcealment."[93] Accordingly, Heidegger states: "Λέγειν is to lay. Laying is the letting-lie-before—which is gathered into itself—of that which comes together into presence [*in sich gesammeltes vorliegen-Lassen des beisammen-Anwesenden*]."[94]

Through a series of rather cumbersome phenomenological articulations among a range of similar signifiers, Heidegger *authentically* brings "λέγειν/legen" and "saying and talking" together. He concludes:

Saying and talking occur essentially as the letting-lie-together-before of everything which, laid in unconcealment, comes to presence [*anwest*]. The original λέγειν, laying, unfolds itself early and in a manner ruling [*durchwaltenden*] everything unconcealed as saying and talking. Λέγειν as laying lets itself be overpowered [*überwältigen*] by the predominant [*vorwaltenden*] sense, but only in order to deposit the essence of saying and talking at the outset under the governance [*Walten*] of laying proper.[95]

Borrowing from Heidegger's interpretation of "λέγειν/legen" and "saying and talking," we can also develop a phenomenological understanding of the relationship of *quan* (诠), *ju* (具), and *gongzhi* (共置). Chinese characters' function of horizontal semantic combination is so powerful that the gap or disconnection between *quan* (诠) and *ju* (具) can be easily tackled by "*ju shuo shi li*" (具说事理 , to interpret the principle of matter fully). However, what seems effortless within one's own linguistic framework may seem disconnected or tricky in another. Equally, Heidegger's meticulous interpretation, viewed from the perspective of Chinese character culture, may seem cumbersome or even

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93   Martin Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)," in Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, pp.62-63. [*GA*.7, SS.216-217.]

94   Martin Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)," in Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, p.63. [*GA*.7, S.217.]

95   Martin Heidegger, "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)," in Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, p.63. [*GA*.7, S.217.]

fragmented. Nevertheless, precisely because of this, it has the merit of "patching up the gaps" (*bu feng que zhe*, 补缝阙者).

In the interlingual communication between Chinese and Western cultures, *quan* (诠), which means "selecting words and collecting them," can also be understood as letting the things gathered lay in unconcealment and come to presence. In an oversimplified sense, this is "manifesting meanings" (*xian le yi*, 显了义), by which the things gathered can be protected and sheltered. The character *quan* (全), which serves as both a phonetic and semantic component of *quan* (诠), can mean keeping whole or protecting. Thus, through this interlingual communication, we can further deepen our knowledge of the function of semantic combination in Chinese characters.

Interestingly, to highlight the wholeness of relations, Heidegger also painstakingly makes use of the function of the horizontal semantic combination of *legen* in the previously cited texts, such as "*nieder- und vorlegen*" (放 下 并 置于面前 , *fangxia bing zhi yu mianqian*), "*zusammenlegen*" (共置 , *gongzhi*), "*einlegen*" (纳 置 , *nazhi*), "*weglegen*" (搁 置 , *gezhi*), "*hinlegen*" (安 置 , *anzhi*), "*hinerlegen*" (存置 , *cunzhi*), and so on. Compared with *lesen*, Heidegger seemed to have a greater preference for *legen*, although the latter is not directly related to λέγειν in the existing etymology as the former.[96] Also tempted by similarity, Heidegger employs interlingual "deriving meaning from sound" (因声求义 , *yin sheng qiu yi*) to draw a connection between German *legen* and ancient Greek λέγειν. But it still implies the possibility of "explaining a character/ word solely by its written form" (望文生训 , *wang wen sheng xun*) since *légein*, the transcription of λέγειν, closely resembles *legen*. In addition, Heidegger's strong preference for *legen* may also relate to the German verb *auslegen* (to interpret) and its nominal form *Auslegung* (interpretation).

In the "Introduction" to *Being and Time*, Heidegger establishes a relationship

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96　Vgl. Friedrich Kluge und Elmar Seebold, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1989, SS.434;439.

between *Auslegung* and λόγος in terms of the phenomenology of *Dasein*:

> Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomeno-
> logical description as a method lies in *interpretation* [*Auslegung*].
> The *λόγος* of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of a
> *ἑρμηνεύειν*, through which the authentic meaning of Being, and also
> those basic structures of Being which Dasein itself possesses, are
> *made known* to Dasein's understanding of Being. The phenomenol-
> ogy of Dasein is a *hermeneutic* in the primordial signification of this
> word, where it designates this business of interpreting.[97]

Further, in the section "Understanding and Interpretation" (*Verstehen und Auslegung*), Heidegger fully exploits the German preposition "*aus*" (out) and its function of semantic combination. He states:

As understanding, Dasein projects [*entwirft*] its Being upon possibilities. This *Being-towards-possibilities* which understands is itself a potentiality-for-Being, and it is so because of the way these possibilities, as disclosed, exert their counter-thrust (Rückschlag) upon Dasein. The projecting [*Entwerfen*] of the understanding has its own possibility—that of developing itself (sich auszubilden). This development [*Ausbildung*] of the understanding we call "interpretation" [*Auslegung*]. In it the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by it. In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself. Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not arise from the former. Nor is interpretation the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out [*Ausarbeitung*] of possibilities projected [*entworfenen*] in understanding.[98] (Translator's original square brackets are converted to round

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97   Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2013, pp.61-62. [*GA*.2, S.50.]

98   Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2013, pp.188-189. [*GA*.2, S.197.]

brackets; the citer's additions remain in square brackets.)

In this way, Heidegger not only makes the semantic relationship of "*Aus-legung*" (interpretation), "*Aus-bildung*" (development), and "*Aus-arbeitung*" (working-out) obvious but also gets the implicit connection between "*Aus-legung*" and "*ent-wirft/Ent-werfen*" (to pro-ject/pro-jecting) or "*ent-worfenen*" (pro-jected) perceptible.

Generally speaking, for Heidegger, *Aus-legung* is the coming-out or manifesting of λόγος. It involves making everything laid out and present unconcealed. This unconcealment represents the "original meaning" of truth (ἀλήθεια). Truth is not a static noun but a dynamic act of disclosure (un-verbergen/ἀ-ληθεύειν). In this light, we can conclude that Heidegger's hermeneutics is the phenomenology of *Dasein* that engages in the activity of truth or the presence of Being. However, for Being (*Sein*) itself, in his article "Anaximander's Saying" („Der Spruch des Anaximander"), Heidegger emphasizes that "[t]he unconcealment of the [B]eing, the brightness granted it, darkens the light of [B]eing" because "[b]y revealing itself in the [B]eing, [B]eing withdraws."[99] Based on this, he brings Being, λόγος, and Ἀλήθεια together:

Yet since the dawn of thinking "[B]eing" names the presencing of what is present in the sense of the lighting-sheltering gathering [*der lichtend-bergenden Versammlung*] which is how the Λόγος is thought and named. The Λόγος (λέγειν, to gather or collect) is experienced out of Ἀλήθεια, the sheltering which discloses [*dem entbergenden Bergen*].[100]

In all fairness, Heidegger's arguments above do have the charm of meticulousness when first heard. However, over time, one will inevitably be burdened by their circuitousness.

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99   Martin Heidegger, "Anaximander's Saying," in Martin Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, eds. and trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.253. [*GA*.5, S.337.]

100   Martin Heidegger, "Anaximander's Saying," in Martin Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, eds. and trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.265. [*GA*.5, S.352.]

In Chinese, the character closest to the German *legen*, the ancient Greek λέγειν, and the Latin *legere* is *zhi* (置) in *gongzhi* (共 置). The most common meanings of this character are "to place, to lay out, and to set aside." But its original meaning and configuration are also intractable. *Shuowen Jiezi* states: "*Zhi* [置], [means] *she* [赦 , forgive/release], [is] from *wang* [网 , net] and *zhi* [直 , straight]."[101] However, *Shuowen Jiezi Xizhuan* states: "*Zhi* [置], [means] *she* [赦], [is] from *wang* [网], with the sound of *zhi* [直]. Minister Xu Kai [徐锴] said: '[It is] from *zhi* [直], which is not the phonetic component but conveys an associative meaning, and has the same meaning as *ba* [罢]. *Zhi* [置] implies *qu* [去 , letting go/removing something].'"[102]

According to the transmitted versions of *Shuowen Jiezi*, *zhi* (置) can be explained as either an associative compound character or as a phono-semantic compound character. Xu Kai's preference for the former rather than the latter may be related to the fact that it is more likely to reveal the "original meaning" of *zhi* (置). The association of *zhi* (直), which has the image of stretching, and *wang* (网) can handily convey the connotations of "forgiving" or "releasing." However, although the net that stretches can be the net for "releasing," it may also be the net waiting for "catching." Xu Hao's (徐 灏) *Shuowen Jiezi Zhu Jian* (说 文 解 字 注 笺 , *The Comments on the Annotations on Shuowen Jiezi*) holds that the original meaning of *zhi* (置) is "to enmesh and arrange, which is why the character contains the component *wang* [网]."[103] Therefore, *zhi* (置) encompasses semantic layers such as enmeshing, arranging, and displaying. This complexity leads to a situation where we cannot definitively determine whether "forgiving/releasing" or "enmeshing/arranging" is the original meaning of *zhi* (置). It is possible that the two original meanings of *zhi* (置) are coexistent, which also lays the groundwork for its "mutual explanation of antonym" (反义

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101 ［汉］许慎撰：《说文解字》，北京：中华书局 1978 年影印清同治十二年陈昌治刻本，第 158 页。

102 ［南唐］徐锴撰：《说文解字系传》，北京：中华书局 1987 年影印道光十九年重彫宋钞本，第 156 页。

103 ［清］徐灏撰：《说文解字注笺》卷 7 下，清光绪二十年初雕、民国四年补刊本，第 76 页 b。

互训，*fan yi hu xun*).

In *Annotations on Shuowen Jiezi*, Duan Yucai compromises the two explanations by saying that "*zhi* [直] also serves as a phonetic component." He further states: "*She* [赦], [means] *zhi* [置]. These two characters are used to explain each other. The original meaning of *zhi* [置] is forgiving and sending away, and it has been extended to mean establishing…. *The Rites of Zhou* [周礼] states: '*Fei* [废, dismissing] and *zhi* [置, appointing/establishing] are used to control the officials.' Here, *zhi* [置] is in contrast to *fei* [废]."[104] Below the entry for *fei* (废), Duan Yucai states: "In ancient times, *cun* [存, to preserve] is *zhi* [置], and *qi* [弃, to abandon] is *fei* [废]; also, *cun* [存] is *fei* [废], and *qi* [弃] is *zhi* [置]. *Gongyang Zhuan* [公羊传] states: 'Remove those that make sounds, and abandon those that make no sounds.' Zheng annotates: '*Fei* [废], [means] *zhi* [置].' … *Zuo Zhuan* [左传] records: 'Abandon the six passes.' Wang Su's [王肃] *The Family Sayings of Confucius* [孔子家语] records: 'Establish the six passes.' … That *fei* [废] can mean *zhi* [置] is similar to that *cu* [徂, to go] can mean *cun* [存, to remain], *ku* [苦, pain] can mean *kuai* [快, joy], *luan* [乱, disorder] can mean *zhi* [治, order], and *qu* [去, to discard] can mean *cang* [藏, to preserve]."[105]

It is evident that *zhi* (置) and *fei* (废) not only form an antonymic pair but also exemplify the phenomenon of "mutual explanation of antonym." Hence, the "vertical semantic shift" of Chinese characters can also spare Heidegger the trouble with roundabout and circuitous interpretations. Since the notion of *fei dun* (废顿, to abandon and collapse) is embedded within the concept of *gongzhi* (共置, to gather or lay together), the λóγος that lets the things gathered lay in unconcealment and come to presence at the ontic level can, at the ontological level, let Being "collapse" into the gathered things to shelter the Being of beings.

104　[汉]许慎撰、[清]段玉裁注：《说文解字注》，上海：上海古籍出版社 1981 年影印经韵楼藏版，第 356 页。

105　[汉]许慎撰、[清]段玉裁注：《说文解字注》，上海：上海古籍出版社 1981 年影印经韵楼藏版，第 445 页。

5. What Is Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue*

Since it is untenable that the character *quan*（诠）means *xun gu*（训诂，to gloss) in ancient Chinese, which character can directly relate to "glossing"? It must be *shi*（释，to explain). *Er Ya*, a glossary book included in the *Shi San Jing*（十三经，*Thirteen Canons*), employs *shi*（释）in each of its books, such as "*Shi Gu*"（释诂，Explaining Ancient Terms), "*Shi Yan*"（释言，Explaining Characters), and "*Shi Xun*"（释训，Explaining Phrases). Hao Yixing's（郝懿行）*Er Ya Yi Shu*（尔雅义疏，*Commentary on Er Ya*) states: "According to *Shuowen Jiezi*, *shi*［释］means '*jie*［解，to dissect], composed of the radical *bian*［采，to distinguish], implying the act of distinguishing things.' The primary purpose of *Er Ya* is to distinguish characters and explain their forms and pronunciations, which is why all its books are titled with *shi*［释］."[106]

Therefore, we are inclined to adopt "*quanshi xue*"（诠释学）as the Chinese translation of *Hermeneutik*, which is also a result of the synthesis and dialogue between "Ancients and Moderns, Chinese and Western." Since *quan*（诠）excels in *yi li*（义理，meanings and principles), while *shi*（释）emphasizes *xun gu*（训诂，gloss of characters and words), the term *quanshi*（诠释）can not only encompass the two intertwined traditions in ancient Chinese annotations and commentaries but also, in a broad comparative sense, resonate with the Western "Theological Hermeneutics" and "Philological Hermeneutics."

As to the term "Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue*"（*Jing Xue Quanshi Xue*, 经学诠释学），Yang Naiqiao（杨乃乔），a Chinese scholar known for his comparative studies of Chinese and Western hermeneutics, has long proposed the proposition that "Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue* is the mainstream of Chinese hermeneutics."[107] The genealogical construction of "*quan*, [means] *ju*"（诠，具也）across multiple

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106　［清］郝懿行撰：《尔雅义疏》，上海：上海古籍出版社 1983 年影印上海图书馆藏同治四年郝氏家刻本，第 1 页。

107　参见杨乃乔著：《中西学术文化交汇中的诠释学——论中国经学诠释学的建构》，《徐州师范大学学报》（哲学社会科学版）2009 年第 6 期，第 14-24 页。

interlingual boundaries is precisely based on the combination of Chinese *Jing Xue* and Western hermeneutics, as well as the theoretical considerations and research practices of "Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue*."

However, it is quite perplexing that many scholars engaged in traditional scholarship, such as *Jing Xue* (经 学), the history of *Jing Xue* (经 学 史), *Guo Xue* (国 学), and *Gu Wenzi Xue* (古 文 字 学) criticize or even mock "Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue*," which arises solely from a literal understanding. Consequently, some scholars argue that "Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue*" employs new methods or perspectives from contemporary Western academia to provide unconventional interpretations of Chinese Confucian Canons. In fact, the "Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue*," as we define it, harbors no "overreaching ambition" to reinterpret the Confucian Canons directly. One of its primary tasks is to make the hermeneutical premises of annotations on Confucian scriptures and their methodological presuppositions across successive dynasties manifest in a *disclosing* manner. Thus, from the theoretical perspective where Chinese and Western hermeneutics converge, "Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue*" is essentially a form of "meta-studies," which can be better described as "hermeneutical studies of exegetical traditions of Confucian scholarship." As this research approach deepens and becomes more widespread, it may even be designated more concisely as "Confucian Hermeneutics" (corresponding to Theological Hermeneutics).

If we regard the meaning-endowing processes of annotations on Confucian Canons across successive dynasties as signifieds awaiting further interpretation, the Western hermeneutical thoughts, such as Heidegger's ontological hermeneutics, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, and the related reflections—or even anti-hermeneutical ideas—of Paul Ricoeur, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, can offer valuable metalingual signifiers for interpretation. In essence, the reason why relevant scholars "turn a blind eye" to the uncomplicated theoretical claims of the Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue* may

lie deep in a mental closure and a limited perspective caused by their cultural fundamentalism. As a result, they arbitrarily argue that there is no possibility of convergence between Chinese *Jing Xue* and Western hermeneutics or other related academic fields.

In contrast, American scholar David B. Honey takes Chinese *Jing Xue* as a theoretical reference and places it with Western classical studies on the same academic platform for mutual interpretive research. Notably, in 2012, Honey published *Xifang Jing Xue Shi Gailun* (西方经学史概论, *An Introduction to the History of Western Jing Xue*), a book written in Chinese. By adopting the culturally specific term "Jing Xue" to designate the "classical studies" in the Western tradition, Honey performs a reversal in terminological direction that both deconstructs disciplinary identities and poses significant theoretical challenges. This act of cross-cultural naming offers critical insight for scholars in both Chinese and Western academia—especially for those in China who remain imaginatively dwell on the uniqueness of traditional Chinese scholarship.

In his book, Honey no other than begins with a humble challenge to the claim of a contemporary Chinese classical scholar, who asserts that "*Jing Xue* is a unique discipline of our country, with no ready-made theories available for reference."[108] Honey rebuts in a low-key manner:

In fact, Western *Jing Xue* equally has a long-standing history, tracing back to the ancient Alexandrian era (corresponding to the five-hundred-year period from the late Warring States period to the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty). Its research methods and learning attitudes are no less rigorous than those of the great scholars of the Qian-Jia School or the profound scholarship of contemporary Chinese experts in ancient texts. Moreover, the status and influence of its classical texts in Western civilization are comparable to those of the Four Books [四书, *Si Shu*] and Five Canons [五经, *Wu Jing*] in Chinese cultural history. It is essential to

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108　林庆彰著：《经学史研究的基本认识》，见于林庆彰编：《中国经学史论文选集》（上册），台北：文史哲出版社 1992 年版，第 2 页。

recognize that this distinguished academic tradition, with its rich achievements, should offer valuable references for the study of Chinese *Jing Xue*![109]

Besides communication of "Chinese and Western," Western scholarship can offer more references in the sense of "bridging (collecting) Ancients and Moderns" for traditional Chinese *Jing Xue*. Prominent Western scholars, such as Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Foucault, and Derrida, have strong ties to classical studies and Christian exegesis, each contributing uniquely to the modern transformation of ancient scholarship. Similarly, by engaging in a philosophical meta-dialogue with Chinese classical studies, mainly represented by *Jing Xue*, the Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue* likewise aims to promote the modernization of traditional Chinese scholarship.

Further, there is another question worthy of profound reflection: how many of the so-called *Jing Xue* by contemporary Chinese scholars are *genuine*? Or, borrowing the distinction made by Japanese scholar Hidezo Ikeda in his article "Jing Xue Zai Zhongguo Sixiang Li De Yiyi"（经学在中国思想里的意义, The Significance of *Jing Xue* in Chinese Thought), are they engaged in *Jing Xue* or studies of *Jing Xue*（经学之学, *Jing Xue zhi xue*）? According to Ikeda, *Jing Xue* is "a classical hermeneutics that seeks the truth of the Confucian Canons"— that is, it takes "the unfolding of the Six Canons [六 经, *Liu Jing*] as absolute truth" and "revering Confucian texts as sacred scriptures" as its foundational premises.[110] Hence, "researches conducted from the standpoint and methods of modern classical philology"（古 典 文 献 学, *Gudian Wenxian Xue*）, including bibliography（目 录 学, *Mulu Xue*）, editorial studies（版 本 学, *Banben Xue*）, textual criticism（校 勘 学, *Jiaokan Xue*）, etc., is not *Jing Xue* in the traditional sense but rather the studies of *Jing Xue*.[111] This distinction, on the one hand,

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109　［美］韩大伟著：《西方经学史概论》，上海：华东师范大学出版社 2012 年版，第 1 页。

110　［日］池田秀三撰、石立善译：《经学在中国思想里的意义》，见于彭林主编：《中国经学》（第十四辑），桂林：广西师范大学出版社 2014 年版，第 1 页。

111　参见［日］池田秀三撰、石立善译：《经学在中国思想里的意义》，见于彭林主编：《中国经学》（第十四辑），桂林：广西师范大学出版社 2014 年版，第 1-2 页。

positions *Jing Xue* as a classical hermeneutics, indirectly suggesting that Western classical studies or Christian exegesis can fully serve as references for Chinese *Jing Xue*. On the other hand, it raises the question: do scholars who no longer believe in the truth of the Six Canons actively contribute to the nourishment of traditional Chinese learning—or do they merely passively parasitize upon its legacy?

For a long time, perhaps this inertia and comfort of passive parasitism have not only prevented those scholars from reflecting on the variant relationship between their own academic research and traditional *Jing Xue* but also made them unwilling, reluctant, and seemingly unable to understand the modern transformation of Western classical scholarship and its internal relationship with hermeneutics. As such, their various misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue* seem to be precisely the *appropriate* responses generated by their implicit discursive hegemony and self-mystification. In this regard, we should instead express a "understandable sympathy"!

However, no matter how futile it may have seemed in the past, we must reiterate it now and may continue doing so in the future: as a form of meta-studies, the Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue* primarily and consistently interrogates not the "what" of scriptural annotations but the "how"—that is, the prerequisites that make interpretations of Confucian Canons possible, and the manipulative role of these prerequisites playing in meaning production and discourse formation. At the same time, what it transcends precisely is the research paradigm of the Qian-Jia School, which prides itself on scientific objectivity, empirical verification, and erudition, as well as the epistemological orientation underlying it.

Nevertheless, slightly different from Hidezo Ikeda, I argue that it is only after the establishment of the Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue* as a (meta-)study of *Jing Xue* that the "dimension of truth and belief" in the Six Canons can authentically recur. To borrow Paul Ricoeur's terms, for modern Chinese who have lost their "first naivety" (*première naïveté*)—having already completed the historical and

epistemological criticism of Confucian Scriptures—the Hermeneutics of *Jing Xue* may serve as ascending steps to attain "second naivety" (*second naïveté*) and thereby regain access to the "Great Way" in the Six Canons.[112]

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112 For the French concepts of "*première naïveté*" and "*second naïveté*," see Paul Ricoeur, *Finitude et culpabilité II: La Symbolique du mal*, Paris: Éditions Montaigne, 1960, p.326.